# DAs – Russia Relations – CPWW – Michigan Summer Debate Institutes 2022

# Notes

## How to Use this File

#### This file presents multiple different scenarios for Russian influence being good around the globe. Each DA argues that the plan’s increase in NATO cohesion/strength/unity trades off with the motivations behind [x] country/region relations with Russia which is bad.

#### The best way to use this file is to pick a region and use that section of the file for execution of the DA. There are *7 unique* relations scenarios for you to choose from. The “generic link” at the top of the file can be used with all of the scenarios.

## Acknowledgments/Contact Information

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# Central Europe-Russia Relations

## AFF Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Central Europe is taking hardline stances against Russia’s advances in Ukraine – turns the DA.

Tůma ’22 [Petr; visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations, previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC, posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah; 3-30-2022; "Central Europe leads the way in backing Ukraine. Here’s its game plan for what’s next."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-europe-leads-the-way-in-backing-ukraine-heres-its-game-plan-for-whats-next/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

As the West scrambles to maintain its united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) member states of Central and Eastern Europe have led the way as some of the continent’s loudest moral voices, sending arms and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while receiving streams of refugees.

But while neighboring Poland has perhaps been most visible—hosting both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in recent weeks while absorbing more than two million refugees—geography isn’t the only factor that determines who is a frontline state.

Take the Czech Republic, for example: Though nestled in the heart of Europe and away from the EU’s eastern border, its new government—together with the three Baltic countries, Poland, and the United Kingdom—spearheaded weapons delivery for Ukrainians when most EU member states were still hesitating. It is also now home to around 200,000 Ukrainian refugees.

So when Prime Minister Petr Fiala—along with his Polish and Slovenian counterparts, Mateusz Morawiecki and Janez Janša, respectively—traveled to Kyiv earlier this month to visit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it wasn’t just a powerful symbolic gesture. It was also a reflection of the region’s growing clout as a bridge between Brussels and Kyiv.

I spoke to Tomáš Pojar, Fiala’s chief foreign-affairs adviser, who accompanied the delegation to Kyiv. Below are six major takeaways I distilled from our conversation—which can be also read as a guideline for Europe’s next steps for engagement toward Ukraine.

Europe’s most important task is to continue providing Ukraine with military support, especially anti-tank and -aircraft weapons. Quantity and time matter here, and the coming weeks are likely to be decisive in the war. Ukrainians are committed, but can’t defeat the Russian military without Western support. Moscow needs to understand that Europe stands firmly behind Ukraine, ready to provide what is needed to wreck Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. If Ukraine is properly equipped with more anti-aircraft weaponry, it can even create something akin to its own version of a no-fly zone (without, of course, achieving NATO-aided air superiority). Indeed, something similar is already happening in parts of the country’s airspace, where Russian planes and helicopters dare not enter. Military support is critical to any prospects for meaningful negotiation; if Putin sees the West hesitating, he is likely to press his advantage on the battlefield for quite some time.

Europe must also continue pushing for stronger sanctions against the Kremlin, as efforts thus far seem to be quite effective. There are many options still available to the EU—not least in the field of energy—but as some member states call for restraint, the immediate task is to close loopholes, such as those facilitating sanctions evasion through third-party entities. And if needed, a sixth or even seventh sanctions package should be on the table. The key is to remember that continuing to do business with Russia enables the Kremlin to finance its war, thus creating a further burden that Europe will need to carry in the future—from accepting more refugees to paying for the stabilization and reconstruction of a devastated Ukraine.

Ukraine needs a plan to rebuild. Beyond the immediate humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian people, Europe must already start thinking about postwar reconstruction. Even if we still don’t have a clear picture of the final scale of the wreckage (or even the final geographic extent of the country), an aid package on the scale of the Marshall Plan will likely be needed. At their summit in Brussels, European leaders discussed an EU recovery fund for Ukraine similar to one set up in 2020 amid the pandemic. The EU should organize a donor conference with NATO and partners from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. France, as the head of the European Council through the end of June, should start laying the groundwork now, to be continued by the Czech Republic when it takes over the rotating presidency later this year. The success of the reconstruction could, in turn, showcase the value of liberal democracy—especially if a new Iron Curtain falls across Europe.

Kyiv must attain a meaningful framework for cooperation with the West, even though Ukraine’s entry into NATO seems unlikely. By now, it’s clear that Ukraine deserves EU candidacy; yet accession is a long process with many political and administrative hoops to jump through. While Ukrainians must understand that there are no shortcuts, Kyiv should still get something soon. That’s why the European Union needs to invent a fast-track special partnership for Ukraine as part of the bloc’s overall reinvention for the post-post-Cold War period. But this new format needs to be credible: The effects of a protracted EU accession process are already on display in the Western Balkans, where countries have started searching for alternative patrons while backsliding on their reforms.

Europe should offer asylum and humanitarian protection to Russian soldiers ready to surrender. Today, those who don’t want to fight their Ukrainian neighbors face three awful options: death, captivity in Ukraine, or a harsh prison sentence in Russia. Europe needs to offer an alternative, something similar to temporary humanitarian asylum. Such proposals would be more appealing to young soldiers than to officers, and even in the best-case scenario, the number who would avail themselves of the opportunity won’t be in the thousands. But even hundreds matter: It represents a powerful humanitarian gesture—a hand extended to a demoralized Russian military.

The positive impact of the three prime ministers’ trip to Kyiv underscores the importance of having a diplomatic presence on the ground. Any EU member states that withdrew their diplomatic corps from Ukraine should consider sending them back to Kyiv. This is not just a gesture of solidarity: I was stationed in war-torn Syria when Damascus was shelled daily between 2013-2015, and while diplomatic work was difficult, it was still possible—and very much worthwhile. The picture we got on the ground was different and far more nuanced from the mediated images the rest of the world was getting. In Syria, the West left for good political reasons; in Ukraine, it should return as soon as possible.

Is the East the new West?

As Ivan Kravstev and Stephen Holmes noted in their 2019 book The Light that Failed, Eastern Europe had been mostly imitating the West since 1989. In the post-Cold War period, the chief aim in the East was to become—politically, economically, and socially—the new West. It was a mostly one-way stream of influence.

But now that’s partly changing. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more relevant and inspiring, as their once-hardline stance on Russia is becoming increasingly mainstream.

Consider—in parallel to the Czech takeaways from Kyiv—Morawiecki’s recently published ten-point plan to “save” Ukraine. He focuses mainly on restrictive measures against Russia and proposes concrete steps that can be implemented almost immediately. They include, among other options, cutting off all Russian banks from SWIFT, blocking Russian ships from EU ports, suspending visas for all Russians, and a total ban on the export of technologies that can be used for war.

#### Ukraine has forced Central Europe to move with caution due to Russia’s aggression – they’re not moving closer to Russia.

Wigura & Kuisz ’22 [Karolina; sociologist and historian of ideas; Jaroslaw; a political analyst who is writing a book about Poland’s illiberal turn; 3-25-2022; "America Thinks the War Is About Ukraine. Russia’s Neighbors Disagree."; NYTimes; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/nato-russia-poland-europe.html; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

WARSAW — The symbolism was striking. On March 12, two weeks into Russia’s brutal bombardment of Ukraine, the leaders of France and Germany held a joint call with President Vladimir Putin. Just days later, three prime ministers from post-Communist Europe — Polish, Czech and Slovenian — traveled to Kyiv by train, despite the danger.

This divergence exposed a sharp divide in how Eastern and Western NATO member states view the war in Ukraine. For Western countries, not least the United States, the conflict is a disaster for the people of Ukraine — but one whose biggest danger is that it might spill over the Ukrainian border, setting off a global conflict.

For Central and Eastern European countries, it’s rather different. These neighbors of Russia tend to see the war not as a singular event but as a process. To these post-Soviet states, the invasion of Ukraine appears as a next step in a whole series of Russia’s nightmarish assaults on other countries, dating back to the ruthless attacks on Chechnya and the war with Georgia. To them, it seems foolhardy to assume Mr. Putin will stop at Ukraine. The danger is pressing and immediate.

While the West believes it must prevent World War III, the East thinks that, whatever the name given to the conflict, the war against liberal democratic values, institutions and lifestyles has already started. Both positions have merit. But Mr. Biden’s visit to Poland on Friday, a day after an emergency NATO summit, is a vital opportunity to forge a common understanding. Both sides, West and East, must present a united front against Russian aggression. The alternative is disarray and destruction.

At the root of the divide is history. Across centuries, Central and Eastern Europe have experienced the chilling effects of Russian imperialism. From czarist Russia to the Soviet Union, many countries through the region had their independence stamped out, their societies oppressed and their cultures marginalized. The trauma caused by the cyclical loss of territory and statehood is one of the most important elements of collective identity across the region.

Many Central and Eastern Europeans share an anxious sense of themselves, a nervous sovereignty. Their independence, restored with such great effort after 1989, could easily be lost again, as the 20th century proved all too painfully. In the tragic fate of Ukraine, and earlier of Chechnya and Georgia, they see not only their own traumatic past but also their possible future. “We will be next” is the phrase on many lips.

In this febrile atmosphere, NATO’s cautious steps look to many Central and Eastern Europeans like an echo of the phony war of 1939, when France and Britain undertook only limited military actions and did not save their eastern ally, Poland. At that time, too, horrible stories from bombed Warsaw and other cities filled the media. Yet the allies were determined not to be drawn in too deeply. Their military inaction temporarily delayed the spread of the war across the globe, but did not stop it.

#### NATO’s stationed permanent forces in Poland – prefer the Defense Secretary’s confirmation.

Strozewski 6-29 [Zoe; correspondent at Newsweek, citing Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; 6-29-2022; "U.S. establishing permanent troops in Poland amid fears of NATO-Russia war"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/us-establishing-permanent-troops-poland-amid-fears-nato-russia-war-1720384; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

The U.S. will station its first permanent forces on NATO's Eastern flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced Wednesday, as fears mount over a potential war between Russia and the 30-member alliance.

In a Twitter thread detailing several new commitments from U.S. President Joe Biden to bolster security in Europe, Austin said that the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters and a field support battalion will be stationed in Poland, which shares a border with non-NATO member Russia.

"These forces – the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO's Eastern Flank – will improve our command and control capabilities, interoperability with NATO, and management of prepositioned equipment," the Defense Department said in an accompanying fact sheet. "This action builds on the central role Poland has played in supporting NATO's combat credible deterrence and defense posture.”

Officials such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov have issued warnings in recent months against NATO expansion or perceived threats from the alliance that they say could endanger Russia's security, even as their own country continues its monthslong assault on Ukraine.

The new European security commitments from Biden that Austin announced on Wednesday, as well as NATO's invitation for Sweden and Finland to join its ranks, might further fuel Russia's ire and feelings of vulnerability against the alliance.

Putin has cited the prospect of NATO expansion as one of his reasons for justifying the war in Ukraine, though the move seemed to backfire when Sweden and Finland announced their intention to join the alliance after Russia's invasion. Russia has also warned against any direct NATO involvement in the war, and taken issue with the weapons and supplies some member countries have funneled into Ukraine.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a self-exiled Russian oligarch and Kremlin critic, warned during an interview with the France-headquartered television network Euronews last month that Putin could eventually wage war on NATO if Ukraine does not win the current war. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in a video address to NATO's summit in Madrid this week that Putin's aggression could spread beyond Ukraine's borders and into a NATO country within a year.

Despite the prospect of Russian aggression, some of NATO's recent actions indicate that the alliance is not shying from bolstering its own strength and assisting Ukraine.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Monday that the number of NATO troops on high readiness will increase more than sevenfold, the largest boost since the Cold War. He also said that NATO members will agree on a "strengthened assistance package" for Ukraine that includes anti-drone systems and secure communication.

### 2AC – China Thumper

#### China’s refusal to condemn Ukraine has accelerated Central Europe’s shift away from Russia.

McCarthy 6-30 [Simone; correspondent for China for CNN Digital Worldwide; 6-30-2022; "Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy"; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]

China’s concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. “China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a ‘systemic challenge’?” ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. “We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe.” But that rhetoric – blaming NATO for “disruption” in Europe – is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China “very quickly and very clearly lined itself up – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia,” while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging “democracies versus autocracies” narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. “In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift,” Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China’s economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation’s relations with Taiwan.

### 2AC – Cyber Thumper

#### NATO has already increased cybersecurity defense with Ukraine – thumps the DA.

Hakmeh & Naylor 3-7 [Joyce; a senior research fellow for the International Security Programme at Chatham House; Esther; a research analyst at the International Security Programme; 3-7-2022; "How the tech community has rallied to Ukraine’s cyber-defence"; Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/tech-community-rallied-ukraine-cyber-defence-eu-nato; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

In response to the Russian threat, there have been unprecedented efforts by private and government entities – and even individuals – to support Ukraine’s cyber resilience.

Responding to cyber-attacks and building national cyber resilience has never been – and will never be – the sole responsibility of governments. It requires a whole-of-society approach grounded in international cooperation efforts. For the first time since its inception, the EU rapid cyber response team, with capabilities to detect and respond to a variety of threats, and headed by Lithuania, was deployed to help defend against cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine. The Romanian national cybersecurity agency and a cybersecurity company called Bitdefender launched a public-private partnership to provide pro bono technical support and threat intelligence to Ukraine’s government, businesses and citizens for “as long as it is necessary”. NATO, which has been working for a number of years with Ukraine to increase its cyber defences, signed an agreement a few weeks before the invasion aimed at enhancing cyber cooperation with Ukraine.

The tech community leveraged its resources and knowledge to expose cyber-attacks and threats, and limit their spread. Shortly after WhisperGate, Microsoft shared technical analysis on the tools and techniques used in the attack and recommendations for those affected, and it continues to do so. The Slovakia-based cybersecurity firm ESET exposed the nefarious component of the HermeticWiper malware attacks in February, a malware designed with a component aimed at “wiping” the data out of systems. This timely technical analysis provided vital information to security experts and governments about the technical steps that should be put in place to mitigate and protect against hacks.

At the same time, efforts within Ukraine started to materialise. In what has been referred to as an unprecedented effort in the midst of an armed conflict, a whole “IT army” of volunteers was assembled in response to a request by the minister of digital transformation to support the country’s cyber-defence efforts, with reports of some even operating from within bomb shelters.

The solidarity shown so far is unprecedented and a testament to the benefits and potential of collective action across sectors and communities. As the war continues, this solidarity will become even more important.

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Ukraine is a turning point – Central Europe is using solidarity against Russia to distance themselves.

Brix 2-24 [Emil; the Director of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Vienna School of International Studies since 2017. After joining the Austrian diplomatic service in 1982, Mr. Brix worked as political secretary for the parliamentary group of the Austrian People’s Party. In 1986, he was appointed Head of Cabinet at the Ministry of Science and Research. From 1990 until 1995, he served as Austrian Consul General in Cracow, Poland. Subsequently, he was Director of the Austrian Cultural Institute in London, a position he held for four years. In 2002, Mr. Brix was appointed Director-General of Foreign Cultural Policy at the Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria. After serving five years as the Austrian Ambassador to the UK from 2010-15, he became Austrian Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2015. He is deputy chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe and member of the governing board of the Austrian Research Association. He holds a PhD from the University of Vienna and was awarded by the University of Drohobytsch, Ukraine and by the University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is an alumnus of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien and published numerous books and articles on Austrian and European history of the 19th and 20th century; 2-24-2022; "Interview with Ambassador Emil Brix"; Central European Network for Teaching and Research in Academic Liaison; https://central-network.eu/news-events/interview-with-ambassador-emil-brix/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]

Ambassador Brix, February 24, 2022 marked a change in Europe's relations with Russia. Before that, there was a period of economic integration and a hope for peaceful, prosperous neighbourly relations. This hope seems to have been destroyed. How do you see the further development of Europe's relations with Russia?

February 24 was a decisive turning point in the relations between Europe and Russia. The reason for this was that it marked the destruction of the hope that through close cooperation – between universities, civil society, but also economic partners – we could achieve a reasonable relationship between Russia and Europe. The war of aggression is proof that one side does not want that. Therefore, we have to assume that a rather impenetrable new wall is being created here in Europe between Russia and the rest of Europe. And this also raises the question: what does this mean for Central Europe, for those states that are relatively recent members of the European Union, that have had decades of experience with communism, with the Soviet Union? To what extent have these countries now become a region in Europe that can, on the one hand, help us to understand what's going on; and on the other hand, actually help us defend what European values are?

Apart from Central and Eastern Europe, you were also stationed in Russia as a diplomat, so can you assess what this ultimately means for Russia too?

The war is a decisive turning point for the Russian side as well. It is to be expected that the result of this war will be a weak, isolated Russia – both politically and economically, but also in terms of cultural and scientific links. It is true that many people are trying to maintain contacts as far as possible – and rightly so, as far as they are not politically driven – but this will only be partially successful, and we can expect to see even stronger nationalism on the Russian side. The leadership in the Kremlin in Moscow has decided to stake everything on this approach: isolation, military strength and strong control of its own population. Apparently, it accepts that this will bring disadvantages for the Russian population as a whole.

What is driving Russia, and are official Russia and the Russian population on the same page?

For years now, only the official depiction of what drives Russia and what its interests are has existed. Everything that we understand by the term “civil society” has been systematically dismantled and banned in recent years. If you ask me what arguments the official leadership uses, they see the West as an ideological enemy that no longer upholds anything that remains in terms of traditional values. And official Russia casts itself as the preserver of traditional values – family, religion, gender roles – and this is currently supported by a majority of the Russian population; the polls are quite clear on that. But this strong focus on a 'different civilization', a different worldview, is certainly not undisputed in Russia. Too much has happened since the Soviet Union in terms of modernization, opening up, and scientific contacts. Many people have emigrated in the wake of February 24, but many are still there. In order to avoid putting themselves in danger, they have to stand back and wait a bit to see what can be done publicly. However, we have opportunities to continue to work together on both sides here. Science and culture in particular are predestined to do this. In the long term, we need this contact – for historical, cultural, geographical and human reasons.

Does this mean that calls to break off academic relations and expel Russian cultural workers are actually the wrong way to go, and these channels should remain open?

We should maintain contacts on the cultural and scientific level as much as possible. However, certainly not with those who have been in solidarity with the Kremlin's policy explicitly and for a long time. I am very much in favour of us taking a clear position here. That is actually what everyone in Europe has done. Even we at the Diplomatic Academy have suspended official contact with the leading Russian academy. Nevertheless, we did not send the Russian students home.

Europe has shown itself to be quick and surprisingly united in its support of Ukraine. However, there are fault lines too now; there is disagreement even among the Visegrád states. Do you see the danger of a split due to these fault lines?

I would put it positively: it is actually a miracle that we have so far managed to get far-reaching sanctions packages against Russia, against this war, off the ground with relatively little discussion. It's a real miracle that we've managed to get arms financing through a resolution in the European Union. So there's a lot of positives here. I think that perceptions of Poland, for example, which have been very negative in recent years, are changing as we see how they deal with refugees from Ukraine. Or think about Lithuania. They were the first European state that not only recognized the energy dependence on Russian oil and gas, but also did something about it by building an LNG terminal in 2014 to provide exactly this alternative to Russian gas, and today they are a role model with that. And it’s a Central European state that has done this, not one of the rich Western European states. That means there are very many positive contributions that Central European states are making in this dangerous situation.

At the same time, however, we also have Central European states that tend to put on the brakes – and in some cases only because of economic considerations.

In a state of emergency, as this war is for a region like Central Europe, it is very understandable that you look at your national situation first. In Austria, we say that security of supply is the most important thing as far as energy issues are concerned. The Hungarians say that national patriotic unity must not be endangered and that we have to look after our minorities in Ukraine. So each of the Central European countries is directly affected, and most of them are more affected than Portugal, Spain or France. This means you have to understand that the situation is really different. I don't think that the political climate of opinion at the moment sees the Central European region as having a destructive role. On the contrary, I believe that people are now beginning to understand what the historical experience of these Central Europeans, who for decades were largely under the Soviet yoke, actually means. Because this didn’t just mean that they had to orient themselves symbolically towards the East, but that they had to orient themselves with pipelines and other energy supplies towards this direction and make themselves dependent. After all, this was not a voluntary decision in many states. And I think it is a positive contribution to European solidarity that these Central European states now have to engage much more intensively with the question of how they stand between the West and the East.

Does that mean that this situation also offers an opportunity?

Absolutely, it also offers an opportunity. I'm calling my presentation in the upcoming panel discussion, 'Is Russia again the tragedy of Central Europe?' because this title is from an essay by Milan Kundera from 1984. In this essay, he describes how dangerous Russia can be, but in the end it's not about Russia at all. It's about the fact that on the European side, nobody is willing to stand up for European values anymore; that the Central Europeans talk about Europe, especially the dissidents before the end of the Soviet Union, while in (editor’s note: Western) Europe these European values are no longer talked about.

# EU-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### The EU is pursuing a military strategy against Russia

EU Neighbors East 7/21 ("War in Ukraine: EU adopts ‘maintenance and alignment’ package against Russia", 7-21-2022, EU Neighbors East, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/war-in-ukraine-eu-adopts-maintenance-and-alignment-package-against-russia/, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the European Union today adopted new measures intended to tighten existing economic sanctions targeting Russia, improve their implementation, and strengthen their effectiveness.

This ‘maintenance and alignment’ package introduces a new prohibition to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, if it originates in Russia and it has been exported from Russia into the EU or to any third country after. This prohibition also covers jewelry.

The package also extends the list of controlled items, which may contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or the development of its defence and security sector, thereby reinforcing export controls on dual use and advanced technology.

Furthermore, the new measures extend the existing port access ban to locks to avoid the circumvention of sanctions and expand the scope of the prohibition on accepting deposits to include those from legal persons, entities or bodies established in third countries and majority-owned by Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia. The acceptance of deposits for non-prohibited cross-border trade will be subject to a prior authorisation by the national competent authorities.

The EU is also introducing a number of clarifications to existing measures, for instance in the field of public procurement, aviation and justice. For instance, technical assistance to Russia for aviation goods and technology will be allowed insofar as it is needed to safeguard the technical industrial standard setting work of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and the prohibition to enter into any transactions with Russian public entities will be slightly amended to ensure access to justice.

The EU also decided to extend the exemption from the prohibition to engage in transactions with certain state-owned entities as regards transactions for agricultural products and the transport of oil to third countries.

“None of the measures adopted today or earlier in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine target in any way the trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers, between third countries and Russia,” specifies the EU. “Similarly, EU measures do not prevent third countries and their nationals operating outside of the EU from purchasing pharmaceutical or medical products from Russia.”

According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the EU also “listed another major Russian Bank, Sberbank, and added further individuals involved in Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, such as military officials, the Night Wolves motorcycle club and disinformation actors”.

The Council also strengthened reporting requirements, putting the burden of declaring assets onto sanctioned people. This measure aims to facilitate the freezing of their assets in the EU.

“It sends a strong signal to Moscow: we will keep the pressure high for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commented on Twitter.

#### Putin can’t be trusted by his words

RFE 22 ("Putin Claims Russia Will ‘Guarantee’ Peaceful Export Of Ukrainian Grain", 6-3-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-grain/31882556.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied accusations his armed forces are blocking Ukrainian grain exports from the Black Sea and said his government would “guarantee" peaceful passage to ships leaving Ukraine's ports.

In an interview with Russian state television on June 3, Putin tried to put the blame on Ukraine for the trapped grain, saying Kyiv has mined the Black Sea and sunk vessels, preventing grain ships from leaving.

Ukraine carried out those steps after Russia launched a massive, unprovoked invasion by land and air on February 24, sparking fears it could seek to use its navy to storm the key Black Sea port of Odesa.

“I have already told all our colleagues many times: let them clear the mines and let the ships loaded with grain leave the ports. We guarantee their peaceful passage into international waters without any problems," Putin said.

The Russian president said his armed forces would not use the removal of mines “to launch any attacks [on Ukraine] from the sea.”

Glen Howard, a military analyst and president of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, said history shows Putin can’t be trusted to abide by his word.

The Kremlin repeatedly said Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine in the months leading up to its attack.

Howard said Ukraine now has anti-ship missile systems to defend its coast from invasion, including several delivered late last month by Denmark.

However, he said that grain ships leaving Ukrainian ports would have no escort if they set sail and thus would be “trusting the Russians at their word.”

Putin’s comments came after he met with Senegal's President Macky Sall, who is also the current head of the African Union, to discuss surging food prices.

Africa is heavily dependent on grain supplies from Russia and Ukraine and any disruptions could lead to social unrest on the continent.

The surge in food prices triggered by the conflict is already putting pressure on African governments and, in some countries, leading to protests.

Amid isolation from the West, Putin has been seeking to build his ties with African nations, many of whom have significant historical ties to Moscow dating back to Soviet times.

"President Putin has expressed to us his willingness to facilitate the export of Ukrainian cereals," Sall wrote on Twitter after meeting Putin.

The war has blocked as much as 25 million tons of Ukrainian grain at local ports, Howard said.

Putin sought to downplay the significance of the issue, saying Ukrainian grain only represents about 2.5 percent of total world grain production.

However, Ukrainian grain makes up a significant percentage of global exports and thus has outsided influence on world prices.

Putin also blamed the United States for rising food prices, saying the U.S. central bank stimulated inflation by printing too much money.

But wheat and corn prices have surged more than a quarter since Russia began massing its troops along Ukraine’s border in late October amid fears over grain exports while the United States has taken steps to curtail inflation by raising rates.

Russia also cut back on gas exports to Europe leading up to the war to gain leverage in talks with the West over Ukraine, driving prices to record highs. Natural gas is a key component in fertilizers used by farmers.

Putin suggested Ukraine could export grain via the Baltic Sea by shipping its products by rail through Belarus.

The West would have to lift sanctions against Belarus to do so.

Howard dismissed Putin’s suggestion as impractical, saying there is not nearly enough rail capacity to move Ukraine’s grain.

Rail is also more expensive and shipping from the Baltic ports to Africa would extend the sea route by thousands of miles.

Howard said time is running out to export the grain, adding it will begin to rot by July.

#### G20 summit failed and heightened tensions

RFE 22 ("G20 Diplomats Find No Common Ground As Western Countries Press Russia Over War In Ukraine", 7-9-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/g20-diplomats-gather-ukraine-war-global-inflation/31934288.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Diplomats from the world’s major industrialized nations failed on July 8 to find common ground over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how to deal with its impact on grain shipments and energy markets.

Russia’s foreign minister walked out of two sessions held by diplomats from the Group of 20 (G20) amid criticism of the war on Ukraine and amid calls for Russia to allow Kyiv to ship grain out to the world.

The July 8 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, was intended to lay the groundwork for a summit of G20 leaders later this year. The war and soaring global food and energy prices that have resulted from it topped the agenda.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov walked out of the morning meeting after German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock criticized Moscow for the war.

The vast majority of representatives at the meeting had condemned "Russia's brutal war of aggression," Baerbock said. "The appeal of all 19 states was very clear to Russia: This war must end."

Lavrov left the afternoon session before Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s scheduled virtual speech. Kuleba told ministers to "remember about 344 families who have lost their children when listening to Russian lies."

Lavrov told reporters the discussions "strayed almost immediately, as soon as they took the floor, to the frenzied criticism of the Russian Federation in connection with the situation in Ukraine."

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Lavrov was in the room when the meeting began and "about two hours later he began to hold bilateral talks with colleagues in the same forum in the next room."

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also condemned the Russian invasion.

"What we've heard today already is a strong chorus from around the world...about the need for the aggression to end," Blinken said.

During a closed-door session of officials, Blinken, who refused to hold one-on-one meetings with Lavrov, demanded Moscow allow grain shipments out of Ukraine.

"To our Russian colleagues: Ukraine is not your country. Its grain is not your grain. Why are you blocking the ports? You should let the grain out," Blinken said, according to a Western official present.

Zakharova said Lavrov was not present to hear Blinken's comments.

Members of the G20, whose countries account for about 80 percent of the world's economic output and about two-thirds of the world's population, had much to address as prices for meat, cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, and sugar have soared in recent months, due largely to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine is not a member of the G20 but is one of the world’s largest exporters of corn and sunflower oil, but Russia’s invasion halted most of that flow. Millions of tons of Ukrainian grain are stuck in silos, unable to be exported due to Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea.

Those disruptions threaten food supplies for many developing countries, especially in Africa.

But the meeting ended with no group photo taken nor a final communique issued as has been done in previous years. It also exposed further evidence of an East-West split driven by China and Russia on one side and the United States and Europe on the other.

In closing remarks, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said "participants expressed deep concern about the humanitarian impacts of the war" in Ukraine, and "some members expressed condemnation" of the invasion.

The meeting's agenda was also rocked by the resignation of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, which prompted his foreign secretary, Liz Truss, to depart Bali, and the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

While in Bali, Blinken will also seek to reopen dialogue with Beijing in talks on July 9 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Lavrov met Wang on July 7 to discuss Russia's invasion. The United States has condemned Beijing's support for Russia, and Blinken is expected to reiterate those warnings in talks with Wang.

### 2AC – Grain UQ

#### Huge barriers to grain deal---demining ports, persuading shippers, Russia already stole the grain, and substantial political divisions

Malsin et. Al 7/21 (Jared Malsin, William Mauldin and Alistair Macdonald; "Russia, Ukraine Face Thorny Issues to Complete, Implement Grain Deal", 7-21-2022, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-face-thorny-issues-to-complete-implement-grain-deal-11658408580, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

ISTANBUL—Negotiators, having reached the outlines of a deal for Ukraine to export grain from seaports amid the war with Russia, face challenges to getting it done, from the demining of ports to persuading shippers they can operate safely in a conflict zone.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and United Nations officials are expected to resume negotiations this week on a framework that would establish a grain export corridor in the Black Sea and potentially help alleviate a hunger crisis in some developing countries.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres planned to fly to Istanbul on Thursday evening, a U.N. spokesman said. The announcement of the trip raised hopes that a deal could be signed in the coming days, although the spokesman said the situation remained fluid.

Turkey’s and Russia’s presidents have sounded positive about the talks, as has a senior Ukrainian official. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose government has brokered the negotiations with the U.N., expressed optimism Wednesday that Russia and Ukraine would soon sign a deal.

Video Investigation: Russia Is Using a Secret Network to Steal Ukraine GrainPlay video: Video Investigation: Russia Is Using a Secret Network to Steal Ukraine Grain

While the war in Ukraine has upended the global supply of grain, a WSJ investigation reveals how Russia has quietly institutionalized the theft of hundreds of thousands of metric tons of it out of newly occupied areas of Ukraine and into Russian-allied countries in the Middle East. Photo illustration: Adele Morgan

“This week, we want to put this agreement into writing. And we wish that this plan will start to be implemented in the coming days,” Turkey’s state-run news agency quoted Mr. Erdogan as saying, a day after he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

An agreement could potentially free up about 18 million tons of wheat, corn and other supplies that war has prevented Ukraine from exporting, with the Russian invasion contributing to a rise in global food prices that U.S. officials said has sparked protests in 17 countries.

Substantial differences still need to be bridged among the warring parties, said Western officials. Should the governments reach a deal, privately owned freighters, insurers and sea crews might be reluctant to handle cargoes from Odessa and other war-zone ports, given the threat of further attacks, according to the officials, grain traders and other industry experts.

Ukraine faces the challenge of how to store or export its coming summer harvest.

Both Russia and Ukraine have laid sea mines in the Black Sea that pose a hazard to the movement of any ships in the area. Military delegations from Russia and Ukraine disagreed in the talks in recent weeks over how the demining would take place, a U.S. official said.

Ukraine has also increased the number of mines near its ports in recent weeks to defend against possible Russian attacks, the official said.

Safe passage for ships handling food cargoes and procedures for searching private vessels to ensure they aren’t carrying military equipment are among the issues to be resolved, officials said. Beyond that, Ukraine has demanded international security guarantees to prevent a Russian attack once mines are removed.

“You still have to get the parties to address the demining and the unfettered access and movement for the vessels themselves,” said the U.S. official.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and U.N. officials took part in grain-export talks in Istanbul earlier this month.PHOTO: TURKISH DEFENCE MINISTRY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russia is still seen as a potential spoiler, U.S. and other officials said, with Washington and Ankara trying to pressure the Kremlin to reach a deal and implement it.

“Turkey is pressing Russia to say this can’t be a zero nothing forever. And Russia, you’re not going to like the look if you make your own navy guys take back their own mines. That’s an admission of guilt,” the official said.

Mr. Putin, meeting Mr. Erdogan on Tuesday, thanked him for his mediation and said that the talks had made progress. “Not all issues, however, have been resolved. But the fact that we have moved forward is already good,” Mr. Putin said, according to remarks shown on Russian television.

Meanwhile, skeptical U.S. officials this week pointed to recent Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and grain-storage facilities as part of its war strategy.

“We are hoping for the best, but we have seen how Putin weaponizes food,” Jose Fernandez, the U.S. undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, said on Wednesday.

To nudge the talks forward, the U.S. and the European Union have in recent days clarified that financial sanctions against Russia don’t pertain to food and agricultural trade. Clearing a path for Russia’s food and fertilizer exports is part of the framework for a broader deal on grain exports put forward by Mr. Guterres.

Russia and Ukraine have laid sea mines in the Black Sea. Cargo ships wait for port access near Constanta, Romania.PHOTO: ANDREI PUNGOVSCHI/BLOOMBERG NEWS

The stakes of a potential agreement are high for the poorer nations that were Ukraine’s biggest customers. Much of the grain formerly exported via the Black Sea went to Asian countries and to Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat.

While grain prices have fallen from the highs they reached in the aftermath of the invasion, an increase in Ukrainian supply would ease pressure on prices.

Grain traders working in the region also expressed doubt that Russia would allow the grain exports while its military campaign continues to destroy Ukraine’s farms, roads, grain-storage facilities and other vital infrastructure necessary to export grain.

“To me, their objective is strangulation, somehow or another, of Ukraine. They’ve been stealing grain from the occupied areas,” said Jonathan Grange, a partner at Sunstone Brokers, an agricultural-commodities brokerage working in Ukraine and the Black Sea region.

Ukraine exported about two million metric tons of grain in June overland and via smaller ships leaving the Danube River into the Black Sea, according to Ukrainian officials. That maritime route opened up this month after Ukraine’s military retook strategic Snake Island from Russia, which occupied it soon after the invasion began in February.

In addition to up to 18 million tons of grain currently trapped in Ukraine as a result of the invasion, there is also the challenge of how to store or export the country’s coming summer harvest of an estimated 65 million tons, according to Mr. Grange.

“We are desperately looking at those negotiations,” said Ivan Kriuchkov, a director at Ukrainian agribusiness IMC. “If the ports don’t open, where do we put all our grain?”

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A truck unloads harvested wheat into a storage facility in Ukraine’s Donetsk region as the Russian invasion continues.PHOTO: AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

### 2AC – Internal Link Turn

#### Continued assistance to Ukraine is key---otherwise, Russia is emboldened to engage again, and the US will lose its diplomatic credibility

Ferguson 7/14 (Michael P. Ferguson, **Master of Science in Homeland Security** at San Diego State University; "Is imperialism negotiable?", 7-14-2022, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3559028-is-imperialism-negotiable/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Despite modest gains in east Ukraine, June was not a good month for Russia. Within a single week, European Union leaders offered Kyiv candidacy for membership, NATO reached an agreement to bring Sweden and Finland into the alliance and Great Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace, called for a 20 percent hike to his budget.

These historic developments are sure to rile Kremlin officials, but the future of Western support to Ukraine’s fight remains uncertain. As public interest in the war continues to dwindle, appeasing Russia’s extortionate demands could become more desirable. Such concessions would do more than disfigure Ukraine and impose devastating new realities on Western security institutions — they would declare to the world that imperialism is negotiable.

The debate over policy toward Ukraine has split experts into two camps. One side believes this war will end only when Russia is humiliated and exhausted militarily by a stream of Western arms packages. Until now, the Biden administration has pursued a strategy along these lines.

The other camp sees that option as far-fetched and too costly, and instead seeks diplomatic solutions to Russia’s war. Proposed remedies typically include allowing Russia to expand its borders into Ukraine and insisting that Kyiv amend its constitution by swearing never to join NATO. These conditions echo Moscow’s demands to the letter. In exchange, Russia might stop leveling Ukrainian cities. While this bargain is clearly an example of political extortion, it tends to moonlight under the cover of various euphemisms.

Among them are the terms “diplomacy,” “negotiations” and “realist international relations theory.” Veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger, scholars John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen and the New York Times editorial board have all argued for solutions in line with such euphemisms. Admittedly, as the war wears down the pocketbooks and attention spans of Western governments, even some Russia hawks have crept slowly into the appeasement camp. French President Emmanuel Macron, who only months ago reminded Putin slyly that France too was a nuclear power, has since said that Russia must not be humiliated in Ukraine.

These arguments have merit, but they miss the underlying question that appeasement poses to the world: If Ukraine is not worth saving from an overestimated and supposedly crumbling power, who is?

Such inquiries give shape to the type of global power competition described in U.S. strategic documents of the last two presidential administrations. The question is essential not only to resolving the war in Ukraine, but also to enabling the Biden administration’s integrated deterrence concept aimed at competing with powers such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — each of which jockey for leverage over the West.

For them, this jockeying process involves convincing observers that the U.S.-led security infrastructure established after the Cold War is in a twilight and can no longer sustain the existing international order. Fear plays a role in driving the point home.

Bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO might strengthen the alliance, but their desire to join after seven decades of neutrality is proof that nations external to NATO feel remarkably vulnerable. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political party won a super majority in Japan shortly after his July 8 assassination. He was perhaps most famous for his role as architect of the informal Quad alliance, what some consider the early phase of an Indo-Pacific NATO.

Aside from its paternalistic nature, appeasement fails to see the bigger picture. The idea of the free world as a conglomerate of nations that share liberal democratic values has animated political campaigns and national security policies for generations. This concept is rooted in the assumption that a rules-based international order prevents tyrants from doing exactly what Putin is doing. If the existing order cannot serve this purpose, it will suffer a severe blow to its credibility, especially in places where diplomats and military advisers such as myself work to assure foreign partners of our commitment to those principles.

Condoning Russia’s extortion further undermines the diplomatic process because it corrodes the legitimacy of existing treaties upon which many countries rely for materiel and political support. Clearly, Moscow has thrown out the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of 1997. But the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – bearing the signatures of the United States, Russia and United Kingdom – offered Western-backed security guarantees in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. If that parlay ultimately contributes to Ukraine’s disintegration, the West could face a credibility crisis in future diplomatic exchanges. Putin’s statements amplify this erosion of trust and nest it conveniently within the twilight narrative.

Realists want the West to shake off the war in Ukraine and focus on China, even as Belarusian president and Putin ally Alexander Lukashenko uses terms like “moral cleansing” to describe his vision of Europe’s future. But if Moscow can leverage its atrocities in Ukraine to bludgeon the free world into conciliation, it will signify a terrifying new beginning, not the end of a war.

As argued by Lt. Gen. James Dubik in these pages, forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table in a position of weakness is a recipe for disaster. Considering the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the ongoing use of genocidal tactics in Ukraine and the likelihood of a protracted insurgency in Russian-occupied territories, it is folly to assume that a sacrificial land offering will produce anything resembling stability.

Russia’s incursion presents to the world a troubling question that it must answer collectively: Is imperialism negotiable? Outside Ukraine, appeasement is an easy option because it creates the mirage of reconciliation while demanding nothing from those conjuring the illusion. On the other hand, generating the political will to explore new frameworks of burden sharing in support of Ukraine’s fight is much harder, but it is the only solution that clearly answers the question of how much imperialism Europe will tolerate this century.

If the answer is anything more than zero, then Moscow is at liberty to continue exploiting that ambiguity with its imperial interests. Public officials from Washington to Canberra must consider the long-term effects of Russia experiencing anything less than abject failure in Ukraine.

One calls to mind the 1805 “Plumb-pudding in danger” cartoon in which Napoleon Bonaparte and British Prime Minister William Pitt are depicted at a dinner table carving up the globe. A rising tide of authoritarianism over the last decade means the situation in Ukraine might determine *who* now gets a seat at that table. The United States and its allies spend billions each year persuading foreign partners that the West can help deter, and, if need be, stop modern Napoleons. Now is the time to prove it.

#### “Do not humiliate Russia” is a dumb idea and only bolsters Russia’s stance---we are past the point of return

Bento 7/15 (Xavier Bento, Programme Assistant at Friends of Europe; "Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security", 7-15-2022, Friends of Europe, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/dont-humiliate-russia-or-how-to-repeat-past-mistakes-at-the-cost-of-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Europe “must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels,” contesting that diplomacy must consistently be considered to address violent conflicts. Problematically, Macron simultaneously implied that negotiations could only take place if Russia can escape any form of shame or humiliation.

This gave rise to mixed reactions from other Western leaders. The United States Ambassador to the European Union, Mark Gitenstein, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin had “humiliated himself” by his conduct in the war and that the West wanted to see him defeated on the battlefields of Ukraine. Similarly, former US ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, claimed: “Putin will only negotiate when his army can’t keep marching forward, humiliated or not. Macron should focus on creating that condition.” The strongest European reactions came from the head of the Estonian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Marko Mihkelson, who stated that Macron was “still looking for ways to save war criminal Putin from humiliation,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis claimed Macron’s comments risked jeopardising the unity and security of the EU. Most notably, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said that allies should “better focus on how to put Russia in its place” and that “calls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it.”

By contrast, no reactions emerged from the German and Italian governments. Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Prime Minister Mario Draghi have previously hinted that resolving the conflict might require Ukraine to comply with Russian claims on certain territories. The four-point plan Draghi put forward in late May included a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine to clarify the future of Crimea and Donbas, which would, in this scenario, have almost complete autonomy. The Italian plan’s proximity to core Russian demands had led many to describe it as ‘classic appeasement’. For his part, Scholz has avoided non-committal or conflicting public announcements, refraining from affirming that Ukraine should recapture all lost territory, settling instead to comment that Putin could “not win” the war.

Calls to avoid Russia’s humiliation do not guarantee Europe’s security, but rather strengthen Russia and weaken the EU in the long run

The notion that the EU would be well advised to spare Russia prevails within the Union, not least among the leaders of three member states. This stance is not only disrespectful to Ukraine, but its strategic thinking is fundamentally erroneous and short-sighted, and even endangers Europe in the long term. Recent history reveals that indulging a Putin-led Kremlin is not only an impractical and reckless policy, but prone to placing many European nations in a position of dependency vis-à-vis Russia, creating divisions between EU member states, and thus, making the Union vulnerable to Putin’s intimidations and pressures. Calls to avoid Russia’s humiliation do not guarantee Europe’s security, but rather strengthen Russia and weaken the EU in the long run.

Macron’s posture relies on the precedent set by post-WWI Germany, a nation whose humiliation caused by the Versailles Treaty is often cited as a driving factor for its return to the battlefield 20 years later. The takeaway behind this is that deeply humiliated countries make for bad partners in peace. In this case, Macron’s phrase reflects an attempt to avoid ‘making things worse’ and antagonising Russia to an extent that would be critical for Western democracies.

However, Russia has undermined Western objectives even in the absence of any provocation or humiliation. The Russian management of the Syrian issue, even before its 2015 intervention, and its illegal annexation of Crimea are just two illustrations of this reality.

Moreover, Moscow has repeatedly shown its tendency to use compromise frameworks to leverage permanent interference in its neighbours’ affairs, rather than to seek conflict resolution. This was displayed most recently by the 2014-2015 Minsk agreements, signed as a means to reunite Ukraine, but distorted by the Kremlin to enshrine a process that would see Russian-aligned administrations emerge in Luhansk and Donetsk. Making concessions that could be used by an adversary to maximise its influence and further escalate destabilisation abroad is evidently not a clever diplomatic strategy – and not one that Europe should rely on.

Putin’s demands contradict the very nature of what cooperation with Europe might entail

Behind this appeasement rhetoric lies a flawed and ineffective strategy for peace that is based on the premise that Russia still adheres to the post-Cold War status quo and seeks to integrate the European and Western circle. While this could have been true in the 1990s and the beginning of Putin’s first term as president, the perspective for improved relations suffered from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the pro-Western democratic changes in Georgia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005, and Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008. Any prospects whatsoever ceased to exist after Putin’s 2012 re-election. Macron’s belief in a functioning appeasement strategy for Europe is effectively ten years outdated.

Nowadays, Putin’s demands contradict the very nature of what cooperation with Europe might entail, as made clear by recent draft agreements with the US and NATO. With demands such as NATO withdrawal from eastern Europe or officially closing the door on Ukraine’s membership, these documents reinforce the Russian president’s obsessions with the survival of his regime and the country’s geopolitical might. As seen with Ukraine, Putin is clearly willing to engage in hostile actions and even go to war when he believes these objectives are threatened or that Russia risks being humiliated. Here lies the core problem with trying to appease or indulge Putin’s Russia: as the protagonist, Putin defines the rules of the game. The practice of appeasement leaves Europe in a position of weakness, vulnerability and ill-preparedness.

Rather than passively react to Russia’s demands, the EU must fortify its voice and set its own terms to Russia, even if the Kremlin will reject them. The point is not to get Russia to accept European terms, it is to stop playing by Russian rules.

This will require European nations to considerably bolster their stance vis-à-vis Russia. This is already being done through NATO, which significantly reinforced its military posture on its eastern flank and prepares to welcome Sweden and Finland to its ranks. But the greatest change needs to occur within the European Union.

A sense of urgency alone cannot sustain a common sense of purpose and unify all member states over time

A more secure Europe can emerge only with an EU that is better prepared to deter – or face – Russia politically, economically and militarily. The Union will thus need to take actions in all three of these domains.

First, it is essential that the EU abandon ambiguity and adopt more unified rhetoric when addressing foreign policy issues. The relative speed at which the EU27 managed to agree on sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine constitutes grounds for hope; however, a sense of urgency alone cannot sustain a common sense of purpose and unify all member states over time. The EU now needs to prioritise its unity on the international stage.

Second, the EU must be willing and able to protect its interests and oppose any adversary seeking to undermine its objectives through the use of economic instruments. Although limited in scope, the EU has only just started to leverage gas imports to pressure Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, despite medium and long-term costs for the Union. The EU must hold its ground and further integrate economic instruments in its foreign policy toolbox to compel opponents. The fact that the EU needs Russian gas more than Russia needs European cash is not immutable.

Finally, the EU must endorse its willingness to militarily defend itself against any potential aggressor. While the military aspect of defence is and will remain in the hands of NATO, the EU and its member states should clearly express and demonstrate the will to take up arms if needed. Moreover, Europe must prove its determination and ability to defend itself alone; the US cannot, and will not, fight Russia in a full-scale war at a time when its greatest strategic threat comes from the Pacific. In its recent ‘The Case for EU Defense’ report, the Center for American Progress proposed that the EU must now “focus on developing and acquiring new capabilities that can enable Europe to act without the involvement of the U.S. military.” Accordingly, the report called for American leaders to stop opposing EU defence integration initiatives, maintaining that the current approach encouraged unnecessary redundancies among EU countries.

Only with a long-term, coordinated, intensified and complementary rearmament strategy will the EU component of NATO be able to play its part within the alliance

While many EU member states have already increased defence spending in reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these efforts will now need to be elevated to the EU level to ensure close coordination between member states – an objective also shared by NATO. Only with a long-term, coordinated, intensified and complementary rearmament strategy will the EU component of NATO be able to play its part within the alliance as an effective deterrent force against Russia.

Instead of debating if it should or shouldn’t humiliate a belligerent nuclear power, the EU must strengthen itself to keep Russia from ever crossing the line as it did with Ukraine not but six months ago. After all, as John Chipman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) put it: “Humiliation is a mild punishment for war crimes.”

#### Realism cannot solve the war now---negotiations will be rendered ineffective

Sood 7/11 (Rakesh Sood; "Ending the Ukraine war in an imperfect world", 7-11-2022, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ending-the-ukraine-war-in-an-imperfect-world/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

The war in Ukraine has been underway for over four months. What began as a European conflict has had global repercussions. Of course, Ukraine and its people have borne the maximum brunt. More than five million Ukrainians have left the country and over eight million are internally displaced. Rising casualties and large-scale destruction have set back the country by decades. Recent estimates for rebuilding the destroyed cities and infrastructure are as high as $750 billion.

During 2020-21, most economies that could afford to, provided generous financial support to its citizens in the form of direct payments and subsidised food to tide over the economic hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Supply chains suffered disruptions, aggravated by politics. Economic recovery has generated demand, creating inflationary pressures. Today, inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s. As these countries tighten money supply, fears of recession loom large. The war in Ukraine has aggravated the situation for the poorer countries by creating food and fertilizer shortages. The sharp surge in energy prices threatens the prospects of economic recovery. Prospects of collective global action to deal with these challenges appear remote, given growing tensions among major powers.

Inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s.

And so, the war grinds on, with no end in sight.

The inevitable conflict

It is a fact that Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and international law; it is equally true that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not an innocent bystander. In 2022, Russia is the guilty one but NATO’s folly was to forget that the cost of its expansion goes up as it gets closer to the Russian border. Its strategic error was in concluding that Russia was in terminal decline and adopting an ‘open door’ policy.

By 2005, 11 former East European and Baltic states had joined NATO. Addressing the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin described NATO’s decision of moving eastwards and deploying forces closer to Russian borders, “a serious provocation”. The warning was ignored. At the NATO summit in early 2008, the United States pushed for opening membership for Ukraine and Georgia. France and Germany, sensitive to Russian concerns, successfully blocked a time-frame for implementation. As a compromise, it was the worst of both worlds. It convinced Russia of NATO’s hostility and dangled prospects for Georgia and Ukraine that NATO could not fulfil.

NATO continued to strengthen its relationship with Ukraine by providing it training and equipment, formalising it in 2020 by making Ukraine a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner.

Later that year, Russia intervened in Georgia on the grounds of protecting the Russian minorities, taking over the neighbouring provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, following the Euromaidan protests in Kiev against President Viktor Yanukovych, who was pro-Russian, Russia annexed Crimea and pro-Russia separatists, assisted by Russian mercenaries, created autonomous regions in eastern Ukraine. The fuse, lit in 2008, was now smouldering.

Post-2014, NATO continued to strengthen its relationship with Ukraine by providing it training and equipment, formalising it in 2020 by making Ukraine a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner. The presence of warships from Britain and the United States began to increase in the Black Sea. In 2019, the United Kingdom entered into a cooperation agreement with Ukraine to develop two new naval ports, Ochakiv on the Black Sea and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov, a move that Russia saw as potentially threatening. The die was cast.

Liberalism trumps realism

Neither side wanted war. NATO members insist that Ukraine would not be joining NATO but remains unable to walk back from its 2008 statement. This would be seen as ‘appeasement’. In diplomacy, appeasement had long been accepted as an honourable route to ensuring peace, practised by the British since the mid-19th century in its dealings with European powers and especially the U.S. as it sought to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Neville Chamberlain too used appeasement to negotiate “peace in our times” in 1938 but Winston Churchill employed it to pillory him and the term never regained respectability thereafter.

An equivalent term surfaced — sensitivity for each other’s core interests — practised during the Cold War to prevent the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from getting into conflict. With the end of the Cold War, this became history. The liberal school, having vanquished the Marxist school of thought, was now convinced of the righteousness of its cause. If only the rest of the world could be made to see reason, democracy would flourish, free markets ensure prosperity and a western-led rule-based order prevail. The triumph of liberalism led the neo-con believers towards interventionism (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Colour Revolutions, Syria); others, attracted by the prospects of the Chinese and Russian markets, deluded themselves that economic growth would lead to political openings.

The realist school of thought cautioned against military interventions backed by a one-size-fits-all democratic prescription and the risks of excessive economic dependence on China but these voices were dismissed. Many U.S. scholars and strategic thinkers cautioned against NATO enlargement, warning that Russia may be weak but it would be reckless to ignore its security interests; they were charged with ‘appeasement’. Liberalism was upholding ‘moral values’; amoral realism was easy to reject as immoral.

The realist school of thought cautioned against military interventions backed by a one-size-fits-all democratic prescription and the risks of excessive economic dependence on China but these voices were dismissed.

French President Emmanuel Macron talked in February of the Finlandisation model as an option for Ukraine. Austrian neutrality imposed by the U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and France in 1955, enshrined in its constitution was mentioned. But these solutions had found acceptance in a war-weary Europe when politics was frozen by the Cold War. Finland had accepted limited sovereignty and just two Presidents guided it — Urho Kekkonen (1956-82) and Mauno Koivisto (1982-94) and both also served as Prime Ministers. In 2022, such stability is impossible with power politics in flux, rivalries sharpening and populism on the upswing.

In early March, in an interview to Russian media, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, declared that Ukraine was not pressing for NATO membership but wanted neutrality to be guaranteed; he even talked of autonomy for Donbas as a compromise and a period of 10 years for talks on Crimea. But that interview was soon forgotten.

How wars end

Wars often develop their own momentum and the Ukraine war is no exception. Russia possibly anticipated a short, sharp conflict, a collapse of the Kiev regime (perhaps similar to what happened in Kabul last August), and a lack of NATO cohesion. It has had to readjust its aims as it has settled down to a long and brutal war. The G-7, the European Union (EU) and NATO have displayed unusual cohesion and Ukrainians have shown exemplary grit and motivation. Russia is in a bind. Even its limited war aims of controlling Donbas and the Black Sea coast have been a slog. Finland and Sweden joining NATO will squeeze it further in the Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s ability to fight depends on how long western funds and military hardware keep flowing.

In a moral world, there is a right and wrong and Russia should be held to account. But in the real world, other factors come into play. A blame game or establishing the root cause will not help end the crisis. Eventually, talks will need to take place, between Ukraine and Russia and with NATO and the U.S. playing an outsize role behind the scenes. This means acknowledging Russia’s security interests in its neighbourhood.

The G-7, the European Union (EU) and NATO have displayed unusual cohesion and Ukrainians have shown exemplary grit and motivation.

The problem is that the war is now being cast in binaries — a battle between freedom and tyranny, between democracy and autocracy, a choice between rule-based order and brute force. This makes compromise difficult. And Russia cannot be defeated unless NATO wants to engage in a full-scale war.

The longer the war continues, the greater the suffering for the Ukrainians. The more territory Ukraine loses, the weaker will be its bargaining position at the table. And the longer the war continues, the greater the risk of an inadvertent escalation. History tells us that when faced with choices, major powers have a propensity to double down. The nuclear taboo has held since 1945; sane voices need to ensure that it is not breached. The sooner the war ceases, the better it is for Ukrainians, Russians and the world. It is an imperfect world, but we do not have another.

#### An “epic military win” is key---Russia’s on the brink of losing---BUT, giving up on military operations signals weakness to China over Taiwan, causing miscalc---current Western support is *slow*, but the AFF *speeds* it up

Corera 7/21 (Gordon Corera; "Russia about to run out of steam in Ukraine", 7/21/2022, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62259179, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russia will struggle to maintain its military campaign and Ukraine may be able to hit back, the head Britain's foreign intelligence service says.

MI6 chief Richard Moore said Russia had seen *"epic fails"* in its initial goals; removing Ukraine's president, capturing Kyiv and sowing disunity in the West.

He was speaking at the Aspen Security Forum, in a rare public appearance.

He called the invasion "the most egregious naked act of aggression... in Europe since the Second World War."

He said recent Russian gains were "tiny" and that Russia was "about to run out of steam".

"Our assessment is that the Russians will increasingly find it difficult to find manpower and materiel over the next few weeks," Mr Moore told the conference in Colorado. "They will have to pause in some way and that will give the Ukrainians the opportunity to strike back."

That view may be seen as optimistic and Ukraine's ability to counter-attack may well depend on greater supplies of Western weaponry, which its officials say has often been too slow in arriving.

The MI6 chief said some kind of battlefield success would be an "important reminder to the rest of Europe that this is a winnable campaign" - particularly ahead of a winter which was likely to see pressure on gas supplies.

"We are in for a tough time," he said. A further reason to maintain support to help the Ukrainians win, or "at least negotiate from a position of significant strength", he said, was because China's leader Xi Jinping was "watching like a hawk".

"There's no evidence that [President Vladimir] Putin is suffering from ill-health," he replied when asked, echoing comments from his US counterpart CIA Director William Burns at the Forum yesterday.

Around 400 Russian intelligence officers operating under cover have been expelled across Europe, he said, reducing Russia's ability to spy in the continent by half.

"Our door is always open," he said when it came to recruiting disaffected Russian officials to spy for Britain.

MI6 puts most effort on China

On China, he said MI6 had "never had any illusions whatsoever about Communist China".

He revealed MI6 now devoted more effort to China than to any other single subject - the effort in this field having just moved past that devoted to counter-terrorism.

He said it was "too early to tell" what lessons China would draw from Putin's actions in Ukraine, but there were lots of signs officials in Beijing were going into overdrive to work out what they thought. "It is quite difficult to read at the moment," he said.

He said it was "important" to remind China's leadership of how an invasion of Taiwan could go wrong. He said China's leadership underestimated US resolve and power and this might lead them to miscalculate. "I don't think it is inevitable," he said when asked about a major conflict.

On Iran, he said a nuclear deal was "absolutely on the table", but he was sceptical that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wanted to sign a deal.

For all the limitations, he said the previous deal was still the best means available to constrain the Iranian nuclear programme.

Asked if the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan last year made it harder to deal with threats, he acknowledged "this was a reverse for us when it happened and it is now more difficult". He said it would require finding "different ways" to deal with the Islamist terrorist threat, including working with partners who MI6 may not normally deal with.

Asked to reflect on the state of politics and violence in the United States, the MI6 chief sidestepped the question, but stressed his "huge affection" for the US, where he had studied and taken his first paid job as a teenager.

He corrected the interviewer to say this job had been as a beach attendant rather than a lifeguard. "I didn't have the body for that," he said to laughter from the audience.

#### China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, \*senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, \*\*fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB>

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

### 2AC – AT: Link

#### There is still room for NATO involvement---fears of escalation are unfounded---the US and NATO must adopt a policy of going just-behind crossing the redline

Altman 7/12 (Dan Altman; "The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine: NATO Can Do More Without Provoking Moscow", 7-12-2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-12/west-worries-too-much-about-escalation-ukraine, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

As the world looks on while Ukrainians fight for their lives and their freedom, many feel a burning desire to do more to support them. The problem is not a lack of forces or resources—it is fear of provoking a wider, perhaps nuclear, war with Russia. That fear is why U.S. President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders have consistently made clear that they will not intervene directly in the conflict, instead limiting their help to weapons, money, intelligence, and sanctions. As devastating as events in Ukraine are today, a nuclear war with Russia could kill more people than Ukraine’s entire population of roughly 44 million.

NATO leaders understand that they must walk this fine line between aiding Ukraine and risking war with Russia, but they have no theory of how to do it. The German and French governments hem and haw about whether to provide Ukraine with tanks. When Poland proposed a plan to transfer MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, the United States refused. U.S. Defense Department spokesperson John Kirby warned that it “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance” and therefore was not “tenable.” Yet the United States was already shipping Javelin antitank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Soon after, it began sending other weapons, including M777 howitzers and now HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. What is the difference? Those weapons do more to strengthen Ukraine’s combat power than MiG-29s, so the theory cannot be that Russia reacts more strongly to policies that do more harm to its interests. Why, then, missiles and artillery but not planes? The answer is that there is no answer. It is simply arbitrary.

NATO needs a strategy predicated on a theory of what it can do to aid Ukraine without widening the war to a direct conflict between it and Russia. Lessons from past crises point to the principles that should guide such a strategy. History shows that NATO would recklessly risk war only by crossing two Russian redlines: openly firing on Russian forces or deploying organized combat units under NATO-member flags into Ukraine. As long as NATO stops short of unmistakably crossing those lines, it can do more to help Ukraine at an acceptable risk of war.

Arms transfers and sanctions are both wholly consistent with this approach, so it is tempting to conclude that NATO members are doing all they can. They are not. They should build on current policies by dispensing with arbitrary limits on the types of conventional weapons they are providing Ukraine and expanding sanctions. Moreover, there is a third way to support Ukraine besides arms and sanctions—one that NATO is neglecting. It is time for NATO to encourage, organize, and equip its soldiers to volunteer to fight for Ukraine.

WALKING THE LINE

NATO should pursue a strategy of going as far as possible in Ukraine without plainly crossing Russia’s redlines—meaning refusing to openly attack Russian forces or send combat units into the country. The United States prevailed in the gravest crises of the Cold War by using this approach.

The Cold War’s first major showdown—the Berlin blockade of 1948–49—evinced this strategy. Although easily able to overwhelm U.S., British, and French troops in what would become West Berlin—an enclave deep inside Soviet-occupied East Germany—Soviet leader Josef Stalin did not seize the territory. To do so would have meant attacking those troops and thus provoking war. Instead, he imposed a blockade that choked off food and coal for two million Berliners. When Soviet troops blocked the roads and railways, Western leaders declined to attack them to reopen supply corridors. They resorted to an airlift instead, betting that Stalin would not attack defenseless transport aircraft. In the end, the vaunted Berlin airlift succeeded.

More than a decade later, American leaders decided to impose a blockade in lieu of launching an open attack—this time, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Angered by the Soviet Union’s attempt to sneak nuclear missiles into Cuba and Moscow’s lies about it, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was initially inclined to destroy the missiles with airstrikes. He and others around him, however, decided the risks were too great. Director of Central Intelligence John McCone deemed airstrikes too risky, writing in a memo that the “consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable ‘spilling of blood’ of Soviet military personnel.” He went on: “This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations.” Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev recognized this, too. According to a transcript of his remarks at a Soviet Presidium meeting, he feared that a U.S. attack would spark a war: “The tragic thing—they can attack, and we will respond. This could escalate into a large-scale war.” Kennedy chose neither to attack nor to accept the missiles as a fait accompli. He instead blockaded Cuba. In history’s gravest nuclear crisis, neither leader ordered an attack.

One attack did occur, however, when Soviet generals on the ground in Cuba decided to launch surface-to-air missiles to shoot down an American U-2 spy plane that had entered Cuban airspace. The attack killed U.S. Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., the pilot. Khrushchev’s fears of war peaked at that moment, and Moscow chastised the generals who carried out the attack. Before retaliating, Kennedy gave diplomacy one last chance. Shared fears about the implications of that shootdown led both sides to make concessions that helped resolve the crisis. In the end, the United States prevailed by taking risks without attacking.

The United States and the Soviet Union also engaged in proxy wars to avoid attacking each other directly and starting World War III. Both countries used large-scale arms shipments and sometimes soldiers fighting as volunteers to support local forces. Designed to avoid escalation, such covert wars are a common tactic in international politics. During the Korean War, Soviet pilots secretly fought in the Chinese air force. Soviet arms equipped North Vietnam, and Soviet soldiers even operated surface-to-air missile batteries against U.S. aircraft. Despite its losses, the United States decided to tolerate this Soviet participation rather than widen either war. The Soviets also allowed similar behavior from the United States on other battlefields. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, for example, the United States armed and financed the mujahideen resisting it. The Soviet Union eventually withdrew. As recently as 2018, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria unsuccessfully attacked U.S. forces operating alongside Kurdish forces. The United States did not treat it as an attack by the Russian government.

HOW FAR CAN NATO GO?

These examples underscore that pushing as far as possible without openly attacking is often the best way to compete while managing escalation risks. Creative policymaking can engineer options that achieve objectives without crossing redlines, thus preventing a wider war. Providing intelligence that Ukrainian forces use to kill Russian soldiers is not the same as NATO openly attacking Russia, nor is support in cyberspace. Lithuania’s restrictions on Russia’s use of its territory to ship goods to Kaliningrad meet this standard. Even enlarging NATO to include Finland and Sweden and deploying forces eastward to defend NATO members bordering Russia entail acceptable risks; such actions do not constitute an attack on Russia. In fact, there is good reason to think that NATO can do even more in Ukraine without provoking a wider war.

Some believe that Russia’s nuclear weapons and greater interests in Ukraine give it the advantage over NATO. This is mistaken. It is true that NATO leaders prioritize avoiding war with Russia over aiding Ukraine, but it is just as true that war with NATO would cost Russia far more than would abiding most forms of aid to Ukraine. After all, Russia is already struggling mightily against Ukraine. It cannot simultaneously win a conventional war with NATO. And no one would win a nuclear war.

Interests alone do not determine who has the advantage when both sides wish to avoid war. Instead, the advantage goes to the side that puts the other in the difficult position of choosing whether to escalate or accept a limited defeat. The side that must start the war is in the more difficult position. Russia has tolerated NATO’s sanctions and arming Ukraine for precisely that reason.

### 2AC – AT: Negotiations

#### Sanctions mean the U.S. and its allies are key to negotiations.

James M. Acton 3/10, Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 3/10/2022, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612>, RES

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

#### OR The U.S. isn’t going to be involved in negotiations.

Anurag Roushan 7/3, 7/3/2022, “Russia-Ukraine war | US Won't Press Ukraine To Engage In Peace Negotiations With Russia, Says John Kirby,” <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/us-wont-press-ukraine-to-engage-in-peace-negotiations-with-russia-says-john-kirby-articleshow.html>, RES

As the forces of Russia and Ukraine continue to engage in the ravaging war, US National Security Council (NSC) coordinator John Kirby stated that it's not Washington's role to press Kyiv to engage in peace talks with Moscow. “It’s time for the United States to continue to support Ukraine, and that’s what we are doing,” Kirby told a journalist on Fox News Sunday. He went on to say that the decision of whether and when to pursue a diplomatic settlement with Russia would always be made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. "President Zelenskyy gets to determine how victory is decided and when and on what terms. And what we’re going to do is continue to make sure that can succeed on the battlefield so that he can succeed at the table. But even President Zelenskyy will tell you that the time is not now for those discussions," the US NSC coordinator added. According to reports, Russian troops continue to make steady progress in Ukraine's eastern region and launched recent strikes on Kyiv and other cities in the country. Kirby also commended Ukrainian forces, saying that they have resisted Russian invaders far more successfully than anyone anticipated.

# Germany-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Germany is firmly committed to NATO again post-Ukraine invasion

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

But this turnaround in German foreign and security policy is not only beneficial to Europe, however. **The German Chancellor gave numerous pledges to US President Joe Biden who hoped to see Germany once again become this “model ally” after the Trump era**14. Once again, **Germany remains faithful to its principles, according to which “the cohesion of the European Union” is not incompatible with “the strength of NATO”.** Finally, in this volte-face vis-à-vis Russia, the strength of these changes must be for Olaf Scholz to use "as much diplomacy as possible", but "without being naive": it is the duty of the diplomacy "to keep the channels of discussion open". Diplomacy within the framework of international institutions has always been the guarantee of a democratic German foreign policy faithful to the principles of international organizations of collective security. At an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on March 1 , 2022, Foreign Minister Annalaena Baerbock, called on the international community to condemn outright the Russian aggression which “brutally attacked” the international order of peace. His speech reaffirms both the attachment to the principles of collective security and also shows that the Russian invasion marks the beginning of a new era for German diplomacy.

#### The Ukraine invasion was the last straw for Germany-Russia relations

Judy Dempsey ’22, is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe., “Russia’s Invasion Has Become a Watershed Moment for Germany”, Carnegie Europe, 3/3/22, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/03/russia-s-invasion-has-become-watershed-moment-for-germany-pub-86553

In just thirty minutes on Sunday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz put Germany on a radical new path. **In an extraordinary speech made during a special session of the German parliament on Sunday, Scholz ended the decades-long Ostpolitik of his Social Democratic Party** (SPD), **with immense ramifications for Europe and NATO**. Ostpolitik, or “eastern policy,” was forged in the early 1970s and intended to bring the Soviet Union politically and economically closer to Europe. One major component was building a gas pipeline, which the United States opposed, that West Germany hoped would bring confidence, stability, and predictability with the USSR. But Ostpolitik also meant that Germany’s ruling left wing had little sympathy for dissident movements in communist Eastern Europe, as these movements upset the Cold War status quo. **That belief in having a special relationship with Russia persisted even when President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014**. Germany’s powerful and influential business lobbies and pro-Russia left-wingers preferred to protect their interests with Russia, despite the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights, press freedom, and civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Thursday was the last straw for Scholz. He became convinced that Germany could no longer hedge its bets with Russia. In his speech to legislators, he laid out his vision for the country’s radical shift. Scholz said German defense spending would increase to 2 percent of gross domestic product, meeting the target set in 2014 during NATO’s summit in Wales. In addition, he announced a special 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund to provide much-needed basic equipment for the German armed forces. Scholz also said Germany would send weapons to Ukraine, ending a long-held policy that it would not deliver weapons to a conflict zone—hardly a plausible argument when Germany supplies weapons to authoritarian regimes. Finally, the country would move quickly to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. This means sharply cutting back its imports of Russian energy, which account for 55 percent of its gas imports. Apart from mapping out an ambitious new course for Germany, it was Scholz’s impassioned support for Ukraine that won him rapturous applause. “The twenty-fourth of February 2022 marks a watershed in the history of our continent,” he said. “With the attack on Ukraine, Russian President Putin has started a war of aggression in cold blood.” But **what does Scholz’s speech mean in practice?** First, Russia has lost one of its most important supporters in Europe, and Germany no longer sees Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through the prism of Russia. The time when the SPD tacitly acknowledged Russia’s sphere of influence over these sovereign, independent countries is over. In addition, Germany’s relations, particularly with Poland and the Baltic states, will markedly improve. These countries were highly critical and distrustful of Berlin’s commitment to Nord Stream 2, the $11 billion project to bring Russian gas directly to Europe that was finished and awaiting certification when Scholz halted it last week. **They, along with Ukraine, believed the pipeline would increase their vulnerability in terms of energy supplies and make Germany more dependent on Russia for its energy, pushing Germany to lean more Russia-friendly inside the EU and NATO**. Expect a thaw in relations. Scholz’s announcement to send weapons to Ukraine will also boost Germany’s standing in this part of Europe. Early last month, Germany faced widespread ridicule over its promise to supply Ukraine with 5,000 helmets, as other NATO members sent weapons, and it blocked Estonia’s move to send German-made weapons to Kyiv. This policy change ends the long-held suspicion that Berlin did not want to antagonize Russia. In addition, these decisions are a boost for NATO, with Germany now fully committed to the defense of Europe via the U.S.-led military alliance. The change shows that Germany no longer wants to be seen as a “free rider,” always relying on the United States to be Europe’s security guarantor without paying much for that security umbrella. Germany was repeatedly criticized for its unwillingness to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and this raised questions among allies if Germany was taking America’s protection for granted. One caveat to the increase in defense spending. The 100 billion euro “special fund” will kickstart a long overdue modernization of Germany’s armed forces. This is no joke: German soldiers were sent recently to the Baltic states lacking thermal underwear and other basic clothing. But spending more over the next few years will not be useful if it leads to more duplication of equipment among allies instead of focusing on adapting weapons systems to cyber attacks, modern aircraft fighters, and the changing nature of warfare. **Germany could now shape the future direction of EU foreign policy**. **The war in Ukraine has shown how the EU, pushed by Germany, needs a revamped “Eastern Partnership” policy that entails not only reducing Russian interference, especially by pro-Russian and local oligarchs in politics and the economy, but also strengthening the state institutions and combating corruption**. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—countries in which Russia has consistently meddled—want to join the EU, or failing that, some special relationship that will make their trade, economy, political, and social structures more closely tied to Europe. Scholz’s policy change indicates that Germany will no longer stand in the way of these changes, and could even lead them.

#### Germany and Russia relations low, they are threatening conflict now

Gorman 21 (Lucy has been a correspondent intern at the OWP since 2021. She is a junior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Psychology with a concentration in intelligence and international relations. Through her studies, she has developed a special interest in counter-terrorism, understanding the effects of war on populations, and regions of the Middle East and East Asia, November 3, 2021, “Germany And Russia Threaten Nuclear Arsenal Use Against Each Other”, <https://theowp.org/reports/germany-and-russia-threaten-nuclear-arsenal-use-against-each-other/>)

A protest note was handed to the German military by the Russian Defense Ministry in response to comments about deterring Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Germany especially had been coming out with statements about the pressing need to focus on Russia and reducing their nuclear capabilities, causing Russia to deliver the note. According to Reuters, Russia announced it would break off existing institutionalized contacts with NATO and the alliance agreed on a new plan to defend against any potential Russian attack. In an interview last Thursday, incumbent Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stated that “**We have to make it very clear to Russia that in the end** — and that is also the deterrent doctrine — **we are ready to use** such means [**nuclear weapons] so that it has a deterrent** effect beforehand and nobody gets the idea…” It is alarming that Germany is quick to state that they would put to use such weapons against Russia. The spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said that “there are level-headed people in the German leadership who can prevent their defence minister from recklessly wanting to test our armed forces.” It is unknown what the note from Russia stated, but it introduces a possible strife between the two nations over nuclear power. Janis Kluge, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, views the **current relationship between Berlin and Moscow as at an all-time low in post-Soviet history**. Germany-Russia relations have always been complicated with shifts from alliances to total warfare. The recent rise in negative relations stemmed from Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Within NATO, Germany was quick to impose multiple rounds of harsh sanctions against oil and other Russian industries. This **leaves Germany and Russia with unstable relations today**, meaning the note is **indicative of a possible major conflict between the two**. **Germany** has **made** an **aggressive threat towards Russia by stating that they would go as far as to use nuclear weapons in acts of deterrence**. This puts hundreds of millions of people at risk, as a deadly conflict would arise if Germany took such severe action. Germany’s initial comments and responses to the situation are intended to make Russia fearful of an attack and be cautious with their nuclear program. Weapons of mass destruction like the ones in question are obviously catastrophic, which pushes the common reaction to often be the use of them as it is the only way to counter such a massive threat. It is ironic that many nations choose to fight the problem with further use of the same weapons. However, nations may not see many alternatives to preventing the spread of nuclear power as they have to put forth a large enough and credible type of threat.

### 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

#### EU’s economy is declining now due to the Ukraine war

**Randow 22** (Jana Randow, ECB, economics & more at Bloomberg in Frankfurt, April 29, 2022, “Recession Threat Hangs Over Europe’s Fragile Economic Growth”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-29/recession-threat-hangs-over-europe-s-fragile-economic-growth>)

The euro **zone’s recovery from the pandemic is already showing signs of flagging even before it meets the economic storm clouds heading its way**. The **danger of a recession loomed into view** this week after Russia halted gas flows to Poland and Bulgaria, offering a foretaste of what the region might have in store. But even without the energy rationing such a move might provoke, the outlook looks ominous, underscored by weaker-than-expected growth reported Friday. European Weakness Inflation and war are weighing on economic output across the region European Central Bank Chief Economist Philip Lane insisted after the data that there’s “still a lot of momentum” in the recovery. Even so, European factories are signaling distress amid record inflation and a stubborn supply squeeze, aggravated by strict lockdowns in China. Meanwhile any catch-up on leisure and travel by Covid-liberated consumers may fade, not least as price increases eat into incomes. The coronavirus itself could return with a vengeance. **European financial markets reflect the gloom**, and economists at Morgan Stanley are among those seeing a “meaningful slowdown” in the second half. Corporate giants including Germany’s BASF SE are bracing for “serious disruptions,” and the OECD is warning that governments underestimate the impact of the war in Ukraine. What that suggests is that a year that began with the region extending its growth beyond pre-Covid levels, and offered the prospect of further tailwinds from European Union fiscal aid, now risks becoming another sorry episode in the single currency’s history of frustrating setbacks to growth. “The economy may show resilience in the coming quarters, but the problem is, what will happen at the end of the year?” said Anatoli Annenkov, an economist at Societe Generale SA in London. “We don’t know what will happen with wage growth and fiscal stimulus in 2023, there’s as much concern over China as there is over energy costs, and it’s easy to become pessimistic in light of the war.” Given the backdrop, Europe’s main equity benchmark has struggled to find its footing this year and widening bond spreads are feeding concerns that fragmentation will return to the 19-nation euro zone. First-quarter gross domestic product data didn’t offer cause for hope. The euro area grew only 0.2%, less than economists anticipated, hurt by a contraction in Italy, stagnation in France and weaker-than-expected growth in Spain. Indicators since then aren’t much better. Factory output and new orders are close to grinding to a halt, and business confidence across major economies has declined since the start of the year. That’s left services to shoulder the burden, undermined by waning consumer confidence. “**Manufacturing will be very weak** in the coming months and quite likely contract in the second quarter,” said Veronika Roharova, an economist at Credit Suisse International, who predicts euro-area growth of 2.8% this year. Still, “services are strong and household savings high, the labor market continues to look healthy and fiscal support is ensuring we won’t see a spending slump.” Lane of the ECB, interviewed by Bloomberg Television after the growth data, observed that it was “not very high admittedly, but still positive.” “We know from the near-time indicators, from what’s going on right now, that there still seems to be reasonable activity right now here at the end of April,” he added. Even so, **economic forecasts for this year are being slashed**. The International Monetary Fund cut 1.1 percentage point off its projection this month and now sees growth of 2.8%. The Institute of International Finance anticipates just 1% expansion. ECB officials acknowledged this month that growth risks have increased “substantially,” but they remain optimistic they can deliver an accelerated exit from crisis-era stimulus to combat inflation at a record 7.5% in data on Friday. Some policy makers are touting the first interest-rate increase since 2011 as soon as July, and even Russia’s complete halt of gas deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria and the prospect that euro-zone countries could also be shut off next doesn’t seems to deter them. While “this would definitely have a more negative, stronger immediate effect” Governing Council member Madis Muller said on Wednesday, he added that “the risk of an economic contraction in the euro area on the whole is more likely to be small.” The **effect in Germany, the region’s biggest economy, might be more significant**. First-quarter growth of 0.2% matched expectations, but the Bundesbank sees a risk of it shrinking nearly 2% this year if the war escalates and an embargo on Russian coal, oil and gas leads to restrictions on industry. Scores of companies including BMW AG and ThyssenKrupp AG have warned earnings could be affected, and utility Sniper SE said Wednesday that the economic toll of any stoppages in gas supplies would be “dramatic.” German Economy Minister Robert Habeck insisted this week that a full embargo on Russian oil would be “manageable.” Meanwhile the EU has been discussing new sanctions targeting the commodity, and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in French presidential elections may reinforce the bloc’s cohesion in addressing challenges together. The ECB also highlighted this month that fiscal measures to help households cope with surging inflation are helping. The prospect of such policies being extended, particularly in the event of a Russian energy shut-off, could provide a cushion for the economy, though at a cost to public finances. “Fiscal measures, including at EU level, will help shield the euro area from the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” ECB President Christine Lagarde told the IMF meetings last week. The central bank’s next policy decision is on June 9.

#### EU economy will collapse now regardless

Smith 22 (Elliot Smith is a Markets Reporter for CNBC in London. He joined the team in April 2019 after two and a half years with Citywire, where his reporting garnered the 2018 PressGazette British Journalism Award for Specialist Media (Finance), May 6, 2022, “We see a big recession in the making’: Top CEOs are fearing the worst in Europe”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/06/we-see-a-big-recession-in-the-making-top-ceos-fear-worst-in-europe.html>)

The **CEOs** of several European blue chip companies have told CNBC that they **see a significant recession coming down** the pike **in Europe**. The continent is particularly vulnerable to the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, associated economic sanctions and energy supply concerns, and economists have been downgrading growth forecasts for the euro zone in recent weeks. The euro zone faces concurrent **economic shocks from the war in Ukraine and a surge in food and energy prices exacerbated by the conflict**, along with a supply shock arising from China’s zero-Covid policy. That has **prompted concerns about “stagflation**” — an environment of low economic growth and high inflation — and eventual recession. “For sure, **we see a big recession in the mak**ing, but that’s exactly what we see — it’s in the making. There is still an overhanging demand because of the Covid crisis we just are about to leave,” said Stefan Hartung, CEO of German engineering and technology giant Bosch. “It’s still there and you see it heavily hitting us in China, but you see that in a lot of areas in the world, the demand of consumers has already even been increased in some areas.” In particular, Hartung noted lingering consumer demand for household appliances, power tools and vehicles, but suggested this would dissipate. “That means for a certain amount of time, this demand will still be there, even while we see the interest increase and we see the pricing increase, but at some point in time, it won’t be just a supply crisis, it will also be a demand crisis, and then for sure, **we are in a deep recession**,” he added. Inflation in the euro zone hit a record high of 7.5% in March. So far, the European Central Bank has remained more dovish than its peers, such as the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, both of which have begun hiking interest rates in a bid to rein in inflation. However, the ECB now expects to conclude net asset purchases under its APP (asset purchase program) in the third quarter, after which it will have room to begin monetary tightening, depending on the economic outlook. Berenberg Chief Economist Holger Schmieding said in a note Friday that near-term risks to economic growth are tilted to the downside in Europe. “Worsening Chinese lockdowns and cautious consumer spending in reaction to high energy and food prices could easily cause a temporary contraction in Eurozone GDP in Q2,” Schmieding said. “An immediate embargo on gas imports from Russia (highly unlikely) could turn that into a more serious recession. If the Fed gets it badly wrong and catapults the U.S. straight from boom to bust (unlikely but not fully impossible), such a recession could last well into next year. Yet Schmieding suggested that the euro zone is likely to enter recession only “if worse came to worst,” and that it isn’t a base expectation. Mark Branson, president of German financial regulator BaFin, said any military escalation in Ukraine or further energy supply disruption could pose serious risks to growth in Europe’s largest economy, with industrial sectors particularly vulnerable. “We’re already seeing that growth is down to around zero in many jurisdictions, including here, and it’s vulnerable. It’s also vulnerable from the ongoing Covid-related shocks,” he said. “**We’ve got inflation that’s going to need to be tackled**, and it’s going to need to be tackled now, so that’s a cocktail which is difficult for the economy.”

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Germany-Russian ties enable further Russian aggression – turns the DA

Constanze Stelzenmüller 6/21/22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations, “Merkel’s lack of regrets illustrates the fallacies of Germany’s Russia policy”, Brookings, 6/21/22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/21/merkels-lack-of-regrets-illustrates-the-fallacies-of-germanys-russia-policy/

Merkel left office of her own will, the only postwar chancellor to do so. She was popular at home and she was admired worldwide as one of Germany’s greatest postwar leaders. **Now, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 has cast a dark backwards shadow over her tenure**. Should she not have paid more attention to Putin’s repression of civil society and murders of political opponents in Russia? His poisoning of European politics by means of disinformation and corruption? His careful weaving of a continent-wide web of dependency on Russian gas? His stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad? **His increasingly evident imperial ambitions**? Should she not have seen a connection between the assault on Chechnya, with which Putin began his reign at the turn of the millennium, the war with Georgia in 2008 which resulted in that country’s dismemberment at Russian hands, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and eight years of proxy war in Donbas with 14,000 dead? But those who expected a self-critical examination of her record were disappointed. “I don’t see that I should now have to say, that was wrong. And I will therefore not apologize.” The literal English translation is clunky, but then so is Merkelish in the original German. The point of the former chancellor’s remarks to a Berlin theatre audience was clear enough: she had nothing to regret. Merkel contended that she always saw through Putin: “I always knew he wanted to destroy Europe.” **Yet she insisted** — in a phrase redolent of Bismarckian Realpolitik — **that it was important to maintain “a trade connection” with “the world’s second largest nuclear power.”** One commentator branded her comments as appeasement. A second seized on her description of Putin’s war as “a great tragedy” as evidence of fatalistic determinism. Others suggested that Merkel had simply been “the perfect chancellor for a system that had reached its limits.” None of these explanations is entirely off the mark. **What matters, however, is that Merkel’s signature approach to dealing with problems** — comprehending them fully, but choosing to manage rather than to resolve them — **was shared not just by her various coalition partners, but by the German business community and by voters**. It is in line with a longstanding postwar tradition of German leaders framing strategic choices as strategic constraints, thereby evading the appearance of agency or responsibility. As a recipe for grappling with an unchained totalitarian Russia — and with a future of permanent upheaval and disruption — it is not just futile but reckless.

# Greece-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Greece-Russia relations are low – tit-for-tat diplomat expulsions

Agence France-Presse AFP 6/28/22, is a French private international news agency headquartered in Paris, France, “Russia expels eight Greek diplomats”, Inquirer.net, 6/28/22, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1617997/russia-expels-eight-greek-diplomats

MOSCOW — Russia said Monday it was expelling eight Greek diplomats over a decision by Athens to deliver military equipment to Ukraine, where Moscow’s troops are fighting. Greece’s ambassador was summoned to the Russian foreign ministry and told the diplomats had eight days to leave the country, said a ministry statement. **The decision was “the direct consequence of unfriendly actions taken by the Greek authorities”, said the ministry**. The statement referred specifically to the delivery of weapons and military material to Ukraine and the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Greece. **The Greek foreign ministry expressed “profound regret” over the move, which it claimed was “baseless**”. Athens said the diplomats in question were “distinguished by their professionalism and high sense of responsibility (and) performed their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.” **Athens expelled 12 Russian diplomats in April, following Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine**, launched in late February. **Despite the two countries historical ties**, because of their shared Orthodox Christian religious heritage, Athens has joined other Western nations in condemning the Russian military operation. Western countries around the world have expelled several hundred Russian diplomats over the issue, and Russia has replied in kind.

#### Greece-Russia relations are at an all-time low–Ukraine proves

Kokkinidis 4-23 (Tasos Kokkinidis is a Greek Reporter journalist, 4-23-22, “Russia Warns Greece of Complete Breakdown in Relations”, Greek Reporter, <https://greekreporter.com/2022/04/23/russia-warns-greece-breakdown-relations//BVN> SC)

On Friday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that relations between the two nations that “share the same faith” have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria Zakharova, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.” The Russian official focused on Greece’s decision to declare 12 Russian officials “personae non-gratae,” on April 6 joining other European states that had taken similar steps in response to accusations of atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry said the decision was made in line with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. Russia’s embassy in Athens condemned Greece’s decision and warned of consequences. “We have strongly protested against this unjustified and hostile step which aims to further destroy our bilateral relations,” the Russian embassy announced in a statement. “We made clear that this action will not remain without consequences,” it further said. Grecian Delight supports Greece Breakdown of Greece, Russia relations despite historic ties In her social media post, Zakharova lamented the breakdown of relations between Russia and Greece and delved into the historic ties between the two countries. “There was a time when Russia helped Greece achieve independence and restore its statehood, and its first head was previously Russia’s foreign minister, but now this country’s diplomatic relations with Russia have been reduced to almost nothing,” Zakharova warned. She added that “this happened despite the fact that we share the same faith with the Greeks, the same traditions, and were always there to help our Greek friends.” “This is not so much an issue of Euro-Atlantic solidarity erasing the past, since it is a sovereign choice for every nation to decide whom to honor. Even worse, this deprives people and nations of their future, independence and the right to make sovereign choices,” Zakharova concluded. Diplomatic spat between Russia and Greece The Russian official has previously alleged that there is an orchestrated defamation of Russia in Greece following the ongoing war in Ukraine. “Senior officials in Athens find themselves making gross accusations against our country and its leadership,” Zakharova said. She added: “We noticed the unprecedented campaign launched in Greece to defame Russia’s policy. Senior officials in Athens allow themselves to make crude accusations against our country and its leadership [and] they are literally competing with their like-minded people. They hypocritically speak of an ‘unprovoked attack’ against Ukraine, for the first time since World War II, a ‘mass invasion’ and so on.” “Europe, including Greece, is fully integrated into the ranks of the Kiev regime’s advocates, while the anti-Russia hysteria cultivated by the authorities has reached a boiling point,” the Russian foreign ministry official said. Greece responded to the statements saying they are “unacceptable.” The spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou, noted the following: “The recent statements by the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the posts of the Russian embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable.”

#### Hostile statements have been exchanged – relations are low

Keep Greece Talking KGT ’22, Greek News in English, “Russian statements against Greece are “unacceptable”, says Foreign Ministry”, Keep Greece Talking, 3/7/22, https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2022/03/07/greece-russia-foreign-ministry-unacceptable-statements/

**The statement by the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry are “unacceptable” the Foreign Ministry in Athens said late on Sunday. Greece ’s Foreign Ministry responded to the unprecedented statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova who lashed out against the country for its stance on the war in Ukraine**. **Zakharova went to far to accuse the Greek government of “hypocrisy.”** – Statement is here. “Greek foreign policy is a principled policy and has always been based on complete respect for international law,” Zakharova’s counterpart in the Greek Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou said late on Sunday. “Greece contributes to, and is bound by, the decisions of international organizations it takes part in, such as, among others, the European Union and NATO,” he added. “A main concern of our country’s is to promote truth, on the basis of confirmed and irrefutable facts. Every effort to promote fake news and disinformation, aiming to mislead public opinion, is to be condemned, wherever it comes from. The recent statements by the spokeswoman for the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the (social media) posts of the Russian Embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable. **They do not comport with diplomatic practice, or the historical bonds connecting the Greek and Russian people**. Greece would like to see historical relations maintained and Russian behavior reflecting this,” the spokesman’s statement concluded.

#### Relations are dead

Tasos Kokkinidis ‘22, author at Greek Reporter, “What Has Russia Ever Done For Greece?”, GreekReporter.com, 4/28/22, https://greekreporter.com/2022/04/28/what-russia-ever-done-greece/

Recently, **Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that** relations between the two nations **that “share the same faith”** have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria **Zakharova**, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, **warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.”** Greece has joined its EU and NATO allies in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has sent military and humanitarian aid to Kyiv. **Relations reached a nadir when Greece expelled 12 Russian diplomats in early April.** However, recent opinion polls show that more than one out of two Greeks do not support the government’s policies. While refugees from Ukraine are welcomed with open arms in Greece, many Greeks reject the EU measures against Russia. According to one survey, more than 60 percent are decidedly opposed to arms shipments; they see culpability for the war in both Moscow and Kyiv. Greece is also concerned about the close ties between Turkey and Russia. Moscow has been providing Ankara with weapons, including the controversial S400 missile system and has been financing a nuclear power plant built in Turkey.

### 2AC – Sanctions Thumper

#### Greece struck down Russians ships in support of EU sanctions

RFERL 4-19 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a United States government funded organization that broadcasts and reports news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East where it says that "the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed", 4-19-22, “Greece Seizes Russian Tanker As Part Of EU Sanctions Over Ukraine”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <https://www.rferl.org/a/greece-russia-oil-tanker-seized/31810864.html//BVN> SC)

Greek authorities say they have seized a Russian oil tanker in the Aegean Sea as part of European Union sanctions imposed against Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The Russian-flagged Pegas, with 19 Russian crew members on board, was seized on April 19 near the coastal city of Karystos on the southern coast of the island of Evia. "It has been seized as part of EU sanctions," a shipping ministry official said. The coast guard said the seizure order concerned the ship itself and not its cargo. The vessel had experienced mechanical issues and was being escorted by a tug to the Peloponnese so that its cargo could be transferred to another ship. However, rough seas forced it to Karystos. The European Union, of which Greece is a member, has adopted a wide range of sanctions against Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, designed to cripple the Russian economy and pressure President Vladimir Putin into ending the war against Ukraine. The sanctions include import and export bans for a wide array of goods and a ban on access to EU ports by Russian-flagged ships.

### 2AC – Link Thumper

#### The link is non-unique – the US has already designated Greece as a important ally for security cooperation – draws them away from Russia

Edmond Y. Azadian 6/9/22, Senior editorial columnist EDMOND Y. AZADIAN is Advisor to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Museum in Detroit, Michigan; Advisor from the Diaspora to the Ministry of Culture in Armenia; member of the Republic of Armenia’s Academy of Sciences, “Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Triangle May be in the Offing”, The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, 6/9/22, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/06/09/armenia-greece-and-cyprus-triangle-may-be-in-the-offing/

More recently, Greece’s former socialist government had reduced the country into a basket case. **But Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ center-right New Democracy Party won a landslide election in 2019 and brought about a turnaround to the country’s economy and politics**. Although Turkey brags that it has the second strongest army after the US **in the NATO structure**, **Greece no longer lags** far **behind**. As Turkey continues to abuse its power and thus erode its standing in NATO, sympathy and support is shifting to Greece. **After Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken** in May, **a spokesperson called the two countries to resolve their problems through diplomacy and characterized Greece as “an irreplaceable ally and key ally of the United States in NATO,” while describing Turkey as “an important US partner and important ally in NATO.”** The characterizations are very subtle but clear enough to make clear their place in US foreign policy.

#### Greece is firmly in NATO’s camp

Dr. Jake Sotiriadis and John Sitilides ’22, \*is Director of the Center for Futures Intelligence at National Intelligence University and an Air Force Intelligence Officer, \*\*is a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors and diplomacy consultant to the State Department under a U.S. government contract., “U.S. and Greece Take Strategic Partnership to New Heights”, The National Interest, 5/16/22, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-greece-take-strategic-partnership-new-heights-202444

President Joe Biden is hosting Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in the Oval Office today, but this is no ordinary visit. The Biden-Mitsotakis meeting showcases Greece’s enhanced role as one of Washington’s closest allies, **with U.S.-Greece cooperation advancing American foreign policy objectives across Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa**. **Underscoring this historic visit will be Mitsotakis’ address to a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker** Nancy **Pelosi**—**a rare honor reserved for prominent international leaders**—and the first ever to Congress by a Greek prime minister. The timing of Mitsotakis’ visit comes at a critical moment, as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II rages in Ukraine. **Mitsotakis has burnished Greece’s Atlanticist credentials, voting to sanction Russia, sending weapons to Ukraine at considerable domestic political cost, and expelling Russian diplomats suspected of espionage**. Greece is a small country in terms of territory and population, yet its outsized impact on world history, culture, and civilization has shaped the values that define America’s constitutional republic. Thus, the joint session also celebrates the bicentennial of Greece’s 1821 declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the shared Western ideals of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Greece diplomatic relations have never been better. **Last week, Athens ratified the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, extending the current agreement by five years and solidifying and expanding the U.S. military presence in Greece under the Strategic Dialogue launched by President Donald Trump and continued by President Biden**. Greece’s northern port of Alexandroupolis, near the Dardanelles Straits entry to the Black Sea, is taking on a significant role in America’s forward defense footprint. The port is now a U.S. and NATO defense hub, hosting the largest-ever U.S. military shipment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, to deter and defend against regional aggression and augment NATO’s air, ground, and naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Alexandroupolis is also becoming a key energy hub in Europe, with a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility set to expand the gas supply grid for Europe and reduce reliance on Russian energy. **Greece’s heightened defense and energy roles posture Athens to defend the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean as well as to cooperate with NATO allies Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to constrain Russian naval and air forces in the Black Sea**. Greece is a strong advocate of European Union accession for Western Balkan countries, to boost the regional economy, advance democratic reforms, and combat malign Russian influence, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. **The United States greatly benefits from Greece’s network of strategic alliances beyond Europe’s borders**. Despite the lack of White House support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline project, **the 3+1 mechanism of Cyprus, Greece, Israel**—the three most democratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean—**along with the United States, represents a key cooperation framework in trade, technology, energy security, counterterrorism, and interconnectivity in an extremely volatile region**. Greece is strengthening ties to the Persian Gulf as well, hosting a Saudi Air Force exercise on Crete and a diplomatic gathering called the “Philia Forum,” including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Egypt and Cyprus. In 2021, Greece deployed a Patriot battery along with 130 troops for operations in Saudi Arabia, and concluded a military cooperation agreement with the UAE. Two major hurdles—the unresolved Cyprus problem and Turkey’s challenges of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea—present perilous dilemmas for the region. While the war in Ukraine highlights U.S. and NATO efforts to keep Turkey in the Western camp, heightened Turkish-Greek tensions are counterproductive for the security alliance. Ankara is seeking to mend fences in its immediate periphery, with Egypt, UAE, and Israel, but has been escalating direct overflights of Greek islands in recent weeks. Greece and Turkey have a long and troubled history, and nearly came to blows over maritime disputes in the Aegean in 2020, as they nearly did in 1976, 1987, and 1996. These sovereignty disputes are not Washington’s alone to help resolve. Greece’s key NATO allies, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also have important roles in resolving conflicts in Southern Europe. **The Ukraine crisis clearly emphasizes the criticality of continued stability, security, and cooperation on NATO’s southern flank**. **Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ visit presents an opportunity to elevate these regional and functional issues to Biden, the U.S. Congress, and the American public**. Washington can use its indispensable influence carefully to reinforce this key alliance and dial down regional tensions where solidarity within NATO is of the utmost importance, and where its seams are under greatest stress.

#### NATO and Greece are already working together now

ET 3-25 (The Economic Times is an Indian English-language business-focused daily newspaper. It is owned by The Times Group, 3-25-22, “Greece is a critical partner and NATO ally of the US, Blinken says”, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/greece-is-a-critical-partner-and-nato-ally-of-the-us-blinken-says/articleshow/90447832.cms?from=mdr//BVN> SC)

US Secretary of State, Anthony J. Blinken, acknowledged Greece’s role as a critical partner to the US. According to the US, Greece is a strategic partner and a crucial NATO ally. Blinken highlighted the historical ideals and democratic rights that bind the people of both countries on Greek Independence Day. Blinken also expressed gratitude to Greece for its response to the Ukraine conflict, which entered its 30th day on Friday.Greece and the US have enhanced cooperation across a range of vital topics. Last year, the relationship became more robust as the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement modification strengthened their defense and security cooperation for years to come. A proclamation honoring Greek Independence Day was issued by US President Joe Biden President Joe Biden also expressed his heartfelt gratitude towards the US and Greece partnership by signing a proclamation today. Biden emphasized Greece's leadership role in supporting peace and prosperity from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Western Balkans and the solid historical and current relations between Greece and the US. He also mentioned that Greece and the US are working together to address the problems of our day, including managing the climate catastrophe and diversifying the region's energy supplies, demonstrating that democracies work for people and combating the growing menace of authoritarianism. Blinken’s statement on Greek Independence Day Blinken pointed out the crucial importance of the partnership that both the countries share at the present moment of the Russian-Ukraine war. He also thanked Greece on behalf of the United States for its unwavering and unwavering support for Ukraine's people, authority, and democracy. Both Greece and the US have a stronger relationship, boosting security and prosperity for both the nations and the broader transatlantic connection. Lastly, Blinken stated that the US carries on to support Greece to strengthen and expand the strong and significant relationship governed by democratic values that originated in Greece.

### 2NC – AT: Oil Impact

#### The EU has already adopted large sanctions–they are working now–it hasn’t collapsed the economy

Borrell 7-16 (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, 7-16-22, “The sanctions against Russia are working”, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en//BVN> SC)

Since Russia brutally invaded Ukraine, the EU has adopted six packages of sanctions against Moscow – and we are about to finalise a “maintenance and alignment” package to clarify a number of provisions to strengthen legal certainty for operators and align the EU's sanctions with those of our allies and partners of the G7. Our measures already now target nearly 1,200 individuals and almost 100 entities in Russia as well as a significant number of sectors of the Russian economy. These sanctions were adopted in close coordination with the G7 member, and the fact that over forty other countries, including traditionally neutral countries, have also adopted them or taken similar measures enhances their effectiveness. Sanctions require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. Now, as the war drags on and the costs of energy rises, people in Europe and elsewhere ask whether these sanctions are working and/or whether the side effects are too great. Without underestimating different problems that could occur, including attempts made to bypass them, sanctions remain an important instrument of political action. But for sure we need to use them in a well targeted manner, and, above all, they require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. One of the main sanctions adopted is to stop buying 90% of EU oil supplies from Russia by the end of 2022, depriving Moscow of corresponding revenues. Yes, Russia is able to sell its oil to other markets, however this benefit is limited by the fact that Russia is forced to give high discounts on each barrel (Russian oil is sold at around $ 30 less than the global average). In addition, and this is perhaps the most important point, this gradual oil embargo and the scaling back of the import of gas, liberates Europe from its energy dependence on Russia. We have discussed this issue at the EU level for years, but now we are implementing it. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. This dependence probably played an important role in Putin's initial calculations in Ukraine. He may have believed that the EU would never sanction Russia seriously because it was too dependent on energy. This is one of his most important blunders when launching this war. Of course, this rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. We have to handle these consequences by reinforcing our internal solidarity and that is what we are doing. By breaking its energy dependence, in line with its climate ambition, the EU is learning that interdependence is not always a neutral instrument that is beneficial to all or a mean to guarantee peaceful international relations. The Ukraine war confirmed that interdependence can be used as a weapon. This rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. Are the sanctions really hurting the Russian economy? Some observers have argued they are not very effective because the exchange rate of the Russian currency is very high. But this interpretation is dubious. The exchange rate of the Rouble simply reflects the fact that Russia has a massive imbalance between the high volume of oil and gas exports and the parallel collapse of imports that has followed the sanctions. This trade surplus is not a sign of good economic health, especially for an economy like Russia. While exporting unprocessed raw materials, Russia must import many high-value products that it does not manufacture. For advanced technology products, Russia depends on Europe for more than 45%, the United States for 21% and China for only 11%. Russia may of course try to limit the effects of sanctions by substituting imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, import substitution is much more difficult to achieve. Russia will try to substitute imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, it is much more difficult to achieve. Sanctions on semiconductors imports for instance have a direct impact on Russian companies that produce consumer electronics, computers, airplanes, cars, or military equipment. In this field, which is obviously crucial in the war in Ukraine, sanctions limit Russia's capacity to produce precision missiles. On the ground, the Russian army is not making much use of this type of precision-guided missiles, not out of moderation, but out of necessity, as it does not have enough of them. In addition, the Russian air force has underperformed in Ukraine, also because it lacks precision-guided munitions. The automotive sector is another sector that is very much feeling the effects of the sanctions. Almost all foreign manufacturers have decided to withdraw from Russia and production was last May down by 97% compared with 2021. In addition, the few cars that Russian manufacturers still produce will not have airbags or automatic gearboxes. The Russian oil industry will suffer Russia as the world’s second largest oil producer is still earning large sums from selling its oil worldwide, notably to Asian customers and this helps it to keep financing the war. But over time, the Russian oil industry will suffer not only from the departure of foreign operators but also from its increasing difficulty in accessing sophisticated technologies such as horizontal drilling. In fact, the capacity of Russia to put new wells in production will be limited, which will lead to a drop in production. Finally, there is the airline industry, which plays a very important role in such a vast country. Around 700 of Russia's 1,100 civilian aircraft are of foreign origin. Russia will have to sacrifice a large part of its fleet, to find spare parts, so that the remaining aircrafts can fly. Even the Russian-produced aircrafts are dependent on technologies and material from western countries. As Alexander Morozov, the head of the research department of Bank of Russia recently wrote: ”The restrictions will lead to decreases in technological and engineering sophistication and in labour productivity in the sanctioned industries. Industries that rely on the most advanced foreign technologies and those with highly digitalized business processes risk being hit harder than others”. The list could go on with other important factors: the loss of access to financial markets; the disconnection of Russia with the major global research networks such as CERN for example; the massive brain drain of Russian elites with thousands of highly qualified professionals having left the country. The effects of such moves are not immediately visible. However, the scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. The scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. Moscow may claim that its relations with many countries remain intact. However, in reality, sanctions against Russia are also hurting its trade with non-sanctioning countries like China. The alternative offered by China to the Russian economy remains indeed limited. Although Beijing seems to want to make ideological gestures by siding with Moscow; refusing to condemn its invasion; or taking up the Russian narrative on the threat of NATO, it is overall rather careful regarding helping Russia circumvent the sanctions. While its imports from Russia have risen (mainly through greater energy imports), Chinese exports to Russia have decreased in proportions that are comparable to those of Western countries. Even if it does not admit it publicly, China is probably worried that this war could strengthen the position of the United States not only in Europe but also in Asia, with the strong involvement of countries such as Japan and South Korea in responding to Russia’s aggression. This is not exactly what China is aiming at. As a result, the latest Russian figures released by Bank of Russia show that transactions through the Russian payment system are down 7.2% in June compared to the first quarter of 2022. This is a real-time indicator of the important slowdown in the Russian economy. Of course the biggest question of all is this: will the sanctions and the real effects they have, lead Putin changing his strategic calculations and if so when? Here we need to be cautious and recognise that his actions have always been disconnected from economic considerations. Putin believes in the magical power of political voluntarism. However, this cannot last forever. Hence Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. We have no other choice. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Even if sanctions do not change the Russian trajectory in the short-term, that does not mean they are useless for they do affect sheer amount of resources it has to wage its war. Without sanctions, Russia would ‘have its cake and eat it’, as the expression goes. With sanctions, it will be forced to “choose between butter and guns” locking Putin in a vice that is gradually tightening. Finally, let me raise here as well the issue of the alleged or real impact of our sanctions on third countries, particularly African countries, which depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and fertilisers. Here it is very clear where responsibility lies for the food crisis. Our sanctions do not target Russian wheat or fertiliser exports. And it is until now Russia’s aggression and its blockade of the Black Sea that is preventing Ukraine from exporting its wheat. We hope however that the negotiations led by the Secretary General of the United Nations will enable this issue to be resolved quickly. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. There is a “battle of narratives” going on internationally over who is responsible global food and energy crisis as was clear at the last G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. But the real answer is to bring an end to the war and this can only be achieved by Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. I keep reminding all our international partners that respect for the territorial integrity of states and the non-use of force are not Western or European principles. They are the basis of all international law and Russia is blithely trampling on them. To accept such a violation would open the door to the law of the jungle on a global scale. Europe must become a real power The war in Ukraine makes clear that, contrary to what many thought rather naively just a few years ago, economic interdependence does not automatically guarantee peaceful international relations. This is why Europe must become a real power, as I have been calling for since the beginning of my mandate. Faced with the invasion of Ukraine, we have moved from debates to concrete actions, showing that, when provoked, Europe can respond. Since we do not want to go to war with Russia, economic sanctions and the support of Ukraine are at the core of this response. And our sanctions are beginning to have an effect and will do so even more in the months to come.

# Iran-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Russia Iran relations decreasing now

Fathollah-Nejad 22 (Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is an Associate Fellow and the author of the Iran in Focus brief at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB), March 21, 2022, “Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations”, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-invasion-ukraine-and-nature-iranian-russian-relations)

However, the Islamic Republic’s pro-Kremlin narrative has not remained unchallenged. There have been important cracks even with some major media outlets and especially so across Iranian society. Those seeking to bring forth counter-narratives, however, face daunting obstacles. Russian tutelage over Iranian media reporting — a demonstration of neo-colonialism After the Russian embassy in Tehran condemned a report by the Tasnim News Agency — which, curiously, is affiliated with the pro-Moscow IRGC — as “fake news” for characterizing Putin’s operation in Ukraine as an “invasion,” the report was taken offline and replaced with one that closely mirrors the Kremlin’s official wording. In another instance, the embassy lashed out against an Iranian reformist daily that criticized Russia for threatening to derail the JCPOA negotiations. Later, on March 9, Russia’s ambassador to Tehran held a press conference urging Iranian media not to use the terms “war” or “invasion” in their coverage, a blatant interference in Iranian domestic affairs that has stoked anger in the country. These cases bring to mind similar interventions by China’s embassy in Iran against unfavorable media reporting and official statements, most recently about China’s alleged stationing of security forces in Iran to protect its investment interests. Earlier, in the pandemic’s first year, the Chinese embassy had stepped in to silence skeptics of Beijing’s official COVID-19 statistics. Such interference by ambassadors from both non-Western great powers into Iran’s domestic affairs reflects the nature of Tehran’s relations with Russia and China, upon which Iran’s entire “look to the East” geopolitical strategy depends. A yawning power gap results in chronic Iranian weakness and dependency, raising the specter of a neo-feudal arrangement whereby Tehran’s leadership follows the diktats of their masters in Moscow and Beijing. However, Russia’s newfound pariah status may improve Iran’s standing in bilateral ties, but only if Tehran plays its cards carefully and doesn’t degenerate into a power that simply follows Putin’s whims. At its core, Iran’s “look East” policy has as its goal not only economic development and political support against Western pressure, but the very survival of a regime whose domestic support has been hollowed out. Moscow and Beijing hold up this teetering regime from the outside. Hence, the Islamic Republic finds itself granting concessions to Russian or Chinese interests, and sometimes even trying to anticipate their apparent desires. In this context, fears associated with Iran’s already signed 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China are mirrored by those over the planned 20-year deal with Russia. Both long-term agreements, which are branded as “strategic,” lack transparency and have therefore stoked wild speculation. Theories abound that the Islamic Republic’s leadership is potentially selling out the country only to cement its own power amid unprecedented domestic and international pressures with the help of these non-Western great powers and their U.N. Security Council vetoes. As a core pillar of the deal with Russia, which Iran’s foreign ministry said last December was “almost finalized,” Moscow will reportedly protect Tehran’s interests at the U.N. Security Council and with the JCPOA, and finally provide it with advanced military hardware (such as the S-400 missile defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets) in exchange for Russia obtaining favorable deals on Iran’s oil and gas fields. Coinciding with this 20-year agreement is another reported deal between the two countries from last fall, granting Russian companies the largest share in the recently discovered giant Chalous gas field in Iran’s Caspian Sea territory (followed by Chinese companies and only then Iranian ones, more concretely those affiliated with the IRGC). For Russia, Iran has been a true trump card, enabling it to leverage the “Iranian threat” vis-à-vis the West while also benefitting economically from ties with Tehran, including re-energizing its nuclear industry through its prominent role in Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, if Iran normalizes relations with the West, that would likely sharply curtail Russia’s influence. In other words, a Western-oriented Iran would constitute a larger threat to Moscow’s interests than a “nuclear Iran.” Societal and geopolitical concerns The nature and possible ramifications of Iran’s relationship with Russia are hotly debated across Iranian society. Iranian fears emerge from the unevenness of bilateral ties and the perceived disconnect between national and regime interests vis-à-vis Russia — or China for that matter. These concerns about Russia are rooted in both history and geopolitical realities. The bitter memories of the 1908 bombardment of Iran’s parliament by the Russia-led Persian Cossack Brigade meant to torpedo the Constitutional Revolution as well as the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion linger in the collective consciousness as a reminder of the Kremlin’s willingness to run roughshod over Iran in pursuit of its interests. Moreover, some elements of Iran’s foreign policy community see Russia as flip-flopping when it comes to the perennial conflict between Iran and the West. For them, Moscow is an opportunistic actor focused solely on achieving its own aims, even if it means contradicting official rhetoric that lambasts the U.S. and the West, including its propensity to keep the flame of the Iran-West conflict alive as a means to maximize Moscow’s standing in that conflictual triangular relationship. Among other things, Russia is accused of breaking arms supply contracts, sabotaging the JCPOA process, and maintaining close ties with Iran’s regional foes (Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, there are also broader concerns within society over the long-term alliance the Iranian regime hopes to forge with the like-minded autocracies of Russia and China. Although sparsely attended, anti-war protests in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Tehran, complete with chants of marg bar Putin (“death to Putin”), illustrate the anti-Moscow sentiment. Such reservations about Russia also pertain to China. Yet there is no organized opposition to the regime’s deepening of ties with either. The interests of the regime and those of Iranian society clash over Russia. While the former sees Russia as a formidable military-security guarantor of its stability and survival, the latter sees in such support a looming threat to democratic aspirations. Pro-democracy Iranians fear that Moscow could boost their country’s repressive apparatus, and potentially even deploy its military if popular protests ever were to imperil the regime — as witnessed in both Syria and Kazakhstan. The relationship between the Russian and Iranian regimes is also strengthened by their parallels: Both are petro-states with mafia-style ruling classes helmed by all-powerful autocrats unafraid of using a heavy hand and guided by their nostalgia for the glory days of empires past.

#### Relations are impossible---centuries of bad blood.

Michael Rubin 21, Senior Fellow at AEI, 12/2/2021, “Why the Russia-Iran Alliance Will Backfire,” <https://www.aei.org/articles/why-the-russia-iran-alliance-will-backfire/>, RES

For all its talk of leading a “resistance front,” the Islamic Republic of Iran has historically had few allies. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led his revolutionaries, “Neither East nor West but Islamic Republic” was a foundational slogan of the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini also described the United States and Russia as being “two blades of the same scissors.”[1] He meant it: While the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran symbolized the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward the United States and its European allies, Khomeini was equally distrustful of the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc satellites. Iran’s isolation was cemented when every Arab state with the exception of Syria sided with Iraq during their 1980-88 war. Tehran’s ties with Damascus have remained tight, but Syria’s influence is limited inside the Middle East and its diplomatic weight is nonexistent outside it. The Iranian authorities sought to cultivate African states and were able to purchase the occasional vote on an international body, but Tehran’s declining resources limited its success. Today, that isolation is over. Whereas Khomeini was wary lest Moscow take advantage of Iran’s vulnerability, Ali Khamenei, who succeeded him in 1989, took the risk to align with Russia in pursuit of a broader, anti-U.S. agenda. In this, he found success. But, the question for Iranians is, at what cost? Distrust Centuries in the Making Iranian leaders were aware of Russia by the fifteenth century as many European traders, seeking to bypass the Ottoman Empire on their overland journeys into Asia, traveled to Persia via Moscow.[2] Iranians worried little about their distant neighbors to the north: they viewed Russians as illiterate and cultureless peasants and worried more about Uzbeks and the independent khanates of the Central Asian steppes, which occasionally raided into Iran. The Russians were equally uninterested in the Persians. Russian tsar Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) withdrew Russian troops from the Caspian coast, believing Iranian forces posed little threat. Such neglect would be short-lived. In 1796, Catherine the Great (r. 1762-96) sent a 50,000-strong force into the North Caucasus, which at that time was part of Iran. Her death gave Iran a reprieve and saved it from what might have been a far greater conquest. As the Russians conquered more territory in Asia, British leaders grew increasingly concerned about the security of India and, by extension, Iran, which had become the only power separating Russia from India. It was this fear that led London to first dispatch an ambassador to the shah’s court in 1800. Both the Russians and the French soon followed suit. It was not long before disputes between Moscow and Tehran resumed. Between 1804 and 1813, Iranian and Russian forces fought repeatedly in the Caucasus. The campaigns drained the shah’s treasury and, in the end, the Russians forced him to cede much of what today is the Republic of Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia. Resentment simmered, and in 1826, the Iranians attacked Russia to regain what the shah had lost. The gamble failed and, in the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai, the shah ceded much of Armenia. For Iranians, these were not some peripheral territories but rather part of the heartland and the territory over which the crown prince would serve as governor. In 1829, an Iranian mob sacked the Russian embassy in Tehran, slaughtering its thirty-seven Russian diplomats.[3] Russia became a favorite bogeyman for both nationalists and clergy, and Russians in Iran suffered occasional mob violence over subsequent decades.[4] Still, the Russian government saw commerce as a source of influence and encouraged businessmen to move to Iran. Russian leaders, like their British competitors, also sought to further their leverage with debt traps: Both powers would tempt the shah with loans to fund his profligate lifestyle but then call in their extortionate terms, the expense of which the shah would often pass to his subjects. This led to a pattern in which the Russian rulers often successfully wooed the shah while Iranian public opinion continued to harden against them. The Twentieth-century Unrest The twentieth century’s first decade was a time of upheaval in both Russia and Iran. First, the Japanese defeated Russia in war, ending Moscow’s image of invincibility. Then, first in St. Petersburg and then across Iran, revolutionaries successfully won parliamentary constraints on monarchies. In Iran, Muzaffar ad-Din Shah conceded to a constitution just five days before his death. His successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, was unhappy to see what he believed to be his birthright diluted before he could even take power. He quickly turned to Russia where Tsar Nicholas II also sought to preserve his traditional powers. As the shah worked to consolidate power and roll back reforms, the Russian government worked to cement its position in Iran. Mohammed Ali Shah continued the practice of tax farming and office selling, so Russian officials used their resources to ensure pro-Russian candidates won advantageous positions, much to the chagrin of more liberal Iranian nationalists in Tehran’s new parliament.[5] The 1907 Anglo-Russian convention divided Iran into spheres of British and Russian influence. An editorial cartoon of the time depicts the Russian bear sitting on Persia while the English lion looks on. The Russians were blatant in their disrespect of Iranian sovereignty. On August 31, 1907, they shocked Tehran when they, alongside their British competitors, unveiled the Anglo-Russian convention, which effectively divided Iran into spheres of influence. While Iranians remained angry at both parties for the affront, Britain’s main strategic interest at the time was its telegraph lines across southern Iran, and so it ceded most major Iranian population centers to Russian control. Here, the Russians chafed the population more, using proxies and pressure to force closure of Iran’s nascent civil society groups and secret societies and to impose broader censorship on Iran’s exploding newspaper scene. Even the affront of Russia’s secret agreement to divide Iran into different spheres did not break Mohammed Ali Shah’s tilt toward Russia. His ambitions were too great and so, in December 1907, he made his move against the Iranian Constitutionalists. His guards—and a detachment of Russian-trained Persian Cossacks—surrounded the parliament. Parliament’s supporters resisted and soon Iran was on the brink of civil war. As far as most Iranians were concerned, there were two sides: nationalists and Russian-backed Iranian autocrats. That perception largely remains unchanged today. Fighting erupted in July 1909 and, within two weeks, it was over. The shah and his retinue fled first to the Russian embassy and then to Russia itself. The nationalists put Ahmad, the shah’s 12-year-old son, on the throne. Still, Mohammed Ali Shah did not give up. Two years later and, again with Russian support, he invaded Iran from the north. He failed, but the episode cemented Russia’s reputation inside Iran as hostile to Iranian sovereignty. During World War I, Russian forces drove south from the Caspian Sea reaching as far south as Qom. By 1917, British and Russian forces had occupied most of Iran, leaving Mohammed Ali Shah as a titular leader. Grievance went beyond bruised pride. During World War I, Iran lost more than 20 percent of its population to disease, famine, and violence. The Soviets refused to leave Iranian territory following World War II and supported Kurdish separatism in Iran during the Cold War. The Bolshevik Revolution did not change the uneven power dynamic. In 1921, the Soviet authorities imposed a new treaty on Iran in which Moscow renounced earlier agreements and forgave Russian loans but also reserved the right to intervene should Iran host forces intent on interfering in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities interpreted this literally and, within weeks, Moscow demanded that Tehran expel all Germans. Joseph Stalin would repeatedly cite the treaty to justify Soviet ultimatums. Indeed, Stalin used the 1921 Treaty to justify invading Iran two decades later. The Soviets were not alone in this—British and subsequently U.S. forces took part—but the Red Army was alone in refusing to leave Iranian territory when World War II ended. Not only did Iranian Azerbaijan become the focal point of the first Cold War crisis, but Moscow also sought to encourage and support Kurdish separatism in the Mahabad Republic in northwestern Iran. This was high among the reasons why Tehran tripled its defense budget in the next decade and joined the Baghdad Pact.[6] The direct military threat the Iranians felt from across their 1,100-mile border with the Soviet Union loomed large in public consciousness through the remainder of the Cold War. This is why, even as Ayatollah Khomeini railed against “The Great Satan” America during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, his suspicions and those of his followers remained just as deep toward the Soviet Union.[7] Reconsidering Russia While Khomeini did not waiver on his connection to Russia throughout the Iran-Iraq war despite the isolation Tehran faced, toward the end of his life, he signaled Iran’s need not to treat the Soviet Union with the same enmity as the regime did the United States. In May 2009, Hassan Rouhani, at the time a former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and a member of the Assembly of Experts, spoke at a roundtable on “Iran, Russia, and the West.”[8] While critical of Moscow’s posture toward Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution, he suggested then-parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s 1989 visit to Moscow had laid the foundation for a new partnership.[9] Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader, continued Tehran’s quiet outreach justified on shared enmity with the Russians toward Washington and on economic opportunism. Some Iranians raised questions about inherent ideological compromise, but regime officials tried to explain this away. In 2012, for example, a website affiliated with the supreme leader denied any parallels between the Palestinian plight and Muslim minorities in Russia or China. The difference, it said, was that Israel was alone in having “confiscated” Palestinian lands.[10] Other outlets acknowledged the problem but assured critics that Tehran continued to provide “emotional support” for the Chechens.[11] That same year, however, Rafsanjani—by then a senior statesman—threw cold water on the comfort some Iranian officials felt about their anti-U.S. alliance with Russia even if he was credited with its revival. In an interview, he noted the constraints Russia felt from U.S. pressure and acknowledged, “Like Western countries, Russia is also concerned about Iran becoming a power by acquiring nuclear weapons.”[12] As president, however, Rouhani disagreed, arguing both that the growing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the Caucasus and U.S. human rights advocacy provoked Russia enough to cause it to put other concerns aside.[13] Other officials were less sure. In 2014, Behrouz Nemati, a conservative who represents Tehran in parliament, said that the history of Russo-Iranian relations demonstrates a tendency toward Russian subterfuge and warned Iranian leaders to be careful “shaking Russia’s hand.”[14] Russian soldiers stand watch over Afghans during the Soviet invasion, December 1979. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed that the invasion “left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds.” In contrast to Rouhani, Rafsanjani suggested that Afghanistan remained a source of distrust between Tehran and Moscow rather than a catalyst for tighter ties. “The Soviet Union’s record on invading Afghanistan left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds,” he explained. “It is too often overlooked that the Islamic Republic’s relationship with Russia was formed in such an environment.”[15] Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran’s former ambassador to France, also cast doubt on a Russian gamble. “Historically, there is a national distrust in Iranians’ nature against Russia. We haven’t been harmed by Americans like we have been by Russians,” he argued.[16] This appears to be a common attitude among some senior Iranian diplomats. Ali Khorram, a former Iranian ambassador to China, wrote that Russia was not trustworthy. “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest,” he explained, but “as soon as Americans and Western countries [court Russia], [the Russians] will turn their back to their commitments to the Islamic Republic of Iran. … History has shown whenever we have relied on them [Russians], they have immediately abandoned us,” he added.[17] One Iranian diplomat argued, “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest.” While Khamenei and later Rouhani may have been eager for ties to Moscow, Russia’s historical baggage in Iran continued to intrude. Both countries supported the same side in the Syrian civil war, and yet, when a Russian ship launched cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea into Syria that overflew Iranian territory, even sympathetic Iranians such as senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reacted with outrage.[18] Other Russian actions have antagonized ordinary Iranians. After Moscow provided its Iranian counterpart with technology to jam Persian-language broadcasts from diaspora stations, ordinary Iranians reacted with vitriol. Internet commentary submitted to the conservative daily Asr-e Iran webpage on the story included comments such as, “May God give Russia Death,” “Russia is the biggest jerk,” and “the Russian embassy is a nest of spies.”[19] Outside the constraints of the official press, Iranian bloggers let loose, questioning the value of alignment with a declining economic power and the stability of any alliance with Russia.[20] An Iranian doctoral student in Moscow, meanwhile, observed—correctly—that the Kremlin always acted in its own national interest, but Iranian proponents of the alliance somehow expected the Russians to act in Tehran’s national interest instead.[21] Can Trade Overcome Distrust? While Washington and its Middle Eastern allies may worry primarily about Russia-Iran military ties, the trade relationship between the two countries could potentially be broader. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a deep, multi-year recession. At the time, Tehran was already heavily sanctioned and, after a series of executive orders issued by President Bill Clinton, soon became more so. Both Tehran and Moscow, however, found an outlet in the other. In 1995, for example, Russia’s Atomstroyexport became the chief contractor for the Bushehr nuclear program at a time when few countries wanted Russian nuclear assistance given the stigma of the Chernobyl disaster, and Iranian contracts were toxic for Western firms. Still, initial optimism in Tehran that Russian trade might salvage Iran’s economy quickly faded. In 2012, Rafsanjani explained, In the past quarter century … Iran and Russia have never been able to set and create a visible trade partnership. The most important commodity [oil] that Iran has to offer other countries is not attractive to the Russians, and many Russians commodities and technologies have always been the lowest priority for the Iranian side.[22] Russian exports to Iran decreased by nearly two thirds, from $3.4 billion to $1.2 billion, between 2010 and 2013, while Iranian exports to Russia grew only modestly and remained under $500 million.[23] Nor did either country’s non-military trade with the other increase appreciably over the next decade.[24] Even the arms trade did not fully reassure those in the Iranian government unsure about whether to trust Moscow. In 2007, Tehran agreed to purchase the S-300 system for $800 million. Prior to the development of the S-400, the S-300 was still Russia’s premier anti-aircraft missile system, and so the announcement of the deal was a high stakes affair. Soon, however, Iranians who expressed doubt about Russia’s reliability felt vindicated: Moscow suspended the sale under international pressure. The dispute carried on for another eight years with the Iranian government demanding a $4 billion breach of contract penalty against Russia’s Rosoboronexport. And while Tehran dropped the suit in 2015 when Rosoboronexport finally delivered the hardware, cynicism and doubt remained.[25] Shortly after the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran. Russia and Iran also now hold joint military exercises. Ironically, it was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), President Barack Obama’s signature Iran nuclear deal, that breathed new life into the Russia-Iran arms trade. In order to reach agreement, Obama agreed not only to end prohibitions on Iran’s military trade but also to provide a windfall for Tehran in terms of sanctions relief and enabling foreign investment. It was not long, for example, before Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran.[26] The two countries likewise appear to be cooperating in the cyber sphere with drones, and, despite Russian president Vladimir Putin’s denials, with satellites as well.[27] That appears to be the tip of the iceberg.[28] Russia and Iran also increasingly hold joint military exercises, sometimes with Chinese participation.[29] The IRGC also frequently participates in Russia’s annual military games.[30] Will the Russian-Iranian Alliance Last? For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. In November 2015, he visited Moscow for the first time in more than a decade, nominally to attend a summit for gas-exporting countries. After a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Khamenei declared, “America’s long-term scheme for the region is detrimental to all nations and countries, particularly Iran and Russia, and it should be thwarted through vigilance and closer interaction.” He praised Putin for “neutralizing [Washington’s] policy.” Putin was also affable. “We regard you as a trustworthy and reliable ally in the region and the world,” he told Khamenei.[31] Putin also looks to the future; he was the first world leader to call Ebrahim Raisi upon his win in the June 2021 presidential elections, a victory that many observers believe confirm his frontrunner status to replace Khamenei upon the aging supreme leader’s death.[32] For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. Still, centuries of Iranian distrust and hostility do not easily dissipate. Perhaps this is why, in June 2021, the Russian and Iranian foreign ministries agreed to waive visas.[33] Few countries allow Iranians such access, and the decline of the Iranian rial makes it increasingly expensive for those that do. But a desire to bolster tourism may not be the only basis for the agreement. There is likely hope at a more senior level that enabling Iranians and Russians to meet and mix might breakdown the hostility that overshadows Iranian public opinion of Russia and its aims. While the JCPOA helped reinforce Khamenei’s flailing attempt to build a Russia-Iran strategic alliance, the drive by both Tehran and Moscow’s dictatorial regimes to cement an anti-U.S. alliance will backfire. Decades of official Islamic Republic hostility to the United States have not eroded and, indeed, likely may have encouraged a general friendliness by the Iranian public toward America. To try to push Russia upon the public will likely accelerate that trend while Moscow’s close association with an increasingly unpopular Khamenei and Raisi will reinforce Iranian public hostility toward Russia for decades to come. The nature of dictatorship, however, means that in the short term, such sentiments will not affect policy as both Tehran and Moscow work to erode the post-World War II liberal order and U.S. dominance on the regional and global stage.

#### Iran-Russia relations low – nuclear deal

Golnaz Esfandiari 3/10, a senior correspondent for RFE/RL focusing on Iran. She has reported from Afghanistan and Haiti and is one of the authors of The Farda Briefing newsletter. Her work has been cited by The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other major publications, 3/10/2022, “Will Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Derail The Iran Nuclear Deal?,” <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-nuclear-deal-demands-invasion/31746877.html>, RES

After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Russia is moving away from Syria to Ukraine now---the impact is inevitable.

Dr. Hamdan Al-Shehri 6/4, a political analyst and international relations scholar, 6/4/2022, “Russia’s Syria withdrawal a boon for Iran’s regional project,” <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2096641>, RES

The echoes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is less than four months old, have reached our region. Our talk is not about units or militias affiliated with Tehran joining the fight there. Rather, we are talking about geopolitics, as well as the void we have begun to notice as a result of the gradual military retreat and withdrawal of Russia from Syria, with the Iranian presence filling this void. Russia moved into the region in the shadow of the American withdrawal as it sought to achieve its interests. This led to Moscow improving its trade and investment balance, besides using the port of Tartus and playing an important role in the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Syria — to support the Damascus regime — was considered a counterbalance and check on Iran, even though it is an ally of the Iranians there. Its presence has also become a reason for the regional acceptance of the spread of Iran’s militias in Syria. However, the theory of the foreign balance inside Syria is on the verge of disruption. In recent weeks, there have been reports of Russian troops leaving, possibly to the front line in Ukraine. We will likely see further Russian withdrawals, creating more space for the Iranians. The Russian withdrawal from Syria could end up as a repeat of America’s withdrawal from Iraq. This might mean the Iraqi scenario — with its sectarian war, demographic changes, armed terrorist militias, killings and displacement — is replicated in Syria.

#### Ukraine war destroys Russia and Iran relations

Emil **Avdaliani,** 5-13-20**22**, "Iran Gives Russia Two and a Half Cheers," CEPA, https://cepa.org/iran-gives-russia-two-and-a-half-cheers/

For Iran, the invasion of Ukraine is closely related to the very essence of the present world order. Much like Russia, Iran has been voicing its discontent at the way the international system has operated since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, Iran and Russia see the world through strikingly similar lenses. Both keenly anticipate the end of the multipolar world and the end of the West’s geopolitical preponderance. Iran had its reasons to think this way. The US unipolar moment after 1991 provoked a deep fear of imminent encirclement, with American bases in Afghanistan and Iraq cited as evidence. Like Russia, the Islamic Republic views itself as a separate civilization that needs to be not only acknowledged by outside players, but also to be given ana suitable geopolitical space to project influence. Both Russia and Iran are very clear about their respective spheres of influence. For Russia, it is the territories that once constituted the Soviet empire. For Iran, it is the contiguous states reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon — plus Yemen. When the two former imperial powers have overlapping strategic interests such as, for instance, in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, they apply the concept of regionalism. This implies the blocking out of non-regional powers from exercising outsize economic and military influence, and mostly revolves around an order dominated by the powers which border on a region. This largely explains why Iran sees the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity that, if successful, could hasten the end of the liberal world order. This is why it has largely toed the Russian line and explained what it describes as legitimate motives behind the invasion. Thus the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe was cited as having provoked Russian moves. “The root of the crisis in Ukraine is the US policies that create the crisis, and Ukraine is one victim of these policies,” [argued](https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8879/Iran-supports-ending-the-war-in-Ukraine-US-root-of-Ukraine-crisis) Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei following the invasion. To a certain degree, Iran’s approach to Ukraine has been also influenced by mishaps in bilateral relations which largely began with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet by Iranian surface-to-air missiles in January 2020, [killing 176 people](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51073621). The regime first denied responsibility, and later blamed human error. Iran, like several other of Russia’s [friends and defenders](https://www.mediaite.com/uncategorized/these-are-the-24-countries-that-voted-no-to-suspending-russia-from-the-un-human-rights-council/), the ideal scenario would have been a quick war in which the Kremlin achieved its major goals. Protracted war, however, sends a bad signal. It signals that the liberal order was not in such steep decline after all, and that Russia’s [calls for a new era](http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770) in international relations have been far from realistic. The unsuccessful war also shows Iran that the collective West still has very significant power and — despite well-aired differences — an ability to rapidly coalesce to defend the existing rules-based order. Worse, for these countries, the sanctions imposed on Russia go further; demonstrating the West’s ability to make significant economic sacrifices to make its anger felt. In other words, Russia’s failure in Ukraine actually strengthened the West and made it more united than at any point since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. A reinvigorated liberal order is the last thing that Iran wants, given its own troubled relations with the collective West. The continuing negotiations on a [revived nuclear deal](https://uk.news.yahoo.com/eus-borrell-says-coordinator-trip-075454031.html) will be heavily impacted by how Russia’s war proceeds, and how the US and EU continue to respond to the aggression. Iran fears that a defeated Russia might be so angered as to use its critical position to endanger the talks, vital to the lifting of the West’s crippling sanctions. And despite rhetorical support for Russia, Iran has been careful not to overestimate Russia’s power. It is now far from clear that the Kremlin has achieved its long-term goal of “safeguarding” its western frontier. Indeed, the Putin regime may have done the opposite now that it has driven Finland and Sweden into the NATO fold. Western sanctions on Russia are likely to remain for a long time, threatening long-term Russian economic (and possible regime) stability. Moreover, Russia’s fostering of separatist entities (following the recognition of the so called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” and other breakaway entities in Georgia and Moldova) is a highly polarizing subject in Iran. True there has been a shift toward embracing Russia’s position over Ukraine, but Iran remains deeply committed to the “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and territorial integrity. This is hardly surprising given its own struggles against potential separatism in the peripheries of the country. Many Iranians also sympathize with Ukraine’s plight, which for some evokes Iran’s defeats in the early 19th century wars when Qajars had to cede the eastern part of the South Caucasus to Russia. This forms part of a historically deeply rooted, anti-imperialist sentiment in Iran. Iran is therefore likely to largely abstain from endorsing Russia’s separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. It will also eschew, where possible, support for Russia in international forums. Emblematic of this policy was the March 2 meeting in the United Nations General Assembly when Iran, rather than siding with Russia, abstained from the vote which condemned the invasion. Russia’s poor military performance, and the West’s ability to act unanimously, serve as a warning for the Islamic Republic that it may one day have to soak up even more Western pressure if Europe, the US, and other democracies act in union. In the meantime, [like China](https://chinaobservers.eu/china-struggles-to-strike-a-balance-amid-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/), Iran will hope to benefit from the magnetic pull of the Ukraine war. With so much governmental, military and diplomatic attention demanded by the conflict, it will for the time being serve as a distraction from Iran’s ambitions elsewhere.

#### Ukraine thumps

Mark N. Katz, 3-23-2015, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine," Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/russian-iranian-relations-the-shadow-ukraine

On March 23, 2015, the Middle East Program and the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted an event, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine” with Katz, also a former scholar of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, moderated the event. Katz began by stating that the character of Russian-Iranian relations is much different since the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani than it was in the past. He noted the tension between the United States and Russia has increased because of the escalating crisis between Russia and Ukraine. However, he emphasized that for the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution there is hope for an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not likely that U.S.-Russian relations will improve in the coming years, however. Katz then explained how the nuclear negotiations are playing a large role in the three countries’ relations with one another. He said Russia would not interfere in the nuclear talks because it is not in a position to stop them but argued that Russia would not benefit from improved U.S.-Iranian relations because sanctions against Iran would be lifted with a deal, allowing for Iranian oil imports. Furthermore, Katz stated that despite the illusion of a stronger alliance created by the visits of Russian officials to Iran and vice-versa, there is still a significant amount of history between the two countries. For example, the division of the Caspian Sea is still an unresolved conflict between Russia and Iran, and Iran remains resentful of Russia for Soviet support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Katz emphasized that while the media may portray U.S.-Iranian relations as strained, Russian-Iranian relations are much more hostile. Katz argued that despite the differences Russia and Iran may have, they share the same view on multiple issues. He stated that both countries are fearful of the Taliban regaining control and influence in Afghanistan. In addition, both countries support Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and provide military assistance to Assad. Russia and Iran also both have a common interest in joining the fight against ISIS, which poses a threat to both countries’ national security. Regarding a potential nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, Katz stated that Russia is very conflicted—Russia does not see Iran acquiring nuclear power as the worst case scenario but is concerned about an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations. Although Russia is not in a position to block the nuclear deal, it hopes it will benefit from the failure to secure a deal. On the topic of Russia-Iran relations with regard to the Ukrainian conflict, Katz argued that Iran is not concerned with the issue and has kept its distance from the matter. Katz stated that Iran would benefit from the crisis because it gives the country more leverage with the West, considering that the West will want to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and would be more likely to turn to Iran for support. In response to a question from Jane Harman, President of the Wilson Center, on whether Russia will benefit from taking Iran’s reprocessed fuel if the negotiations succeed, Katz said that Russia would benefit greatly from this because it would produce a profit, but whether or not this will put Russia in the good graces of the West is questionable because of the escalation and severity of the Ukraine crisis. Esfandiari asked what effect Russia’s rush to sign agreements on additional nuclear power plants with Iran will have on the talks. Katz answered that Russia views the negotiations as an opportunity for the United States to gain commercial profit rather than a national security issue. Therefore, Russia is attempting to sign as many agreements as possible with Iran before the United States has an opportunity to lift the sanctions.

### 2AC – Link Turn

#### Turn - NATO expansion improves Iran Russia relations

O’ Connor 22 (Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, July 17, 2022, “As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold”, <https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780>)

Finland and Sweden's green light to join NATO is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal membership ascension process amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process." Of these candidates, Argentina has already applied for membership, potentially advancing the group's status toward being a major player in international economic relations. And with the SCO seeking to grow as well, Beijing and Moscow might be poised to advance their effort to sway the international influence equilibrium toward a broader group of countries that do not necessarily sign on to an explicitly U.S.-led international order. And while Neapole argued that there would be "big hurdles to get over" in trying to transform this vision from ambitious talk to substantive action, he said a cohesive SCO-BRICS bloc could have a huge impact on reshaping the world order. "If it can be successful in positioning itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South or G20, develop strong organizational mechanisms and integrate more thoroughly," he said, "it could be quite influential." BRICS' multipolar approach to international affairs has proven attractive to both Iran and Saudi Arabia alike. The two nations, however, have their own unique reasons for seeking membership. For Riyadh, the move would likely be less about choosing sides against the close ties it has fostered for decades with Washington and more about the kingdom's own growing status as an independent player. "China's invitation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to join the 'BRICS' confirms that the Kingdom has a major role in building the new world and became an important and essential player in global trade and economics," Mohammed al-Hamed, president of the Saudi Elite group in Riyadh, told Newsweek. "Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 is moving forward at a confident and global pace in all fields and sectors." This vision, unveiled by Prince Mohammed bin Salman a year before being appointed as heir to the throne and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017, outlined a plan to diversify his country's oil-dependent economy and present a new image of the kingdom to the international community. And while Crown Prince Mohammed has sought to enhance cooperation with the U.S., especially as President Joe Biden prepared this month for his first visit to the monarchy he once branded a "pariah" over alleged human rights abuses, the Saudi royal has also expanded ties with Russia and China in recent years. Joining BRICS would demonstrate a commitment to Riyadh's resolve in dealing with other major powers and mark a significant win for the effort to boost economic frameworks established outside of the auspices of the U.S. and its immediate allies. "This accession, if Saudi joins it, will balance the world economic system, especially since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and it's in the G20," Hamed said. "If it happens, this will support any economic movement and development in the world trade and economy, and record remarkable progress in social and economic aspects as Saudi Arabia should have partnerships with every country in the world." This approach came in stark contrast to that of Washington, which has regularly shut out countries it disagreed with through a growing list of sanctions. The U.S.' dominant position in the global financial system has traditionally left few options for these nations, but that situation has gradually changed as frameworks like BRICS offer potential ways to dodge these restrictions. Among those countries looking to counter U.S. economic pressure is Iran. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic in response to its nuclear activities were lifted in 2015 after a multilateral nuclear deal was reached with the U.S. and other major powers, including China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom, but then-President Donald Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, severely impacting Tehran's ability to trade with the international community. Biden has set out to negotiate a potential return to the accord that was reached during his vice presidency under former President Barack Obama. However, a series of negotiations held since April of last year has left the U.S. and Iran at an impasse and another set of talks held in Qatar this week appeared to end early with no sign of a breakthrough. Frustration over shifting politics in Washington has led Tehran to increasingly look to its own region for strategic partnerships, which it has increasingly forged with Beijing and Moscow. "Iranian officials have come to the conclusion that the U.S. and its Western allies will never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to play its well-deserved regional role as a middle power," Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, a research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, told Newsweek. "Therefore, they have decided to neutralize U.S. attempts to isolate Iran by further closing to non-western bodies like SCO and BRICS," she added. "In addition, Iranians consider the future world order to be Eastern and they are trying to get closer to organizations in which Eastern powers such as Russia and China play a significant role." This doesn't mean that the two blocs are necessary anti-Western in nature. Though a concerted effort has emerged to empower countries outside of the traditional G7 grouping from which Russia was suspended in 2014 as conflict first erupted over Ukraine and other major economies such as China and India have not been invited, the SCO and BRICS, which are not formal military alliances like NATO, saw themselves as inherently inclusive. "The SCO and the BRICS have not been established as an alternative to Western organizations," Yazdanshenas said, "and their specific function has not been defined on the basis of confrontation with the West or the existing world order." Still, she argued that growing international competition has only intensified "the balancing function of non-Western organizations" such as the SCO and BRICS. And here, she said Iran could serve as an important asset for both coalitions. "Joining a moderate power with an anti-Western approach such as Iran to these bodies can strengthen this aspect of SCO and BRICS," Yazdanshenas said. "Iran has been under the most severe sanctions in the last decade, yet it has been able to significantly expand its power in the region." And, like Saudi Arabia, Iran's oil and gas reserves make it an important strategic partner, especially given the worsening frictions over global energy that have been exacerbated by Western sanctions on Russia, and heated rivalry between Beijing and Washington. "Iran is the only producer of energy resources in the Persian Gulf that is not an ally of the United States and will not refuse to supply energy to China in the event of an escalation of the trade war between Beijing and Washington," Yazdanshenas said. "In addition, Iran's geopolitical position has been strengthened in the wake of Russia-Ukraine war and that is of great importance for great powers in these bodies i.e. Russia and China." The energy problem plays into two key reasons having both Iran and Saudi Arabia on board for BRICS would be a "major gain" for the organization, according to Akhil Ramesh, a fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum. "For countries like China and to an extent India, import dependency for oil has been a major headache, both from an economic standpoint of trade deficits and from a geopolitical standpoint of having to make security and strategic sacrifices for the sake of oil imports," Ramesh said. "Having three large oil producers in the grouping [Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia] could possibly give these countries the option of securing oil at discounted rates or through alternative arrangements [barter]." Tehran and Riyadh's oil reserves would also lend BRICS a stronger hand in taking on the U.S. dollar's hegemony over the world financial system as Ramesh argued that, "in order to replace the USD as the global reserve currency you would need to have more commodity-exporting countries, especially oil exporting ones buying into the idea." "Moreover," he added, "China and Russia are expanding the grouping to create a coalition of countries that have pending disputes with the West or have been humiliated by the West in the past [thinking Argentina and Falklands]." And in this respect, Ramesh expressed that the U.S. and its allies had committed "a grave error" in overlooking the importance of BRICS, as well as the SCO, emerging financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the National Development Bank and China's broader Belt and Road Initiative, which counts some 148 countries and 32 international organizations as partners. "The U.S. and its allies are grossly underestimating China, in particular," Ramesh said. "BRICS, SCO, development banks such as AIIB, NDB, and infrastructure initiatives such as China's BRI are all different platforms for engaging mostly poor countries that do not get a say in world affairs or have a seat at the high table." As internal divisions have threatened to derail NATO's agenda, feuds among members also serve as a complicating factor for organizations led by China and Russia. And even if Iran and Saudi Arabia were to both join BRICS, it would not necessarily prove a breakthrough in their bitter rivalry. The two nations have pursued quiet diplomacy over the past year, but their regional bout for influence has continued to rage across the Middle East, most violently so in Yemen, which has been devastated by a years-long war between a Saudi-led coalition in support of an exiled government on one side and the Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, or Houthi, rebels on the other. The conflict has only quieted in recent months as a result of a fragile three-month truce and not necessarily because of any lasting solution. But China and Russia have demonstrated a capacity to bring enemies together under a common banner as seen with the SCO's simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan five years ago. Yaroslav Lissovolik, a Moscow-based Russian International Affairs Council expert and Valdai Discussion Club program director, said BRICS too has the capacity to host countries with clashing worldviews, mentioning the specific case of China and India, whose rivalry has turned occasionally turned violent, and even deadly, along their disputed Himalayan border. And while he said that the "expansion of the BRICS core membership may indeed result in greater challenges in attaining consensus on key decisions going forward," he felt there was ample room to work together on broader questions. "In this respect, the addition of Iran and Saudi Arabia would not change matters fundamentally within BRICS as there is scope for a divergence in views," Lissovolik told Newsweek, "and while there may be disagreement on particular local/regional problems, there may be greater unity on global issues." He argued that disputes among members have not stopped BRICS from managing "to advance with an increasingly ambitious development agenda, including with respect to launching the BRICS+ initiative and the pragmatic cooperation within the BRICS development institutions." "What this means is that the BRICS offer the possibility of development on the basis of divergence in economic models and approaches to economic modernization rather than convergence towards one particular universal model," Lissovolik said. "While allowing for the differences in views and approaches among their members," he added, "BRICS economies can move decisively forward in tackling those global challenges where they manage to forge a consensus."

#### Russia and Iran are only brought together because of NATO and the US’ expansion

**Tasnim News Agency**, 5-17-20**22**, "Iranian Spokesman Blames Ukraine Crisis on NATO’s Expansion," https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/17/2712467/iranian-spokesman-blames-ukraine-crisis-on-nato-s-expansion

Iran's envoy to Russia has said NATO's expansion is not in the interest of Tehran and Moscow, and there is a global synergy against Western “unilateralism.” The comments came as Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by blaming the United States and NATO for the ensuing crisis. During a webinar about bilateral relations and regional developments, Kazem Jalali urged closer cooperation with Moscow under President Vladimir Putin, saying, “We are working with Russia on regional issues, and have a successful experience in Syria’s case”, Jamaran News in Tehran reported on Monday. "Obviously, neither we nor the Russians see NATO expanding to our borders in our interest," said Tehran’s ambassador in Moscow. Turkey, a NATO member borders Iran in the northwest but has followed a neutral policy between the Washington and Tehran. Jalali added that Russia has stood up to American unilateralism, noting that this is the same approach that the Islamic Republic has taken since the 1979 revolution. Jalali noted that Iran did not have good relations with the Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and in the post-Soviet period, adding, “The fourth era is the Putin era, which I think should be paid more attention to”. Judging by the history of Iran-Russia relations, “some people ask why we should have relations with the Russians when we have such a history with them. We should know that during the Soviet era 25 million people were killed in the war with Germany” but that didn’t stop them to cooperate on the Nord Stream --the system of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. He added that “we should look at the realities of today”, underlining that Iran’s new government prioritizes relations and strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries, and “Russia is a large economy.” Jalali went on to say that “our foreign policy should serve Iran’s national interests”, urging to keep a balance between the West and the East. In fact, in the past 30 years under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly tilted toward Russia and China. In the 1980s, when the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was Supreme Leader, the country followed his dictum of “Neither West Nor the East.” During the same event, former member of the parliament Elaheh Koulai described ties between Iran and Russia as one of the most important issues in Eurasia. “There are bitter events in the history of Iran-Russia relations that have caused pessimism and Russophobia in Iranian society” she added. She called for a balancing approach with Russia, Europe and the United States, saying, “we must try to use Russia to our advantage”. Referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Koulai said, “Iran must condemn Russia's military action against Ukraine and demand that the two sides sit down at the negotiating table”. As debate about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues in Iran, [divisions reflect the political dispositions](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202202274930) of various factions over Tehran’s foreign policy. Hardliners close to the core of the regime fiercely defend a pro-Russia policy, while their rivals within the regime argue for more balanced relations between the West and the East, meaning Moscow and Beijing. Many ordinary Iranians and opponents of the Islamic Republic invariably [support Ukraine](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202202265209) and condemn the government pro-Russia policies on social media.

### 2AC – AT: Syria Impact

#### Syria war wont go nuclear, Israel destroyed their ability to use them

Farley 22 (Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book, January 26, 2022, “How Israel Prevented Syria From Developing Nuclear Weapons”, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-israel-prevented-syria-developing-nuclear-weapons-199923>)

On September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a mysterious installation near the Euphrates River in the Deir-ez-Zor region. The strike incurred curiously little response from Damascus. A cyber-attack reportedly pre-empted a defensive Syrian military mobilization, and even the diplomatic outcry was muted. No other Arab governments commented on the attack, and even the Israelis did not acknowledge the operation for quite some time. Destroying the facility was not regarded as a slam-dunk decision, either in Israel or the United States. Anxiety over the strength of the intelligence in the wake of the Iraq debacle stayed the hand of the latter, while concern about international blowback, not to mention a Syrian military response, worried the former. What if cooler heads had carried the day, and Israel had never undertaken the strike? Nuclear Progress It’s difficult to assess how far Syria would have been from developing a nuclear weapon if its efforts had gone unhindered. Although we may never have the complete story regarding Syria’s interest in a nuclear program, it probably stemmed from the growing gap in conventional capabilities between Syria and Israel, as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although Syria has always denied that the installation was part of a nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later confirmed that the site appeared to be a nuclear reactor. There is little question that Syria’s program was rudimentary compared to those of Iran or North Korea. However, it is entirely possible that Syria could have relied upon technical assistance from both countries; indeed, it is highly likely that North Korea supplied technical assistance for the development of the reactor on the Euphrates. But Damascus would have needed to master a series of technical challenges, and there is little indication that Syrian economic infrastructure was up to the challenge of managing the very serious industrial and bottlenecks that it would have encountered. Although the Syrian economy is larger than that of North Korea, it is more dependent on resource extraction, making it less capable of managing the technical challenges associated with the nuclear pivot. Syria also lacks the enormous oil wealth enjoyed by both Iran and Iraq during their nuclear drives. It became clear after the destruction of the box that Assad wasn’t all that committed to paying the costs necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Unlike Iraq and Iran, Damascus made little effort to disperse and harden nuclear facilities. Indeed, given Syria’s proximity to Israel, it’s difficult to imagine how anyone in the country believed that the project could go undetected. As Anthony Cordesman has argued, the nuclear program would have been extraordinarily vulnerable at multiple points in its development. This suggests that the bureaucratic politics of the nuclear program were complicated, and that Syria might not have gone through with its development even in absence of the strike. Nevertheless, Israel felt that even the remote possibility of a nuclear Syria was worth curtailing, and that the strikes would have the added benefit of reinforcing the Begin Doctrine. The Arab Spring In any case, it is extremely unlikely that even an unmolested Syria could have successfully developed a nuclear weapon by the beginning of the Arab Spring. The oset of the Syrian Civil War taxed the Assad regime so dearly that it’s unlikely it would have continued a nuclear program. Would the nature of the war have changed if Syria had still been actively pursuing nuclear weapons? The war developed, to some extent, out of the expectation of Western intervention. Anti-regime forces took risks and made commitments out of the hope that the United States and Europe would step up with active military support. The West offered rhetorical support for toppling Assad, but only limited and measured military assistance for anti-regime forces. Clearly, the program itself would not have deterred the West; it could not have produced a viable weapon by 2011. However, knowledge of an existing nuclear program might have reduced Assad’s standing in the West even further, potentially making intervention more attractive. Moreover, the program would presumably have achieved some degree of technical success in terms of the production of plutonium, the development of associated nuclear technologies, and the training of a cadre of scientists and engineers. This very success might have made the West nervous—perhaps nervous enough to take a more assertive policy against the Assad regime. The question is what impact the war might have had on the knowledge and infrastructure developed around the program, and how engineers and materials might have found their way into the hands of ISIS or other rebel groups. ISIS took control of the site in 2014, although the Syrian government likely would have defended it more vigorously if an active reactor had remained. ISIS would not have been able to construct a useable weapon, and either the United States or Syria likely would have destroyed any facilities before they fell into the hands of the group—but it still would have been cause for concern. And while ISIS could not have used the expertise or equipment directly, it might have tried to export either, with dangerous consequences. In any case, forces friendly to the United States captured the area in 2017. Conclusion The strike on Syria was probably not decisive in preventing Syria from getting a nuclear weapon; the program was a long-shot from the beginning, and in all likelihood would have ended at the onset of the Syrian Civil War. However, the strike helped to confirm the regional sense of Israeli military power after the failures of the war against Hezbollah, and undoubtedly also convinced both Washington and Tehran that Israel would consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nukes. This, in turn, informed the negotiating strategies of all of the parties to the JCPOA, which continues to govern Iran’s relations with the international community. Whether that legacy will outlast 2018 remains in question.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Turn---Russo-Iranian cooperation over Syria causes conflict---it’s a cover for their own interests.

Seth G. Jones 19, Senior Vice President; Harold Brown Chair; and Director, International Security Program; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis, iDeas Lab and Korea Chair, 7/16/2019, “Dangerous Liaisons: Russian Cooperation with Iran in Syria,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/dangerous-liaisons-russian-cooperation-iran-syria>, RES

The Issue As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria. Introduction Following a June 2019 meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that “relations between Russia and Iran are multifaceted, multilateral.” In characterizing the primary areas of cooperation, Putin noted: “this concerns the economy, this concerns the issues of stability in the region, our joint efforts to combat terrorism, including in Syria.”1 One example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is in Syria. This brief analyzes satellite imagery of Tiyas Airbase (or T-4) in Syria, which is used by Iran and Russia. It highlights what we assess to be the Iranian movement of weapons, other material, and personnel to Syria with the awareness and support of Moscow. This cooperation, which has allowed Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to increase their capabilities and influence in Syria, should be concerning for the United States as tensions increase between Washington and Tehran. Yet Moscow’s cooperation with Tehran is double-edged. Our analysis also highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow is playing a delicate game in Syria. It supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also explicitly or tacitly allows Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of Russian-Iranian relations. The second section analyzes satellite imagery of T-4 Airbase, focusing on the possible Iranian movement of arms, other material, and personnel. The third section highlights Israeli airstrikes in Syria, including at T-4 Airbase, in close proximity to Russian aircraft. The fourth provides a brief conclusion. Russian-Iranian Partnership in Syria Russia and Iran have developed a complex—and sometimes contentious—historical relationship. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union occupied northern Iran, creating deep suspicion and mistrust among many Iranians.2 Yet Moscow and Tehran have developed a working relationship in Syria, even though they have their own interests. Moscow’s decision to become directly involved in the Syrian civil war—including to work with Iran—was motivated by several concerns. First was a growing fear that Washington was preparing to overthrow the Assad regime and replace it with a friendly government, much like the United States had done in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011.3 The possibility of losing Syria was particularly alarming because Moscow had just lost its ally in Ukraine. The 2014 Ukrainian revolution had ushered in a pro- Western government in Kiev, further fueling Russian fears of U.S. activity. Second, Syria had long been an important ally of Moscow. In 1946, the Soviet Union supported Syrian independence and provided military assistance to the Syrian Arab Army. This cooperation continued during the Cold War and endures under Russian President Vladimir Putin today.4 Third, Russian leaders were concerned that Assad’s collapse would allow the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other terrorists to use territory in Syria and Iraq to attract more fighters, improve their capabilities, and spread terrorism in and around Russia. After all, over 9,000 individuals from Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia traveled to Syria and Iraq to join Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.5 Iran has its own interests in Syria. Following the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iranian leaders became alarmed at the rise of Sunni extremist groups like the Islamic State and U.S., European, and Gulf support to rebel groups.6 In addition to providing light and heavy weapons to the Syrian regime and militias, up to 3,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) helped plan and execute campaigns such as the 2016 Battle of Aleppo (or Operation Dawn of Victory).7 The IRGC-QF worked closely with the Assad regime and the Russian military, which conducted strikes from Russian combat aircraft and naval vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.8 Syrian forces and militias supported by the IRGC-QF shelled rebel positions in Aleppo as Russian close air support and Kalibr cruise missile strikes reduced entire neighborhoods to rubble. By December 2016, ground forces routed rebel forces, who departed under an agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.9 Iranian support continues today. In addition, Iranian leaders have tried to use their activity in Syria to counter Israel. Perhaps the most significant example is by encouraging the expansion of Lebanese Hezbollah and other militia groups in Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah deployed up to 8,000 fighters to Syria and increased its arsenal with greater numbers and ranges of rockets and missiles from Syrian territory.10 Hezbollah also trained, advised, and assisted Shia and other non-state groups in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria operating in local militias. Many of these groups like Lebanese Hezbollah possess advanced stand-off weapons, improved cyber capabilities, more recruits, and more expansive forces in Syria capable of striking Israeli targets. While Russian-Iranian cooperation has been contentious at times, both countries have collaborated in Syria in ways that serve their own interests. One example of this cooperation is at T-4 Airbase, which is located in eastern Homs Governorate and roughly 100 miles northeast of Damascus. T-4 Airbase and Flight Tracker Data Figure 1 shows the base using satellite imagery. On the east side of the base is an apron (ramp) where aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are frequently parked. On the west side is an apron where transport aircraft have been located and where Israeli aircraft have struck targets. Figure 1: T-4 Airbase Satellite imagery in Figure 2 highlights a Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76-MD cargo aircraft on the base. This aircraft is likely the former Russian Airforce Il-76 registered RA-76634, as indicated by the number painted underneath the cockpit and livery of the aircraft.11 The imagery shows the freighter being loaded or unloaded under the protection of multiple Syrian air defense systems, including three SA-2 systems and a Pantsir-S1— all of which were provided by Russia.12 We assess that the Il-76 and other commercial aircraft may have been used to transport weapons, other material, or personnel from Iran into Syria, based on the regular use of Il-76s for these purposes in Syria.13 Figure 2: Il-76 on T-4 Runway Flight tracker data of the Il-76 aircraft indicates a recent history of flights between Tehran and Damascus. As indicated on the wing, the plane is registered as YK-ATD. The Prefix (YK) is the Syrian country code. Other Syrian-owned Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft have similar registry codes, such as YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATC. Publicly available flight tracker data indicates the YK-ATD makes regular flights between Tehran and Damascus. As illustrated in Figure 3, on May 13, 2019, YK-ATD departed Damascus International Airport. On May 14, 2019, the day we observed YK-ATD at T-4 Airbase, flight records indicate the plane left Tehran Mehrabad International Airport in the morning, arrived at what we assess to be T-4 based on imagery analysis, and then departed for Damascus International Airport in the afternoon. Our analysis of flight history for other Syrian-owned Il-76 aircraft indicates similar flight patterns between Iran and Syria for other aircraft, possibly for the purpose of clandestinely transferring weapons, other material, and personnel into Syria.14 Figure 3: Flight Data Tracker Map for YK-ATD As shown in Figure 4, we identified four Russian fixed-wing Su-25 ground attack aircraft with full weapons loads at the same site as the Il-76 aircraft, as well as an Mi-17 Hip transport helicopter and an Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.15 The proximity of Russian aircraft to the Il-76 suggests that Russia was highly likely aware of Iranian activity. It is virtually inconceivable that Iran would transport and unload arms, other material, and personnel to a base frequented by Russian aircraft and government officials—and protected by Russian-made air defense systems— without Moscow’s knowledge and approval. Figure 4: Russian Su-25, Mi-24, and Mi-17 Aircraft on Runway The imagery also indicates three active air defense sites around the perimeter of T-4 Airbase. Figure 5 highlights one of these sites. All of the air defense sites are equipped with Russian-made weapons systems. The first SA-2 air defense site is situated to the north, another SA-2 air defense site is located to the northwest, and a third SA-2 air defense site is to the south. The SA-2 Guideline (Russian designation S-75 Dvina) is a high-altitude, command guided, surface-to-air missile system (SAM) capable of 360-degree coverage. The SA-2 Guideline is designed for the defense of fixed targets and field forces.16 The guidance system of an SA-2 site can only focus on one target at a time but can direct three missiles against a target simultaneously.17 This likely explains the need for multiple SA-2 systems around the airbase. Figure 5: SA-2 Air Defense System Also observable in the imagery is a Pantsir-S1 (NATO name—SA-22 Greyhound) transloader. The Panstsir-S1 is a short- to medium-range missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon produced by Russia. The Pantsir-S1 provides point air defense for various installations and provides protection to air defense units. Figure 6 illustrates the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. Figure 6: S-1 Pantsir Air Defense System All military assets in the imagery are Russian made. We assess that the YK-ATD was likely either leased or sold to Syria.18 The Su-25 combat aircraft, as well as the Mi-17 and Mi-24 rotary-wing craft, are likely Russian operated.19 The SA-2 Guideline and Pantsir-S1 are Russian-built SAM systems.20These air defense systems are just two of numerous air defense systems provided by Russia to the Assad government. Others include S-75s, S-200s, S-300s, and Strela-1/-10s.21 With Russian support, Iran has used these types of activities to expand its presence in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria who are operating in local militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War demonstrated Israel’s difficulty of rooting out Hezbollah sites in Lebanon. Iran’s activity in Syria has only expanded the nature of this problem for Israel’s military. Israeli Airstrikes in the Shadow of the Bear Despite Russia’s collaboration with Iran, Moscow has also attempted to placate Israeli concerns about Iranian expansion. This section highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets—including at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also condones some Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. Russia and Israel have established deconfliction mechanisms, including a hotline between the Israeli and Russian militaries. As one Israel Defense Force official remarked, “We are very strict about informing the Russians about our activities and that their operational picture is up to date.”22 This cooperation is particularly important to avoid incidents like the one in September 2018. Following an Israeli strike against Iranian-linked targets in western Syria, Syrian gunners accidentally shot down a Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft. Russia complained that Israel had given Russian leaders less than a minute of advanced warning and Israeli aircraft used “the Russian airplane as a cover.”23 Despite some improvements in cooperation, Russia has occasionally condemned Israel for its actions in Syria. In July 2019, for example, Russia publicly criticized a series of Israeli strikes, saying that that they “grossly violate[d] Syria’s sovereignty.24 Figure 7 plots the location of Israeli airstrikes against Iranian and other targets in Syria. The darker shades of blue in the heat map indicate a higher concentration of Israeli strikes. Most of Israel’s attacks have been in southwestern Syria, near the Israeli border. But a few attacks have been against major bases used by Iran and Iranian-linked groups, including T-4 Airbase, the airbase north of al-Qusayr, and Damascus International Airport. Figure 7: Israeli Strikes in Syria On June 2, 2019, Israel conducted an airstrike on T-4 Airbase.25 This strike, along with similar strikes conducted in 2019, indicate that Israel is still committed to contesting attempts by Iran to entrench itself and its non-state partner forces in Syria. As highlighted in Figure 8, satellite imagery taken before and after the Israeli airstrike indicates that a UAV control vehicle, launch ramp, and ground equipment were likely targeted. This airstrike, which was conducted in close proximity to Russian infrastructure on the base, highlights the ongoing challenge Israel faces when conducting strikes near Russian forces. Figure 8: Before and After Imagery of Israeli Strike Against Iranian-Linked Target at T-4 Conclusion The Trump administration has expressed significant concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its missile program, and the activities of the IRGC-QF and its partner forces in the Middle East. One of the countries where Iran has been most active is Syria, where Tehran has increased its military presence to aid the Assad regime; supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which has been directly involved in the Syrian ground war; and expanded the number of rockets and missiles in the country to establish a second front (along with Lebanon) in a future war with Israel. Yet Iranian actions in Syria have been possible, in part, because of Tehran’s cooperation with Moscow. Containing Iran and preventing further Iranian expansion in the Middle East will be difficult without increasing pressure on Moscow. If Washington wants to be more effective in containing Iran, U.S. policymakers need to put greater pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s movement of arms, material, and people— as this case study of T-4 Airbase highlights.

### 2AC – Impact Turn – JCPOA

#### Russia is killing the nuclear deal and relations overall with it.

Golnaz Esfandiari 3/10, a senior correspondent for RFE/RL focusing on Iran. She has reported from Afghanistan and Haiti and is one of the authors of The Farda Briefing newsletter. Her work has been cited by The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other major publications, 3/10/2022, “Will Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Derail The Iran Nuclear Deal?,” <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-nuclear-deal-demands-invasion/31746877.html>, RES

After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

# North Africa-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – Ukraine Thump Libya Impact

#### **Ukraine war has caused de-escalation in Libya.**

Abdullah 4/20 [Bilal Abdullah; ; 4-20-2022; Russia-Ukraine War and the De-escalation in Libya; No Publication; https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/russia-ukraine-war-and-the-de-escalation-in-libya; 7-19-2022; SK]

Libya has been relatively calm since the Russian war on Ukraine started on February 24. Although this North African nation has long been viewed as a potential arena for settling scores between Russia and the West, the situation in Libya is currently moving in the opposite direction. Its political disputes have become less severe, and the flashpoints between the political rivals have decreased.

This analysis touches on three main areas of conflict between Russia and the West in Libya in the post-February 24 period – oil, the UN mission’s future, and military deployment. The analysis also examines the impact of these points of contention on the local dispute and any local party’s ability to seize the transitional authority or manage any settlement.

The Oil Factor

The dispute over oil revenues has been at the heart of the larger conflict in Libya. Controlling oil wealth creates a balance between the two sides of the conflict. The eastern camp militarily controls the oil facilities, i.e., production and export, while the western camp controls the revenue distribution because the central bank is located in the capital, Tripoli.

Considering this conflict, the international community tried to protect the independence of the National Oil Corporation and moved, for months, toward withholding export revenues from the Libyan Foreign Bank. Also, a conflict over the powers between the Minister of Oil in the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Muhammad Aoun, and the head of the National Oil Corporation, Mustafa Sanalla, deepened the Corporation’s impartiality, which was usually affiliated with the western Libya camp.

Oil is now more critical for the western part of the country. Crude oil is a critical tool in new Western policies designed to besiege Moscow and undermine it economically and militarily by reducing Western countries’ dependence on Russian oil and gas. The idea is to deprive Russia of a significant financing source. Therefore, the United States, the architect of sanctions against Russia, is actively seeking to ensure a stable oil supply from Libya.

Indeed, the West has taken the following steps in this regard:

The embassies of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy in Libya issued a joint statement urging all actors in Libya to respect the unity and independence of the National Oil Corporation. They were urged not to politicize it or engage in any actions that would undermine the stability of this institution. Remarkably, this statement was issued on February 24, the same day the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. [1]

UN Adviser Stephanie Williams tweeted, stressing the need to preserve the independence and impartiality of the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank, and the Libyan Investment Authority and not subject them to arbitrary pressures to employ them for the benefit of one party over another. The US and British embassies retweeted that tweet, emphasizing the same position. [2] This became clear about a month after the Western embassies’ statement referred to this position. It also coincides with growing uncertainty in the oil market against the backdrop of the Western-Russian conflict.

On March 17, the United States ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, announced a proposal to introduce a short-term mechanism for managing Libyan oil revenues that build on the previous arrangement, i.e., depositing oil revenues in the Libyan Foreign Bank. The new mechanism assumes that the various parties publish transparent data on expenditures and revenues, and the oil revenue distribution is limited to salaries, subsidies, fuel production, and major imported goods such as food and medicine. [3]

In early March, the National Oil Corporation announced that it had agreed with British Petroleum to carry out exploration activities in the Ghadames and Sirte basins. The agreement came about 10 days after the British oil giant announced that it had quit its partnership with the Russian oil company Rosneft following the Ukraine war. [4] Kate English, Deputy British Ambassador to Libya, met Mustafa Sanalla, head of the National Oil Corporation, on March 21 and discussed expanding cooperation between British energy companies and the Libyan Corporation. [5]

UN Mission

The appointment of a UN envoy to Libya is likely to turn into a contentious issue between Russia and Western countries. The UN Security Council’s mandate is scheduled to expire at the end of April, and the Council will have to consider renewing it. There have been some key developments related to this issue, including the following:

The UN mission’s mandate was renewed on the last day of January 2022 for only three months without appointing a UN envoy. This British proposal offered a compromise between two American and Russian draft resolutions. The US decision called for renewing the mission’s mandate until mid-September without appointing a UN envoy. However, the resolution stipulated that Stephanie Williams, an American, would assume the actual tasks of the UN envoy as an adviser to the Secretary-General on Libyan affairs, a position she assumed on December 6, 2021. The goal is that Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will not have to seek the Security Council’s approval for the appointment. However, the Russian draft resolution called for the mission’s renewal until the end of April only, with the appointment of a UN envoy by the Security Council without delay.

With the date of the decision on renewing the mission’s mandate approaching, i.e., the end of April, and against the backdrop of a raging US-Russian conflict, it is expected that the dispute over the mission’s future will return to the fore again, especially concerning the issue of appointing a UN envoy.

In a direction opposite to the expected West-Russia escalation over the mission’s future, and specifically on the UN envoy job, some African countries with considerable clout in the African Union cling to the demand of appointing an African diplomat to the position of UN envoy following the resignation of former envoy Ghassan Salame in March 2020. Re-introducing this demand in the coming period may be the best way to shield the mission’s mandate against the repercussions of international escalation. Even the parties to the conflict seem willing to maintain the ceasefire and reduce escalation to preserve the gains achieved.

Military Deployment

There are many indications about how the Russia-Ukraine war will affect Russia and its allies’ military deployment in Libya. A large-scale military escalation is unlikely in Libya during the next stage for several reasons:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to bring in fighters from the Middle East to participate in military operations in Ukraine. On March 11, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 16,000 fighters from the Middle East were ready to volunteer for the war. [6]

On March 20, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar had sent fighters to fight alongside the Russian forces, among the forces announced by the Russian Defense Minister. Wagner would supervise the transfer of fighters. [7] However, the General Command in Libya officially denied these statements. [8]

The British Ministry of Defense announced that the fighters of the Russian company Wagner were deployed in eastern Ukraine, which came at the expense of the company’s operations in Africa and Syria. [9]

The “Syrians for Truth and Justice” organization has published a report confirming that Russia has transferred Syrian fighters fighting in Libya alongside Haftar forces to fight in Ukraine. The report was based on testimonies from Syrian fighters and records of flights from Benghazi and Damascus to Russia. [10]

British Ambassador to Libya Caroline Harrondale met Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar at the General Command headquarters in Benghazi on March 27. The ambassador said that the meeting focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the importance of withdrawing all mercenaries from Libya, and the need to avoid war returning to the country. [11]

These indicators suggest a plan to reduce the support provided by Russia to Haftar’s forces at the level of human resources and prioritize the war in Ukraine, which naturally means that there will be no large-scale military escalation in Libya. However, in light of the escalation of the conflict between Russia and the West led by the United States and the increase in pressures on Russia, the Russian-Western conflict will possibly not remain confined to Ukraine but rather erupt in other flashpoints including Libya.

Therefore, foreign fighters wholly loyal to Russia are expected to remain in Libya, given that Russia controls the oil negotiating card in Libya.

Impact on the Political Track

The Russo-Ukrainian War had impacts on Libya’s political process as follows:

1. Fathi Bashagha as the New Prime Minister: The project to install Fathi Bashagha as the new prime minister is no longer enjoying significant momentum, despite the man’s alliance with the Russian-backed parties in eastern Libya. Moscow was among the few capitals that openly called for Bashagha to be able to exercise his new position in the capital, Tripoli. On March 13, a group of residents of the cities of the so-called Libya Oil Crescent threatened to shut down oil facilities in the region and stop the export of oil if the UN mission continued to support the Dbeibeh government, demanding that Fathi Bashagha be able to take power in the capital. [12] This threat was already put into practice in mid-April. The use of the oil card in support of Bashagha sends negative messages to Western countries regarding attempts by the eastern Libyan camp to justify Western concerns about oil management in Libya and Russia’s support for Bashagha taking power.

Contrary to expectations, on March 2, Bashagha publicly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and met the Ukrainian ambassador to Libya on March 26, stressing his position in support of Ukraine. [13] On the other hand, Bashagha is aware of the sensitivity of using the oil card for political influence at this stage and that the United States would reject this. Bashagha openly announced his refusal to use the oil card to enable him to take power in Tripoli [14], which reflects his commitment to keeping a distance from Moscow to avoid the political price he might pay in his relationship with Western powers. He is also keen to settle for a local alliance with the eastern Libyan camp. At the same time, the control of its headquarters in the eastern and southern regions has mounted pressure on the Dbeibeh government.

If the situation escalates around the Oil Crescent region within a US-Russia conflict, and if Moscow decides to make Libya an arena for settling accounts with the West, this would become the main challenge for Bashagha. Part of the forces loyal to him is located in the country’s center, in an area separating the forces loyal to Haftar and those affiliated with the Dbeibeh government in the western region. Thus, in this case, Bashagha may find himself compelled to break up the political partnership with the eastern Libyan camp, especially if the conflict escalates in a way that undermines his chances of becoming prime minister.

The only case that would make Bashagha accept a military escalation is for his forces to storm Tripoli by force. On the other hand, he is unlikely to accept that his forces will be involved in any confrontation between Haftar’s forces and the camp in western Libya, against the backdrop of the US-Russia conflict.

2. The Drawing Up of a New Constitutional Rule: Due to the new military balance, primarily temporary, owing to the decrease in the number of foreign fighters supporting Haftar, Moscow’s Ukraine preoccupation, and the decline in the chances of Bashagha being appointed prime minister, the UN adviser could work on a draft constitutional rule. It was achieved through a consensus between the House of Representatives and the State Council, based on which the elections might be held next June.

UN Adviser Stephanie Williams seeks to achieve a fundamental breakthrough to break the political deadlock, thus preventing the eastern Libyan camp from installing Bashagha for a new transitional period. The objective is to prevent Dbeibeh from achieving his goal of staying in power for a more extended period, as was the case with the Fayez al-Sarraj government. Williams is under the pressure of the time factor, whether the vote on the mission’s mandate takes place at the end of April or the end of the roadmap term comes at the end of June.

The House of Representatives is aware of the current international balances following Western sanctions against Russia and the latter’s failure to provide sufficient support to the eastern Libyan camp. This explains the Parliament’s attempt to play on the time factor and not respond to Stephanie’s efforts to thwart and wait for a new international order. Until then, the Parliament will continue to adhere to the roadmap it adopted, which calls for the appointment of Bashagha as prime minister.

On the other hand, Dbeibeh seeks to sabotage Stephanie’s plans. He declared that he was committed to his plan “to return the trust to the people,” based on which he formed a committee to draft an election law to hold the vote during June. However, the chances of this plan becoming a reality are almost non-existent. Dbeibeh wants to stay in power for a more extended period, especially when Libya is no longer an urgent priority on the international community’s agenda.

Conclusions

Although the crisis between Russia and the West is poised for further escalation, it is unlikely to see the conflict spill over to Libya due to differences over oil management and military deployment. Still, the two sides might clash over the appointment of a new UN envoy. The Libyan parties are seeking pragmatically to exploit the current international situation to avoid any political losses regarding the conflict over the transitional authority or the future of the settlement process. In this context, the main actors are working, in various ways, to thwart the efforts of the UN adviser to hold elections before the middle of this year and to buy more time in anticipation of any new developments.

### 2AC – Internal Link Turn

#### Russia only intervenes in North Africa to further its interests. Russia supports autocratic, corrupt leaders which is destabilizing and detrimental to African People

Siegle, PhD, 2/22

(Joseph, leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst, The future of Russia-Africa relations, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/)

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm. Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation. PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM? Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others. To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow. This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization. Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022. FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022 Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank. Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence. Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta. Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector. Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa. Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia. Building more mutually beneficial Africa-Russia relations depends on changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would require Russia to establish more conventional bilateral engagements with African institutions and not just individuals. These initiatives would focus on strengthening trade, investment, technology transfer, and educational exchanges. If transparently negotiated and equitably implemented, such Russian initiatives would be welcomed by many Africans.

#### Russia seeks to further its strategic interests in Africa, propping up authoritarian leaders, undermining democracy, and destroying African sovereignty.

Morford, 3/9

[Joseph; leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst; Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia’s destabilising influence; https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785]

It’s commonly held that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s objective [for invading Ukraine](https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512) is to install a **puppet** **regime** that is pliable to Moscow’s interests. If so, this would be consistent with the approach Russia has taken with its forays into Africa in recent years. Drawing from its Syria playbook, Russia has **propped up proxies** in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. Moscow also has its sights on another half dozen African leaders facing varying degrees of vulnerability. In the process, African citizen and sovereign interests have given way to Russian priorities. This **elite cooption strategy**effectively serves Russia’s strategic objectives in Africa. These include, first, to gain a foothold in the southern Mediterranean and Red Sea, putting Russia in a position to threaten NATO’s southern flank and international shipping chokeholds. Second, to demonstrate Russia’s Great Power status whose interests must be considered in every region of the world. And third, to displace western influence in Africa while **undermining support for democracy.** Russia has often used **extralegal tools** to pursue its objectives on the continent. It has deployed **mercenaries**, run **disinformation campaigns**, **interfered in elections** and **bartered arms for resources**. This low-cost, high yield approach has enabled Moscow to expand its influence in Africa more rapidly, arguably, than any other external actor since 2018 when Russia ramped up its Africa engagements. Regrettably for African citizens, these **tactics are all inherently destabilising**. Moreover, the result is disenfranchisement and **diminished African sovereignty**. Russia’s expanding influence portends a **bleak vision for Africa**. In effect, Russia is attempting to export its governance model – of an **authoritarian, kleptocratic, and transactional regime**– onto Africa. This is especially problematic since there are at least a handful of African leaders who are more than happy to go down this path. Never mind that this **diverges wildly from the democratic aspirations held by** the vast majority of **African** citizen**s**. The United Nations’ vote on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine provides a useful prism to understand relationships between Moscow and particular African countries. It reveals a spectrum of governance norms and visions for Africa. It is through these lenses and interests that groups of African countries can be expected to engage with Russia moving forward – with far-reaching consequences for democracy, security and sovereignty on the continent. Puppets, patrons and pushback The UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian aggression garnered only one dissenting African vote – Eritrea. This was accompanied by strong denunciations of the Russian attack on Ukraine by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States. The current chair of the AU, Senegal’s President Macky Sall, and AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat also criticised Russia’s unprovoked war. In total, 28 of Africa’s 54 countries voted to condemn the Russian invasion, 16 abstained and 9 did not vote. All in all, the vote was a remarkable rebuke of Moscow from a continent where many African leaders’ worldviews are shaped by a posture of non-alignment, raw legacies from the Cold War, African diplomatic politesse, and a desire to remain neutral in Great Power rivalries. The vote also revealed a [widening segmentation of governance norms in Africa](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Africa-Year-in-Review-2021.pdf#page=16). And it shows that African relations with Russia from here on in will not be uniform – nor abruptly reversed. The African countries that abstained, or did not vote, did so for a variety of reasons. The most obvious category of country unwilling to condemn Russia was those with African leaders who have been co-opted by Moscow. These included Faustin-Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic, Lt. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, and Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali. These leaders lack legitimacy domestically. They depend on Moscow’s political and mercenary support to hold onto power. A second category among the countries that abstained or did not vote is those with leaders who have patronage ties with Russia. Those in power in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe benefit from Russian arms, disinformation or political cover. These leaders, moreover, have no interest in democratic processes that may threaten their hold on power. Others who abstained or did not vote likely did so for ideological reasons rooted in their traditions of non-alignment. These included Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. While they may maintain ties to Moscow, they are appalled by Russia’s imperialistic actions. By and large, they support the upholding of international law to maintain peace and security. Those who voted to condemn the invasion included leading African democracies and democratisers. These comprised Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Zambia. They represent a mix of motivations. But I calculated that the median Global Freedom score for this group of 28 countries based on Freedom House’s annual (0-100) ratings is 20 points higher than those that did not vote to condemn. The [powerful speech by Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxZlaiuicYM), Martin Kimani, in defence of respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and resolving differences through non-violent means, epitomises the views of this group and its support for a rules-based order. Many have also taken the lead in condemning the surge in coups and [third termism on the continent](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438721000296?via%3Dihub). Priorities for action If the past is any indication, Russia can be expected to **escalate its influence campaign in Africa** in reaction to its international isolation following the Ukraine invasion.

#### Russia has a history of torturing and killing African civilians.

Human Rights Watch, 5/3

[Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on worldwide human rights violations; 5-3-2022; Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces]

(Nairobi) – Forces in the Central African Republic, whom witnesses identified as Russian, appear to have summarily **executed, tortured, and beaten civilians** since 2019, Human Rights Watch said today. National authorities, the country’s Special Criminal Court (SCC), or the International Criminal Court (ICC), should investigate these incidents as well as other credible allegations of abuse by Russia-linked forces with a view to criminal prosecution. Several Western governments, and United Nations experts and special rapporteurs have found evidence that the forces linked to Russia operating in the Central African Republic include a significant number of members of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government. On April 15, the United Nations announced it would investigate the circumstances in which at least 10 people were killed in the northeast, with some initial reports alleging Russian forces may have been involved. “There is **compelling evidence** that Russian-identified forces supporting the Central African Republic’s government have committed **grave abuses against civilians** with **complete impunity**,” said Ida Sawyer, crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “The failure of the Central African Republic government and its partners to forcefully denounce these abuses, and to identify and prosecute those responsible, will most likely only fuel further crimes in Africa and beyond.” Between February 2019 and November 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 people in person and 19 others by phone, including 10 victims and 15 witnesses, about abuses they said were committed by men with white skin speaking Russian, a language the witnesses recognized. Witnesses said that the men were carrying military-grade weapons and wearing beige khaki clothes, scarves to cover their faces, military boots, gloves, and sunglasses. In August 2018 the Central African Republic and Russian authorities signed an agreement under which “primarily former military officers” from Russia, also called “specialists”, would train Central African Republic forces. Russia-linked forces in the Central African Republic do not wear a designated uniform with official insignia or other distinguishing features. Twelve people spoke about an incident on the morning of July 21, 2021, in which apparent Russian-speaking forces killed at least 12 unarmed men near the town of Bossangoa. Human Rights Watch obtained the names of those killed from the United Nations and others who knew the victims. Bossangoa officials said the Central African authorities concluded that 13 people were killed in the attack. Witnesses said that men speaking Russian set up a roadblock, stopped the men, **beat, and shot them dead,** and then put at least eight of the bodies in a shallow hole next to the road. On August 2 the government said that it would set up a special commission of inquiry to establish responsibility and take appropriate measures. On October 27, in a joint statement, 16 UN Working Group experts and special rapporteurs referred to the special commission finding earlier that month that “Russian instructors” had committed human rights and laws of war violations. However, the commission has not published its findings. Human Rights Watch also spoke with six men who said that Central African army forces accused them and fifteen other men of being rebels and unlawfully detained them for several days or weeks between June and August 2021 in inhuman conditions in an open hole at a national army base in Alindao, in Basse Kotto province, in the south. They said both national army and Russian-speaking forces beat five of the men and that both forces may have executed two who were rebel combatants. Human Rights Watch was unable to independently verify the allegations of extrajudicial executions. Human Rights Watch also documented cases of detention and torture by Russia-linked forces in Bambari in 2019.

### 2AC – AT: Libya Impact

#### Russia is not interested in stabilizing the Libyan Civil War. They’ve taken a clear side.

Kirkpatrick ’20 [David D. Kirkpatrick; investigative reporter for the New York Times, based in New York, and the author of “Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East.” He was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2020 for international reporting for coverage of covert Russian interference in the politics of other governments, in part by injecting mercenaries and spies into civil wars; 4-14-2020; The White House Blessed a War in Libya, but Russia Won It (Published 2020); No Publication; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/world/middleeast/libya-russia-john-bolton.html?auth=linked-google1tap; 7-8-2022; SK]

Mr. Hifter did not want to talk peace.

A former Libyan Army general and onetime C.I.A. client, Mr. Hifter wanted a White House blessing for a surprise attack to seize Tripoli, the capital, before the peace talks commenced.

Mr. Bolton did not say no.

The attack, launched last April 4, backfired badly. Mr. Hifter failed to capture Tripoli, overextended his forces and restarted a civil war — killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands more. The fighting has cut off the flow of Libyan oil, injected new volatility into the region and severely diminished Washington’s influence.

But one apparent winner has emerged: the Kremlin. Russia has operated with cold-eyed cynicism, taking advantage of three years of muddled messages from the Trump administration to become a critical kingmaker in Libya, a geopolitical prize with vast energy reserves and a strategic location on the Mediterranean.

Mr. Bolton’s call with Mr. Hifter — described by a former senior administration official as well as three Western diplomats briefed by both Mr. Hifter and American officials — appears to have played into the Russian machinations.

Days before the call, private Russian operatives in Libya reported to Moscow that Mr. Hifter was a flawed and outmatched military leader sure to fail if he ever tried to conquer the capital, according to secret Russian documents seized in Tripoli and viewed by The New York Times. The operatives saw opportunity in his weakness and suggested that Russia could win leverage over Mr. Hifter if it sent mercenaries to bolster his so-called Libyan National Army.

“Russia will maintain a loyal and strong ally in the structure of the LNA,” the operatives argued, “which Hifter will have to contend with.”

Washington’s inconsistent position on Libya — officially supporting the peace process even as the White House has signaled that President Trump favors Mr. Hifter — has played a major role in prolonging the chaos. The absence of a strong American policy has opened the door to interference from competing American partners, including Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

Yet it is Russia that is now best positioned to dominate Libya.

An arm of the Kremlin controls dozens of social media accounts promoting Mr. Hifter and other favored clients, including the eldest son of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, Libya’s former dictator, according to the operatives’ report. The same Kremlin operation has acquired an ownership stake in a pro-Qaddafi Libyan satellite network and advised a pro-Hifter network as well, the operatives wrote.

At the same time, the Russian military has worked behind the scenes to surround Mr. Hifter with many of its old partners from the Qaddafi-era security forces, encouraging Qaddafi henchmen to return from exile. The Kremlin also has built ties to a potential governing party-in-waiting, the documents show.

And the Kremlin followed the operatives’ prescient advice. When Mr. Hifter’s assault stalled, Moscow propped up his sagging advance with thousands of trained mercenaries who continue to operate in Libya.

Representatives for the White House and Mr. Bolton declined to comment.

But alarmed American lawmakers have begun asking how the White House appears to have ended up backing the same side as Moscow.

During a recent Senate hearing on Libya, lawmakers wondered how the United States could fault Russia for propping up a client when the White House appeared to like him as well. The president sounded “inclined to support Hifter” even as the State Department seemed to oppose him, said Senator Mitt Romney, the Utah Republican.

“Is there consistency?” Mr. Romney asked.

“I can say unequivocally,” David Schenker, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, insisted with exasperation, “We do not support the Hifter offensive.”

Courting the President

A campaign to get the White House behind Mr. Hifter started almost as soon as Mr. Trump was elected.

Mr. Hifter’s most important patron, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates, pitched Mr. Hifter to members of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team at a secret meeting in New York in December 2016, according to a person with knowledge of the meeting.

President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, whom Mr. Trump has jokingly called “my favorite dictator,” also took up the Hifter cause five months later when he visited the White House.

“Hifter was a core talking point in every meeting with the Egyptians and Emiratis,” said Andrew Miller, a former member of the National Security Council staff and now a researcher at the Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington-based nonprofit.

Libya had foundered in chaos since a NATO air campaign helped oust Colonel Qaddafi during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Extortionist militias, militant extremists and migrant traffickers ran amok as the country was divided into fiefs. Officially, the United States recognized only the United Nations-sponsored provisional government in Tripoli.

But Crown Prince Mohammed and Mr. el-Sisi told Mr. Trump that the provisional government was hopelessly weak and riddled with Islamists. They argued that only Mr. Hifter could prevent Islamists from taking power in Tripoli, which the Arab leaders said would create a domino effect across the region, according to two former senior administration officials.

Mr. Hifter had vowed since 2014 to eradicate political Islam and take power as Libya’s new military ruler. Yet he had quietly formed an alliance with a rival faction of extremists, Saudi-style ultraconservatives known as Salafis.

As they lobbied Mr. Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed and Mr. el-Sisi overlooked that contradiction. They were also simultaneously working closely with Russia. Egypt had opened a secret Russian base to supply Mr. Hifter’s forces, to the alarm of Western officials worried about Moscow’s expanding influence.

The two Arab leaders, though, found a sympathetic ear in Mr. Bolton, who became national security adviser in the spring of 2018 and had previously led a far-right think tank known for sweeping attacks on political Islam.

The Bolton-Hifter phone call last spring came at a critical moment. Even as the peace talks were approaching, Mr. Hifter had moved his forces into a strategic oasis town south of Tripoli and was poised for a surprise attack.

When Mr. Hifter asked for consent, Mr. Bolton’s answer was “a yellow light,” not a green or a red one, the former senior administration official said. Yet three Western diplomats briefed on the call by both Mr. Hifter and senior American officials described Mr. Bolton as less equivocal: If you are going to attack, do it quickly, he told Mr. Hifter, according to all three diplomats.

Mr. Hifter counted that as an explicit assent, all three diplomats said.

The April 4 attack stunned the world. The United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, had just landed in Tripoli for the peace talks. He urged Mr. Hifter to pull back, a message endorsed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. American military forces hurriedly left the city.

But as the fighting was underway, Mr. Hifter’s powerful allies were lobbying Mr. Trump to show his support, White House officials said. Mr. el-Sisi pressed the president in person last year on April 9, and Crown Prince Mohammed over the phone on April 18.

The next day, the White House said in a statement that the president had called Mr. Hifter to commend his “significant role in fighting terrorism.” A day after the call, Mr. Hifter’s forces began shelling civilian neighborhoods of Tripoli.

“It seemed as if the Americans were switching sides in a way that didn’t make sense,” said Peter Millett, the British ambassador to Libya until 2018, noting that the Tripoli government had been the main Libyan partner to the United States military in counterterrorism.

“There was confusion and massive surprise in the international community,” he said.

Col. Ahmed Mismari, a spokesman for Mr. Hifter, declined to comment on the call with Mr. Bolton but said the Libyan commander appreciated the president’s support.

Russian Hedging

Even before the assault on Tripoli began, the Russians had concluded it would be a disaster for Mr. Hifter.

The Russian operatives in Libya worked for an obscure research center linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin. Mr. Prigozhin is also described by American officials as the leader of a Kremlin-linked private security company, the Wagner Group. Their teams of mercenaries have overseen Russian efforts to meddle in the politics of Ukraine, Syria and several African countries.

The leader of the Libyan team, Maxim Shugaley, had been identified in news reports in 2018 trying to pay bribes and spread disinformation to turn elections in Madagascar. Tipped off by American intelligence, according to a person involved, a militia allied with the Tripoli provisional government eventually detained Mr. Shugaley and his interpreter. A third operative eluded capture, Libyan officials said.

After detaining Mr. Shugaley, the security agents found a report in his hotel room that his team had sent to Moscow in March of last year, shortly before the Hifter-Bolton call. Dossier, a London research center critical of Mr. Putin, obtained a copy of the seized report and provided portions to The New York Times. Senior Libyan officials authenticated the text independently.

For several years, Russia had provided military supplies to Mr. Hifter and printed millions of dollars in newly minted Libyan currency for him to distribute.

But the secret report showed that the operatives were much more skeptical of Mr. Hifter than were the Arab rulers advising the White House.

Mr. Hifter, now 76, had recurring health problems. He won few military victories and had instead gained territory by “buying off local tribal groups for the right to place the flag,” so that he could “raise his significance in the eyes of internal and external players,” the report stated.

Not only did the operatives conclude that any advance on Tripoli was almost certain to fail, as did an offensive in 2014, they also warned that Mr. Hifter was stubborn and had become increasingly “difficult” to his Russian advisers.

“Hifter is using Russian help to increase his significance,” the operatives wrote, but “there is a serious basis to suggest that in the event of his military victory, Hifter will not be loyal to Russian interests.”

The operatives recommended the Kremlin hedge its bets on Mr. Hifter by allying with Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the eldest son of the former dictator. The operatives said their “company” had acquired a stake in a pro-Qaddafi satellite network and revitalized its broadcasts.

A longtime partner to Russia under his father, Mr. Qaddafi, now 47, was imprisoned in Libya in 2011 before somehow regaining his freedom. Now he is at large and plotting a comeback, according to Libyans close to him and Western diplomats familiar with intelligence reports on his movements.

But the Russians also identified a new opening with Mr. Hifter: The Kremlin should insert paid mercenaries loyal to Russia into his faltering military. Sudanese paramilitary forces were ready to do the job, the operatives insisted, and could give Moscow crucial leverage.

Game Changer

The contingents of mercenaries from the Wagner Group began arriving via Sudan last September, according to Western diplomats tracking their movements.

“That was the big game changer,” Ambassador Richard Norland, the American envoy to Libya, said at a recent briefing. “It’s clear the Russians see strategic advantage now in Libya — low risk and high gain.”

To deepen its influence, the Kremlin has also organized secret meetings in Moscow between Mr. Hifter’s supporters and former officers in the Qaddafi-era military and security services, according to Western diplomats and other analysts who have spoken to Libyan participants.

Musa Ibrahim, a former Qaddafi spokesman, declined to comment on specific meetings in Moscow but acknowledged that Russia had been “bringing together” the Hifter and Qaddafi officers, especially since the assault on Tripoli.

This month, on the anniversary of Mr. Hifter’s attack, the United Nations urged a halt to the fighting to respond to the coronavirus pandemic now spreading in Libya.

But Mr. Hifter has continued shelling Tripoli, even targeting a major hospital. And the Russian mercenaries have given Russia a de facto veto over any end to the conflict.

“This has been Russia’s dream since World War II,” said Fathi Bashagha, the interior minister of the Tripoli government, quoting Winston Churchill’s wartime statement that Moscow saw Libya as the “soft underbelly” of Europe.

“To get Russian feet on Libyan soil.”

#### **Recent actions by Libya’s parliament have opened a new road to stability.**

Bruno 3/3 [Alessandro Bruno; ; 3-3-2022; Could Libya Finally Have a Chance at Lasting Stability?; Inside Arabia; https://insidearabia.com/could-libya-finally-have-a-chance-at-lasting-stability/; 7-19-2022; SK]

Bachagha’s Appointment Has the Potential for Stability

Days before the scheduled – and already compromised elections – on December 24, Bachagha went to Benghazi where he met Haftar, head of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) on December 21, 2021. This meeting ­– at Haftar’s invitation no less – was remarkable. Its remarkability can only be explained by noting that in April 2019, Haftar launched the “Flood of Dignity” campaign to liberate Tripoli from the militias and Brotherhood-dominated Government of National Accord (GNA) — the original internationally supported transitional Libyan government — arresting all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and dissolving the political movement.

That same December, Turkey’s ambassador to Tripoli met Aqila Saleh of the House of Representatives, the Haftar-affiliated Libyan parliament in Tobruk. Around the same time, a delegation of GNA members from Tripoli flew to Turkey and met President Erdogan himself. This series of unlikely meetings suggests that Turkey and Haftar have reached a tactical agreement to soften their differences in order to stabilize Libya.

Evidently, Turkey has decided to change its game: it is no longer interested in staying in – and outright controlling – Libya. Erdogan calculated that Turkey’s continued presence in Libya created a problem for fellow NATO allies (Italy, France, and the US) which are eager to increase stability in North Africa, halt the flow of migrants, and secure important energy sources.

This situation parallels that of Tunisia, where Erdogan maintained ties to Rachid Ghannouchi and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda, and where the political cards have also been shuffled with the dismissal of parliament by President Kais Saied. Therefore, a shift in relations between Ankara and the Muslim Brotherhood has occurred in the Mediterranean. And without Turkey’s backing, the movement and its political representatives have been weakened.

Was it a Coup?

Technically, Bachagha’s appointment does not represent a coup. Indeed, as in all democracies, the executive governs with the trust of the parliament. And the “institution” in Tobruk that appointed Bachagha is Libya’s official parliament, elected by the people in 2014. That said, the militias in 2014 were affiliated with Bachagha, implying that any objectives the new prime minister sets toward stability should be easier to achieve.

Meanwhile, following the indefinite postponement of the elections, Turkey and Russia – until then rivals over Libyan matters — moved closer, building a common front and incubating the alliance of former enemies Haftar and Bachagha. This is especially impressive given that Bachagha fought against Haftar two years ago. Despite this ideal situation – for what could be more conducive to peace than a mutually beneficial alliance between two former enemies – there is an unlikely obstacle: the United Nations. Indeed, the UN has made it known that it does not recognize Bachagha and will continue to recognize Dbeibah.

In the current circumstances, which could lead Libya out of its darkness, the UN’s position represents a real and counterproductive interference in Libya’s internal affairs. Until recently, the government in Tripoli had the support of the UN, but not of the parliament. Today, the situation is that of one UN-backed prime minister and another prime minister who enjoys the support of the Libyan parliament. If the Misrata militia close to Bachagha has allied itself with Haftar’s LNA – the two single most powerful armed organizations in the country – the intensity and amount of fighting may also decrease drastically.

As for elections? They may or may not happen this year – or even the next. But there’s no denying the fact that perhaps for the first time since 2011, Libyans have more or less come together. Bachagha is in an unprecedented position to build a unified Libya, and the current scenario is one of renewed diplomacy. If the UN and the West care about elections and democracy, they should welcome these new arrangements as they will lead to more stability and only then, encourage a vote.

Bachagha has the potential to unite the country, even if some suspect him to be Haftar’s Trojan horse. The UN could be more productive and save face by encouraging a scenario that supports the Libyan parliament’s decision to back Bachagha while keeping Haftar at bay.

#### Russia and Turkey are pulling out.

Klapper ’21 [Rebecca Klapper; ; 6-23-2021; Russia, Turkey reach agreement to remove troops from Libya, U.S. official says; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/russia-turkey-reach-agreement-remove-troops-libya-us-official-says-1603508; 7-19-2022; SK]

A senior U.S. official said Russia and Turkey have tentatively reached an agreement to begin the process of withdrawing foreign troops from Libya in agreement with Germany's Foreign Minister pledging to remove foreign forces from Libya.

The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Associated Press that the deal is not yet done, but each country is prepared to discuss an incremental withdrawal of about 300 troops by both sides.

"We will not let up, and we will not rest, until the last foreign forces have left Libya ... wherever they come from," German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said.

Maas said that Russia and Turkey have been heavily involved on opposite sides, but acknowledged that a withdrawal would have to be taken "step by step" while also maintaining balance so one side doesn't gain an advantage over the other.

Libya's transitional government underlined its commitment to holding elections on Dec. 24 at a conference Wednesday with powers that have interests in the North African country, while the German hosts vowed to keep up pressure until all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Libya.

Germany and the United Nations brought together 17 countries at the conference in Berlin. Libya's transitional leadership was joined by foreign ministers from Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, France and Italy, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and senior officials from Russia, the United Arab Emirates and others.

The meeting followed up on a January 2020 conference where leaders agreed to respect an arms embargo and to push the country's warring parties to reach a full cease-fire. Germany has tried to act as an intermediary.

Maas said the meeting "marked a new phase" and that "we are no longer only talking about Libya, but above all with Libya."

Participants welcomed progress since the process was launched. An October cease-fire agreement including a demand that all foreign fighters and mercenaries leave Libya within 90 days led to a deal on the elections in December and the transitional government that took office in February.

Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush said the transitional government came "with a vision of how best to re-establish stability in our country and pave the way for free, inclusive and safe elections on Dec. 24."

Wednesday's conference saw powers involved in Libya recommit to refraining from interfering in the country's internal affairs and stating that foreign forces and mercenaries need to be withdrawn "without delay" — something on which there has been little progress.

Asked what guarantees the countries involved are giving to withdraw foreign fighters, Maas pointed to the fact that they had gathered for the conference.

Mangoush said there was "progress" regarding mercenaries, "so hopefully within the coming days mercenaries from both sides are going to be withdrawn," creating more trust and leading to further steps.

A further challenge will be to start bringing all armed groups in Libya under a joint military command.

Speaking earlier Wednesday ahead of the conference, Blinken said that "we share the goal of a sovereign, stable, unified, secure Libya free from foreign interference — it's what the people of Libya deserve, it's critical to regional security as well."

"For that to happen, national elections need to go forward in December and that means urgent agreement is needed on constitutional and legal issues that would undergird those elections," he said. "And the Oct. 23 cease-fire agreement has to be fully implemented, including by withdrawing all foreign forces from Libya."

Conference participants supported efforts toward a reconciliation process and committed to helping Libyan authorities "in developing a comprehensive approach to addressing migration," including the closure of detention centers.

#### Russia’s presence in Lybia breeds instability and civilian casualties.

Gaouette & Browne, 19

[Nicole & Ryan; journalists for CNN; 11-26-2019; US says Russian troops are destabilizing Libya; https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/politics/us-russia-destabilizing-libya/index.html]

Russia has deployed military forces to Libya that are “**de-stabilizing**” the North African country, a top State Department official warned Tuesday. David Schenker, the State Department’s assistant secretary for near eastern affairs, told reporters that Russia is deploying troops in **“significant” numbers** to support Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army launched an April offensive to seize Tripoli from the UN-backed Government of National Accord. US officials have previously told CNN that they believe hundreds of Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization with ties to the Kremlin, have been in Libya for some time, working on behalf of Moscow and helping Haftar in his bid to capture Tripoli, however Schenker said that Russia is now deploying regular uniformed personnel there as well. “Russian regulars are being deployed in significant numbers to support the LNA,” Schenker said, describing their presence as “incredibly destabilizing.” The presence of the Russian troops “raises the specter of **large-scale casualties among the civilian population**,” Schenker said. His comments come days after a senior US delegation met with Haftar on Sunday to “discuss steps to **achieve** a suspension of hostilities and a political resolution to the Libyan conflict,” according to a State Department statement issued Monday.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Russia increases African instability.

Siegle ’22 [Joseph Siegle; ; 2-2-2022; The future of Russia-Africa relations; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/; 7-16-2022; SK]

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm.

Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation.

PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM?

Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others.

To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow.

This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization.

Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022.

FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022

Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank.

Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence.

Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta.

Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector.

Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa.

Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022.

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY

Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia.

# Turkey-Russia Relations

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated

#### Russia has become both completely politically and economically isolated

Rochlitz 3/16 (Rochlitz , M. ,Michael Rochlitz is Professor for Economics with a focus on institutional change at Bremen University.(2022, March 16). Russia's slide into international isolation. Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/russias-slide-into-international-isolation//RM)

On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. The decision was based on a series of fatally flawed situational assessments, including an overestimation of the fighting abilities of the Russian army, an underestimation of the determination of the Ukrainian army and people, and a faulty evaluation of the West’s willingness to impose serious economic sanctions. The massive sanctions that have since been imposed on Russia’s economy have led to a freeze on half of the central bank’s reserves, a fall in the value of the rouble of more than 40 per cent, and an exodus of most Western companies from Russia. Increasing political repression and a fear of border closures caused several hundred thousand Russians – a significant part of the country’s intellectual elite – to flee abroad. The economic consequences of these developments will be disastrous. At the moment, neither the Russian government nor most Russian people seem to realise the extent of the economic catastrophe that is already sure to happen. In the best scenario, Russia’s economy will shrink by 10 to 20 per cent this year, a somewhat worse decline than during the 2008 financial crisis. But if the war continues, and new war crimes lead to additional sanctions, the economic disaster might be comparable to that caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A self-inflicted catastrophe There are few, if any, politicians in recent history who have inflicted such massive harm on their own country in such a short time as Putin has done in the last 20 days. Three weeks ago, Russia was a middle-income country well integrated into the global economy, with a large part of its population enjoying a standard of living comparable to that of some European states. Russians could choose from a similar range of consumer goods to people elsewhere in the world, occasionally travel abroad for a holiday, and expect to lead a relatively stable and peaceful life. Today, Russia has become an almost completely isolated pariah state. Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria were the only countries that voted against a UN resolution condemning the Russian war in Ukraine. According to a list compiled by researchers at Yale University, by 13 March, 350 foreign companies had ceased or curtailed their operations in Russia, with only 34 overseas firms continuing to operate normally. As both Airbus and Boeing are no longer servicing Russian planes, Russia’s airlines were forced to stop international flights and might soon be forced to stop domestic flights as well. Travel within the country will be pushed back to where it was in the early twentieth century. It is unlikely that any of these companies will return to Russia if the current situation continues or deteriorates. As a consequence, the country will be deprived of many of the high-technology and consumer goods it has been importing until now. As Russia produces very few hi-tech goods, this will seriously affect the Russian economy, disrupting supply chains and making the country’s situation similar to that of Iran during the last 30 years. A similarly heavy blow will be the brain drain caused by the recent wave of repression. Most of the hundreds of thousands of people who have fled Russia in recent weeks are highly qualified specialists and researchers who are difficult to replace. The remaining scientists in Russia will be cut off from international networks, as worldwide academic institutions have cut all ties with Russian universities. The consequences for science, research, and innovation in Russia will be devastating. Dark prospects for the future Even in the best possible scenario of immediate peace, it would take several years to repair the damage already caused. Such a scenario would probably require the fall of the Putin regime, and a new government that ends the war and takes responsibility for Russia’s actions, to open up the possibility of bringing the country back into the international community. Even in this highly unlikely scenario, however, Russia’s population will have suffered substantial economic harm, and the horrors already committed in Ukraine will leave deep scars for Ukrainians and Russians alike. In what is unfortunately a more likely scenario, the war will drag on for a considerable time, potentially leading to a complete end of Western oil and gas imports from Russia. Although China might be willing to jump in, Russia will not be able to significantly increase its oil and gas exports in the near future, as the existing infrastructure in the Far East is already operating at full capacity. Moscow will thus have to rely on Chinese loans to import Chinese consumer goods. As a result, Russia might turn into some large-scale version of North Korea: economically dependent on China and with a government that through tight control of travel and information will try to prevent its population from finding out the true reasons for the disaster that has befallen it.

#### Russia is isolated due to the Ukraine war–Turkey relations are impossible

Kim 5/11 (Kim, L. Kim was born in Charleston, Illinois. He earned a bachelor’s degree in geography and foreign languages from Clark University, studied journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and graduated from Central European University in Budapest with a master’s degree in nationalism studies.(2022, May 11). Russia isolated in its postimperial phantasm. Wilson Center. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm//RM)

From a strategic point of view, Putin’s attack on Ukraine has thrown back Russia to its weakest position since World War II. Ukrainians have shown they are ready to fight and die, and that they will never accept a Russian puppet regime. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, Russia ends up controlling swaths of eastern Ukraine, including a land corridor from Russia to Crimea, allowing Russian forces to continue threatening Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline and the country’s center. Yet even this state of play would hardly improve the Kremlin’s hand compared to what it was before the February invasion, when Russia already occupied Crimea and had the Ukrainians tied down in a low-level war in the eastern part of the country. Strategically speaking, the status quo ante was favorable to Russia, since the simmering conflict was draining Ukraine’s scarce resources and hobbling its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Germany and France, signatories to the stalled Minsk peace process, were uninterested in inflaming tensions with Russia over Ukraine—as was the United States. After taking office, President Biden tried to patch up relations with Moscow so that he could focus on his main foreign policy priority, China. Biden held a summit with Putin, refused to give Ukraine any clearer guidance on NATO membership, and ignored calls to sanction Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In the leadup to the attack, Putin, the eternal tactician, may have been under the impression that he was on a roll in Russia’s “near abroad.” In 2020, when mass protests broke out in Belarus, wedged between Poland, the Baltic region, and Russia, Putin offered dictator Alexander Lukashenko financial support and riot police. After a flare-up in a bitter territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that same year, the Kremlin inserted itself into the fight by dispatching Russian peacekeepers to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In January the Kremlin briefly deployed a Russian rapid-reaction force to Kazakhstan to help a friendly regime shore up its authority amid antigovernment demonstrations and violence. Though all are dependent on Russia, none of the beneficiaries of recent Kremlin support has returned the favor by actively backing the war against Ukraine. Russia’s Isolation To varying degrees, Putin’s attack on Ukraine sent shocks through every former Soviet republic as Russia showed itself to be an unpredictable, revanchist power. Russia’s isolation in its own neighborhood has nothing to do with NATO; its lack of true allies is a strategic disaster entirely of Putin’s own making. In light of their history as Soviet vassals, the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO was understandable and, in view of what’s happening in Ukraine, completely sensible. On emerging from behind the Iron Curtain three decades ago, these countries didn’t have the luxury to wait and see whether their former overlord would first develop into a peace-loving, democratic neighbor. That the Russian establishment even before Putin was opposed to NATO expansion is also understandable, given Russia’s past domination over Central and Eastern Europe. The irony is that NATO membership for the region’s small, insecure nations made Russia’s western border the most stable it has ever been. Although Putin fulminated about U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, it was unclear how they were supposed to neutralize Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world. In fact, before Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the United States was drawing down its military presence in Europe and attempting to pivot to Asia. The case of Ukraine is the most egregious example of how Russia’s postimperial phantom pains have clouded the Kremlin’s strategic thinking. Ukraine, with its close cultural, linguistic, economic, and religious ties to Russia, should have been a natural ally. While most Ukrainians were proud of their distinct identity, they were generally well-disposed toward Russia and deeply ambivalent about NATO before 2014. The Alliance itself was divided over Ukraine’s membership precisely because of the country’s deep connections to Russia. Even as Putin’s attack on Ukraine eight years ago spurred the United States, Britain, Canada, and Germany to send troops to NATO allies in Eastern Europe, it did not solidify support for Ukrainian membership within the Alliance. When Putin ordered a full-scale invasion in February, Ukraine was not significantly closer to joining NATO than it had been in 2008, when the issue was hotly debated, together with Putin, at the annual NATO summit. What has changed since 2014 is that a majority of Ukrainians support NATO membership and have no doubts that Russia has become their mortal enemy. As for NATO, member states such as the United States and Britain began arming and training the Ukrainian military. Putin’s fears of an increased U.S. presence in Ukraine—and Eastern Europe more broadly—became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The reputational damage to Russia that Putin’s belligerence has caused is staggering. Finland and Sweden are considering NATO membership, and even Switzerland has ended its traditional neutrality and adopted EU sanctions against Russia. Germany, once Russia’s most faithful partner in Western Europe, is determined to stop relying on Siberian natural gas, ending an energy relationship that began during the Cold War. Trust and economic synergies that took decades to build have been sacrificed for Putin’s delusional war. The Kremlin may retort that it has friends in other parts of the world. But even in the United Nations, Russia has been ostracized, with a large majority of countries calling on Moscow to end its offensive in Ukraine. Putin received explicit support only from Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, and North Korea, with China and India abstaining. The isolation of Putin’s Russia is linked to the country’s inability to articulate an attractive message about what it stands for beyond being the self-proclaimed antipode to the United States. At least during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the bearer of a powerful ideology that found adherents around the world. During his two decades in power, Putin has squandered the possibilities of Russian soft power. With a tiny fraction of Russia’s oil windfall, he could have established a global network of institutes, like Germany’s Goethe-Institut or Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, to tap into widespread interest in Russian culture. Instead he focused on Russian hard power, turning the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II into the regime’s ideological foundation. The untold human sacrifice in World War II was the source of the Soviet Union’s legitimacy as a UN Security Council member and worthy rival to the United States. With his unprovoked war against Ukraine, Putin has surrendered the last piece of moral high ground Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, held as a leading member of the coalition that defeated Hitler. Putin’s savage attack on Ukraine will taint and overshadow the memory of Russian heroism in World War II for generations to come. In May 2005, leaders from more than fifty countries, including the United States and Ukraine, attended the Victory Day celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. The number of foreign guests has since decreased inversely to Putin’s mounting aggression. Last year, only the leader of Tajikistan paid Putin the honor of attending his parade. This May 9, in a striking symbol of Russia’s isolation, no foreign guests came at all.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-Russia Relations Low

#### Turkey and Russia often align against each other

Got 20 (Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. The views expressed in this article are his own, and do not reflect the views or positions of any organization with which he is affiliated, 11-19-20, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato//BVN> SC)

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now

#### Turkey is focusing on reconnecting with the West

Bekdil 6/6 (Bekdil, B. E, Burak Ege Bekdil is a Turkey correspondent for Defense News. He has written for Hurriyet Daily News, and worked as Ankara bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswires and CNBC-e television. He is also a fellow at the Middle East Forum and regularly writes for the Middle East Quarterly and Gatestone Institute (2022, June 6). Turkey seeks to repair ties with Western Procurement Club. Defense News. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/06/turkey-seeks-to-repair-ties-with-western-procurement-club//RM)

“Turkey is a NATO ally and will remain one. The war between our two partners Russia and Ukraine has created a new understanding in favor of strengthening procurement ties with our NATO allies,” a presidential aide told Defense News, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss Ankara’s diplomatic tightrope walk. The war has once again put Turkey in a pivotal broker position within NATO. Ankara has cultivated ties with both Russia and Ukraine that officials hope will provide dividends in future negotiations. Turkey’s approval is also needed to advance Sweden’s and Finland’s respective NATO membership applications, which grew out of their fear that Russia would work to permanently isolate them from the alliance. But there is some history to overcome. In 2020, Turkey paid $2.5 billion for the Russian S-400 air defense system. But fearing further isolation and sanctions from its allies, Turkey decided against making the system operational. In response to the acquisition, the U.S. suspended Turkey’s membership in the multinational consortium that builds the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet. Turkey’s down payment of $1.5 billion for a first batch of the stealth aircraft, which Ankara never received, remains to be reimbursed. In March of this year, a senior Turkish diplomat who deals with NATO and security affairs told Defense News that the Russo-Ukrainian war has practically killed all potential Turkish-Russian deals related to strategic weapon systems. With Russia off the table as a military supplier, Turkish leaders are back to surveying the Western market. A senior Turkish procurement official said earlier this spring that the Eurofighter Typhoon is one option, involving the sale of about 80 aircraft — a purchase that would give Turkish industry an edge as it builds the country’s indigenous fighter jet in the making, the TF-X. The Typhoon was originally designed as an air superiority fighter. It is manufactured by a consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, which conducts the majority of the aircraft project through a joint holding company, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, representing the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain, manages the project and is the prime customer. Turkey also has moved to acquire 40 F-16 Block 70 aircraft and upgrade kits for its 80 older F-16s. The Turkish request went to Congress in April. Earlier in May, the Biden administration asked the House of Representatives to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet. A potential deal may include high-tech missiles, radar systems and electronic warfare suites for the planes. In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed hope in March that the trilateral talks between Turkey, France and Italy to co-produce the European air and anti-missile defense system SAMP/T, built by Eurosam, would resume after the French elections in April. In similar optimism, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said in late March that Italy and France were thinking “more seriously” now on co-producing the SAMP/T systems in Turkey. Meanwhile, Britain took steps to ease Turkey’s return to the Western procurement system. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Kaymakcı said in February that Britain had lifted a ban on arms sales to Turkey, imposed after a unilateral Turkish offensive in northern Syria in 2019. The ease in trade restrictions was kept secret from the public, and some observers say Canada might follow suit. But most Western restrictions remain in effect. For instance, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden imposed full arms embargoes on Turkey since 2019 over its military interventions in Syria. France has placed restrictions on an array of defense and aviation subsystems, and Italy has barred the sale of certain products. Germany has suspended plans to sell engines to power the Altay, Turkey’s first indigenous main battle tank in the making. “Turkey’s careful balancing act between its NATO allies and Russia has generally been recognized in the West, sometimes with much praise. How Turkey will maneuver between clashing Western and Russian interests in the near future will shape Western appetite for Turkey’s return to their procurement system,” said Ozgur Eksi, a defense analyst in Ankara. Some Western diplomats think Erdoğan may try to use Turkey’s veto power in NATO for a reset in procurement ties with the West. He said May 13 that his country is “not favorable” toward Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, indicating Turkey could use its membership to veto moves to admit the two countries. The issue was unresolved at press time. “The Turks appear to be preparing for a tough bargaining process, which may include the transfer of certain weapons system,” said a U.S. diplomat in Ankara. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to reconsider their traditions of military nonalignment. Eksi said that because of the war in Ukraine, Turkey would unlikely consider touching major arms deal with Russia that were previously on the table. “That includes any Turkish intention to buy the Russian-made Su-35 or Su-57 aircraft,” he said. Erdoğan has previously said Turkey was interested in buying the Russian-made fighter jets.

#### Turkey is turning away from Russia in support of the US–the Strategic Concept thumps and shows Erdogan’s commitment to Western values

Outzen 7-1 (Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of US government service both in uniform and as a civilian. 7-1-22, TURKEYSource, “Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance//BVN SC)

This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday. Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration. Jump to an expert reaction Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: A victory for NATO unity and cohesion Ian Brzezinski: Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia Rich Outzen: The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore A victory for NATO unity and cohesion The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family. The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance. It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus. It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members. The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests. In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade. The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies. The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term. —Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is the president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO. Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia At their summit in Madrid, NATO leaders decided to “invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO, and agreed to sign the accession protocols.” This was an important breakthrough. Until now, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had held up the protocols on the grounds that the two Nordic nations had embargoed his nation from defense sales and refused to extradite alleged Kurdish terrorists. Consensus was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Erdogan—a bilateral long sought by the Turkish leader—and memorialized via a trilateral Turkey-Sweden-Finland memorandum in which the latter two agreed to lift the embargoes, condemn the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition requests, and support Turkey’s involvement in European Union defense initiatives. The breakthrough underscored the influence and leadership of the United States in NATO. There is no way Erdogan would have lifted his veto solely due to European pressure. It also reflects Erdogan’s recognition that NATO brings Turkey far more geopolitical value than Russia, which would savor seeing this Nordic bid for NATO membership fail. Consensus on Finland and Sweden’s applications also demonstrated the Alliance’s unity in the face of Russia’s aggression and the difficulty Moscow still has when it comes to fully peeling Erdogan away from the transatlantic community. Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be far more transactional than strategic. With that said, Turkey, like all the other NATO allies, still has to ratify these accession protocols. There remains ample opportunity for Erdogan to introduce additional negotiations with the rest of NATO. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is still too early to say this round of NATO enlargement is a done deal. —Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy. The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore The summit was a great success for Ankara for three distinct reasons. The first is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland: No arms embargo on Turkey, an affirmed commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no aid to the PKK or (significantly) the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Gulen movement mentioned as a terror concern, collaboration on the defense industry, working groups to follow—it’s hard to see what they missed. Of course, these are statements of principle, and execution or a final commitment will play out over time. But that is as true for Ankara approving accession as it is for the specified cooperation. The second reason is the ringing endorsement from the White House not only for the trilateral memorandum, but for the strengthening of Turkish air power and specifically a commitment to press Congress to approve F-16 fighter jet sales and upgrades. Notably, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already weighed in with a strong endorsement of the deal. The in-person meeting of presidents Biden and Erdogan was notable, too. The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion in the new, slimmed-down Strategic Concept of language on countering terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and the prominence given both terror concerns and the Russian military threat, address Turkish concerns and highlight the value Turkey adds to the Alliance.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now

#### Turkey and NATO have a common interest in stopping enemy encroachment–that serves as a motivator within the alliance

**Congressional Research Service 21** (Congressional Research Service, December-30-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Congressional Research Service, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf//BVN SC)

Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3). From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement in places such as Syria and Ukraine, and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian objectives in various conflict arenas.86 As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.87 Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and Romania might be connected with concerns about Turkey.88 Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)— particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among those allies and partners.89 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S. arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.90 Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish defense cooperation with or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter Russia.91 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions, or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.92 A case in point will be how Turkey regulates and controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).93

#### Turkey does what is in their self-interest–they have no real allegiance towards either the West OR Russia

Ash 6-28 (Timothy Ash Senior Sovereign Strategist at BlueBay Asset Management in London, 6-28-22, “ASH: Turkey playing a delicate balancing act between Ukraine, Russia and Nato”, <https://bne.eu/ash-turkey-playing-a-delicate-balancing-act-between-ukraine-russia-and-nato-248887///BVN> SC)

Turks are rightly proud of the success of Bayraktar drones in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine has also celebrated the success of Bayraktar drones against Russian armour, particularly in turning the tide in the first few weeks in the Battle of Kyiv – with songs even produced and sung by Ukrainians soldiers to acclaim the battlefield changing nature of this high-end Turkish technology. Turks like to view this as a great example of the country’s new-found technological and military prowess, but also their willingness to show support for Ukraine despite obvious risks to damaging valuable relations with Russia. Ukrainians are, though, beginning to doubt Turkey’s commitment to their cause, notwithstanding the undoubted success of Bayraktar. Turkey’s stance on peace talks in Antalya in March and again over trying to broker a deal to break the grain blockade of Ukrainian ports has left a distinct impression in Kyiv that Ankara is too keen to toe the Russian line and force a Russian friendly peace deal down their throats. In Antalya the Turkish side were confident a deal was to be done, and even sold a deal as in the offing, but this seemed to be close to terms being offered by Moscow, with little effort to accept or even understand the Ukrainian position. Predictably the Antalya peace process eventually collapsed. The fact that Ankara seems tone deaf to Ukraine’s position was also evident on talks on-going over breaking the grain blockade, with Ankara negotiating directly with Moscow and seemingly little effort being made to involve the Ukrainian side – even though any plan involves decisions about unblocking Ukrainian ports. On the ports issue, Turkey seemed unable to comprehend the Ukrainian position that getting agreement to de-mine ports was worthless unless there were also security guarantees to ensure that Russian forces did not use this as an opportunity to launch amphibious landings against Odesa, Mikolaiv, et al. Turkey appeared naïve in both the Antalya talks and the talks over ending the grain blockade. The Turkish side appeared to be adopting a peace deal at any (to Ukraine) cost strategy, but with zero effort to understand the Ukrainian position. But key to understanding the Turkish position on the war in Ukraine, and its seemingly blinkered effort to bring peace at almost any cost (to Ukraine), is that the Erdogan administration views all of this through its very narrow electoral lens. And therein it faces difficult elections within the next year, with opinion polls not looking good for either Erdogan or his ruling AKP, while the economy is in a desperately weak position. A degree of desperation and wishful thinking is hence evident in Turkey’s approach to the war in Ukraine. On the latter, over the past decade, under Erdogan’s failed monetary policy mantra that “high interest rates cause inflation,” the economy has been in an almost constant state of balance of payments crisis. Erdogan continually prioritises growth over inflation and exchange rate stability, as in the past credit growth has delivered real GDP growth, jobs and votes. But this has meant the economy has been run too hot, the price of which has been wide current account deficits, large external financing requirements and constant pressure on the lira to weaken. An orthodox response would be to tighten monetary and/or fiscal policy to slow domestic demand, lower import demand and with it the trade and current account deficits, thereby alleviating pressure on the lira. But Erdogan’s interest rate ideology has removed this option for the CBRT, meaning that the lira has had to take the strain, which has in turn fuelled inflation. Turks are unhappy with inflation and a constantly weakening lira. They feel poorer, which explains Erdogan’s lowly popularity. But Erdogan still thinks he can win the election by pulling a few more rabbits out of the hat – including the recent exchange rate protected deposit scheme, and more recently restrictions on corporates borrowing in lira if they have large FX deposits. Erdogan thinks that this can buy him some time, helping slow dollarisation, anchor the lira enough for him to push the growth agenda just one more time to win the next election. In normal times it would be touch and go whether this strategy could hold things stable enough to get through to elections by June 2023 and deliver Erdogan a win. But the war in Ukraine has just made the maths here even more difficult – higher energy and food import costs and the threat of the loss of key Ukrainian and Russian tourism receipts (one quarter of the total) are pushing the current account deficit wider and putting even more pressure on the lira. Erdogan needs this war to end and soon, otherwise he risks getting rolled over in an extreme balance of payments crisis which would scupper any remaining popularity he has. So, Erdogan has been happy to allow Bayraktar drones to go to Ukraine – they advertise Turkish engineering prowess and generate important export earnings. But beyond that Turkey has done little to help Ukraine’s cause. And, as noted, if anything the Antalya peace talks and the talks over unblocking grain deliveries from Ukraine have undermined Kyiv’s position. Turkey has also failed to join Western sanctions on Russia – arguing that it simply cannot afford to, given its challenging balance of payments position. If relations with the West were better, it might have hoped for financial support to offset losses from sanctions and the war in Ukraine. But this option is constrained by broader Western concern about policy choices made by Erdogan, including over monetary policy. Some close to the Erdogan administration have even argued that Turkey could benefit from sanctions by acting as a middle-man similar to its position on Iranian sanctions. Some think that Turkey could benefit as Russian companies look to reflag to avoid sanctions, as Russian capital and business look to exit and evade sanctions, and also by being a conduit for Russian capital – tourism, the latter being the scenario where Russians seek to holiday in Turkey but using this as an opportunity to park capital by opening Turkish bank accounts and buying property. To some extent facilitating capital flight from Russia is a benefit for the West in heaping the economic pressure on Russia, but there is a fine dividing line for Turkey here from being seen to profit from the conflict, and concern that some of the activity might be on the edge of actual sanctions breaking. A recent visit by US Treasury officials to Turkey likely was meant to draw clear lines as to what is and is not acceptable. And then there is the whole furore around Turkey’s stalling on Finland and Sweden’s bid to join Nato. As Nato allies have highlighted, Turkey does have understandable security concerns over Scandinavian support for various Kurdish groups. It has leverage now to force Sweden and Finland to rein these in. And playing hardball on this issue will play very well with the domestic nationalist constituency in Turkey before elections. It's potentially a win-win for Turkey. But the risk is that Erdogan overplays his hand and permanently damages relations with the West. He needs to realise that for the US and the rest of its Nato allies, Russia is the priority and is seen as a clear and present danger, and an existential threat to Ukraine and the West. Finnish and Swedish Nato entry is a huge win for the West, for Ukraine, and a major snub to Putin. If Erdogan now blocks this at the Nato summit in Madrid later this month, relations with the West will, I think, be permanently soured. And likely the West will adopt an openly hostile, as opposed to largely neutral, approach to Erdogan’s re-election by June 2023. Blocking Swedish and Finnish membership would also stall rising hopes of a deal over Turkey’s compensation for leaving the F35 project, through purchase of additional F16s and upgrade kits. This would damage Turkey’s defence capability. Now playing hardball to the end of this could turn the next election in Erdogan’s favour, and I think he will have to balance this off against the risk of a major balance of payments crisis if he plays hardball too long. And with the West angered, he would have few tools to allay any such BOP crisis – he does not want to hike policy rates or go to the IMF, capital controls are counterproductive and will damage business, the CBRT has limited reserves and FX adjustment just leads to more inflation. If he faces a BOP crisis after vetoing Finnish and Swedish Nato membership, I think the West would stand on the sidelines as a full balance of payments crisis washes over Erdogan. And likely Erdogan would lose the next election. Logic would suggest that Erdogan would play very hardball to the Madrid summit – get deals over Kurdish groups in Sweden and Finland, easing of arms sanctions, and new agreements over new arms purchases like the F16. He can tell electors at home that he played hardball and won concessions. He will hope the West is grateful enough to keep capital markets open to allow him to finance his external borrowing needs. All this feels pretty binary. But I think in all this, Erdogan needs to realise that for the West the crisis in Ukraine is a defining moment, a definitive challenge they face, and it’s a time to ask if allies are with the West or against it. Erdogan has tried staying on the fence, to some extent trying to play one side off against the other. I think time for such an approach is fast running out. Madrid will likely be the moment when Erdogan has to decide whose side he is on. An important week is in store for Nato and Turkey.

### 2AC – Swindland Thumper

#### Erdogan has yet to vote for Swindland–he has gone back on his word

Moore 7-18 (Mark Moore is a political editor at the New York Daily Posts, 7-18-22, “Turkey’s Erdogan renews threat to block Finland and Sweden from NATO”, New York Post, <https://nypost.com/2022/07/18/turkeys-erdogan-renews-threat-to-block-finland-and-sweden-from-nato/#//BVN> SC)

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday renewed his threat to “freeze” NATO membership for Sweden and Finland unless they stick to their pledges to crack down on terrorist groups. “I want to reiterate once again that we will freeze the process if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfil our conditions,” Erdogan told reporters. “We particularly note that Sweden does not have a good image on this issue,” ​the Turkish strongman continued. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Finland and Sweden set aside decades of neutrality during wartime and asked to join the 30-member alliance. But Erdogan balked, saying the two countries were too lax in their stand against terrorists because they hosted Kurdish militants. At June’s NATO summit in Madrid, which was attended by President Biden, the three countries reached a deal on deporting or extraditing groups considered to be security threats, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and lift arms restrictions imposed after Turkey’s 2019 military incursion into northern Syria. But on Monday, Erdogan once again raised the threat of blocking their entrance into NATO unless they make good on the promises they made. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed his threat to "freeze" NATO membership for Finland and Sweden.

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Turkey sides with Ukraine–thumps the link

Cook 3-3 (Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook is the author of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East; The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, which won the 2012 gold medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Oxford University Press is publishing his next book, The End Of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East in 2022, 3/3/2022, “Where Turkey Stands on the Russia-Ukraine War”, Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-turkey-stands-russia-ukraine-war//BVN SC)

The Turkish government has designated the Russian invasion as a “war,” giving it the right under the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Strait—which leads to the Black Sea—to warships. Although this action applies to any naval vessel, it is clearly aimed at Russia’s fleet in case Moscow seeks to reinforce the firepower it already has there. Turkey’s decision is, at least, an important symbolic one in support of Ukraine. A Russian submarine surfaces in the Bosporus with Istanbul in the background A Russian submarine sails in the Bosporus on its way to the Black Sea. Despite the restrictions on warships in the Bosporus, it seems clear that Turkey—like other countries including Israel—has sought a strategically defensible but morally questionable middle ground. Though Turkey voted for a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it has not sanctioned Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Some observers have been quick to highlight the differences between Turkish policy and the definitive pro-Ukraine approaches of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), implying that Ankara is trying to have it both ways—remaining rhetorically committed to Ukraine’s independence and offering to mediate the conflict while tilting toward Russia. There is some logic to this, especially after the purchase of the Russian-made air defense system known as the S-400. However, it is less a tilt than a recognition that Turkey’s interests are intertwined with Russia in critical areas, most importantly Syria. There, Turkey wants to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state and maintain pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated a terrorist organization. To accomplish these goals, Turkish officials have to consider Russian sensibilities, as Moscow is the most important external actor in Syria and can thus complicate Turkey’s military operations there and frustrate its diplomatic efforts. In recent years, Turkey has pursued what can best be described as foreign policy independence. As an important power in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucusus, Ankara has sought a multifaceted foreign policy that has, at times, conflicted with its NATO allies. For example, in 2017, Turkey decided to purchase S-400s. This step coincided with a growing dialogue between Ankara and Moscow that included moves to upgrade economic ties and discussions about deepening diplomatic and even military relations. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have found themselves on opposite ends of major regional conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, a region over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a recent war. Even while they were supporting different sides in these places, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin maintained a dialogue. What about Ukraine? Turkey has generally supported Ukrainian independence and the country’s territorial integrity. Erdogan denounced Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has advocated on behalf of Crimean Tatars (a Turkic ethnic group) who have suffered under Russian rule. Turkey sold armed drones to Ukraine ahead of Russia’s most recent invasion, though some reports indicate that only about twelve to twenty were delivered. Still, in whatever number, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones are lethal and have been deployed to great effect in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. How is this war likely to affect Turkey’s interests in the region? Turkey has sought to expand its trade and commercial relations with both Russia and Ukraine. It is also a destination for Russian tourists and an importer of oil and gas. To the extent that this war affects these ties and drives up energy prices, the Turkish economy—which is already experiencing upwards of 50 percent inflation—will feel the repercussions.

### 2AC – No Link–NATO Over Russia

#### Even *if* Turkey and Russia are tied together, Russia will never replace NATO in Turkey’s eyes

Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)

The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.

### 2AC – No Link–Turkey Does Both

#### Turkey can work with both sides

Kusa 6/13 (Iliya Kusa, Iliya Kusa is a Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. For the past six years he has been writing about Middle East, Ukrainian foreign policy after 2014, and European politics. A special focus of his expertise is dedicated to the Middle East and North Africa, June, 13, 2022, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War”, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/turkeys-goals-russia-ukraine-war>//RM)

Of the many countries struggling to find a proper approach to the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey seems to have landed on the most controversial yet comfortable one. Ankara has managed to preserve its relationship with both Moscow and Kyiv without endangering its own geostrategic calculations in the region while at the same time avoiding joining ranks with Western countries in imposing crippling sanctions on Russia. The role of a key mediator, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was so eager to take on, has allowed Turkey to conveniently position itself in the middle of the fight—and not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war. The overall political and ideological polarization incited by the war in Ukraine has threatened many countries that have worked for years to build a balanced, pragmatic, multivector foreign policy. Now many of them find themselves having to make a hard choice. Western countries under U.S. guidance are urging them to make common cause against Russia, which often means abandoning their balancing act between major powers. As the war has shown, in a highly tense international environment, a posture of neutrality and balancing on the part of countries struggling not to choose sides is not welcome by the conflicting parties, which strive to mobilize support for their own efforts. Turkey in particular has had to carve a path that does not lethally threaten relations with either Russia or the EU. The war in Ukraine has presented Ankara with both opportunities and risks. After the 2015 centralization of political power in the hands of Recep Erdoğan, the president moved his personal ambitions and goals to the forefront of Turkey’s foreign policy. In particular, he has sought to make Turkey a regional Muslim superpower capable of designing and guiding a new “post-Western” security architecture in greater Eurasia and one of the first non-Western powers to shape the new multipolar world order. To preserve this course, Turkey has had to find an appropriate way to deal with the Ukraine challenge. In essence, two global objectives became a priority for Turkey when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24: to preserve its global and regional positions, which Turkey has managed to consolidate and enhance after 2016; as well as to reinforce Ankara’s influence and amplify earlier achievements to ensure further expansion. Objective 1: Preserving Turkey’s Global and Regional Positions The first global objective is reflected in several developments that became essential in Ankara’s quest to hold its ground. First, the war in Ukraine has threatened Turkey’s pragmatic multipolar approach underpinning its foreign policy. The political coalescence of NATO and EU countries against Russia could not have escaped Turkey’s attention. Nor could Ankara remain on the sidelines and refrain from getting involved, given its close ties with several Western countries and its NATO commitments. On the other hand, Turkey did not want to degrade its relations with Russia by joining the Western-led sanctions, in which Ankara has declined to participate since 2014. For Turkey, Russia has been an important trading partner ($32.5 billion as of 2021), a key source of foreign investment (more than $10 billion), a colossal source of tourists (Russians account for almost 5 million visits, or 1 percent of all foreign tourist visitation), a crucial energy supplier, and an important “frenemy” in several regional playgrounds where Turkey (though not without Russia) has been able to actually accomplish something, such as in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has been able to maintain relations with Russia and the West, thereby sustaining its desired global position, by assuming the role of a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine. This formal role gives Ankara a good reason not to get involved in sanctioning Moscow. Second, the war in Ukraine, with its subsequent social, economic, political, and transnational repercussions, has endangered stability on a number of regional issues that are vital for Turkey’s security, reputation, and international self-reliance. For years, Turkey’s regional policy was built on a situational partnership with Moscow. The possible weakening of Russia as a result of the war in Ukraine could throw the regional balance in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Levant into disarray, strengthening, for instance, Iran in Syria—and Iran is one of Turkey’s less preferred competitors. Regional destabilization is not in Ankara’s interests, especially in light of the substantial financial and economic difficulties Turkey has been struggling with since last autumn. Objective 2: Reinforcing Ankara’s Influence The second global objective has to do with furthering Turkey’s political, economic, trade, and geopolitical expansion. By shaping the dynamics of the current crisis, Turkey is trying to “ride the tide” and use it to its advantage. Its tactics to achieve this goal include taking the place of Western companies on the Russian market, accruing tourist and financial flows from Russia, thereby bypassing sanctions, and gaining political ground in regional affairs by taking on a mediation role, forcing the conflicting parties to consult with and through Ankara on issues of war, peace, maritime trade, the demining of the Black Sea, and the restoration of essential Ukrainian wheat exports. In addition, many Russians, fearing Western sanctions, have moved to Turkey, investing millions in the local real estate market and registering businesses there, which is also a lucrative deal for Ankara. (Ankara offers citizenship for a $400,000 investment.) Finally, Turkey sees an opportunity to achieve its long-sought goal of becoming the major gas transit hub for Europe. With the European allies determined more than ever to reduce their dependence on Russian gas imports, Turkey is offering its services and lobbying for realization of a long-discussed new subsea pipeline between Israel and Turkey, one that would allow eastern Mediterranean gas to reach Europe through Turkey. Even more important for Ankara in this context is exploiting the momentum to strengthen its own standing in the world. As Western partners search for support in containing the Russian threat and dealing with an array of war-related consequences, Ankara sees the time is ripe to make the West drop sanctions against the Turkish defense industry and embrace Turkey as an equal partner. It is with this logic in mind that Turkey’s leadership unexpectedly jumped on NATO’s expansion process with bold demands as to what Sweden, Finland, and NATO member states should do to obtain Ankara’s consent. And it is this tactic of getting the most out of concessions from all parties that drove Erdoğan to announce a new military operation in northern Syria against the Western-backed Kurds, thereby endangering the regional positions of both Russia and the United States. All in all, Ankara’s predominant stance on the Russia-Ukraine war is not about Russia or Ukraine at all. It is about ensuring that any future postwar settlement in the region and the world will necessarily include Turkey’s interests, and ideally establish Turkey as a stakeholder in the process. Turkey’s serious economic problems, however, mean these plans may have to be adjusted. The key aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war for Erdoğan and his government remains not so much support for Ukraine or Russia as an opportunity for Erdoğan to strengthen his position on the international stage at the expense of either country’s interests by proactively practicing diplomacy amid the developing crisis.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-West Increasing

#### L/T–Russian revisionism pushes Turkey towards the West

Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its&nbsp;relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)

While discontent with the West and anti-Westernism have facilitated cordial and cooperative relations between Moscow and Ankara, Russian geopolitical revisionism has almost invariably pushed Turkey closer to the West. The logic here is straightforward. First, Russian revisionism poses direct security threats to Turkey. Historically, the centre of gravity of Turkish-Russian rivalry has been the Black Sea. From the Turkish perspective, Russia’s actions – from the war in Georgia to annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine – all decisively tilt the balance of power in this region in Russia’s favour. Although Russia’s policy in each of these cases might have specifics and con­textual nuances, taken together they point to one unmistakable outcome: Russian revisionism in the post-Soviet space and an aspiration to turn the region into a sphere of domination. This will only aggravate the Turkish threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow. Second, the post-Soviet space is also Tur­key’s immediate neighbourhood. If success­ful, the Russian policy will restrict Ankara’s geopolitical room for manoeuvre in this region, and undermine its standing from the Black Sea to the Balkans and the South Caucasus to Central Asia. Additionally, Turk­ish and Western interests are in broad align­ment in these regions, so Moscow’s geo­political revisionism is likely to bring Tur­key and the West relatively closer together.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea

#### Turkey provides Black Sea support for NATO

**Aydogan, 21** (Merve Aydogan, 06-14-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Aa.com, "Turkey remains as indispensable member of NATO for 69 years", <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-remains-as-indispensable-member-of-nato-for-69-years/2273488/BVN> SC)

NATO forces in Aegean, Black Sea Turkey provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions in the Aegean Sea, presenting surveillance, reconnaissance, and monitoring activities to prevent illegal crossings. Turkey also supports Standing NATO Maritime Groups' (SNMG) activities in the Black Sea and Aegean, which is included as part of NATO obligations. Moreover, Turkey also hosts LANDCOM, NATO's land command, in the Aegean coastal province of Izmir. The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – one of nine NATO land forces headquarters with high readiness level – is also stationed in Istanbul. Turkey also took command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2021. "Built around Turkey's 66th Mechanised Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops, a total of around 6,400 soldiers will serve on the VJTF," according to NATO. Turkey's latest armed vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers have been allocated to the task force.

#### Turkey acts as a geopolitical powerhouse to defend the Black Sea

**Ellehuus, 19** (Ellehuus, Rachel. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.) [Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.//BVN SC]

Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in NATO. The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in [the] Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance. For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME

#### NATO and Turkey are key to mitigating Middle Eastern conflict

**Cammack & Dunne 18**(Perry Cammack was a nonresident fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on long-term regional trends and their implications for American foreign policy., Michele Dunne is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East., ND, “Fueling Middle East conflict—or Dousing The Flame”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548//BVN SC)

In comparison with almost every other geographical region, the Middle East suffers from a lack of both regional dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic protocols that might reduce the scope for regional conflict. While the Cold War was defined by the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides increasingly felt the need for inclusive institutions and mechanisms to reduce tensions. Every U.S. president during the Cold War, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George H. W. Bush, met with his Soviet counterpart. During the tensest moments, high-level U.S.-Soviet channels of communications were especially important. Over time, a number of confidence-building institutions and transparency-enhancing measures were created, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successive arms control agreements, and later the Treaty on Open Skies, which allows for unarmed surveillance flights over signatory countries to promote military and nuclear weapons openness. In the Middle East, however, the absence of any similar mechanisms or organizations, particularly amid proliferating military conflicts, feeds security dilemmas across multiple vectors, so that steps justified by one state as necessary to its security—military intervention, arms procurement, alliance formation, and so on—are perceived by its rivals as threatening. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts of the 1990s, there were attempts to build mechanisms for regional communication and cooperation. Participants at the 1991 Madrid Conference set up five multilateral working groups to address regional challenges, each involving Israel and a range of Arab states. The centerpiece was the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, which marked the first bid to create a formal multilateral framework for regional security issues. Six ACRS plenary sessions, co-hosted by the United States and Russia, were held and a series of regional confidence-building measures were outlined before the working group slowly broke down by 1995 under the weight of regional animosities and implementation challenges. While all of the working groups have long been defunct, one tangible result survives: the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, created in 1995. The center conducts transboundary water research and development projects, and its membership includes Israel, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, and Qatar as well as several Western nations.

#### Turkey is an essential member to NATO’s defense in the Middle East

Üzümcü et al 20 (Ahmet Üzümcü is the Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006, 12-16-20, “Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat”, European Leadership Network, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat//BVN> SC)

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nationin 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat.

#### NATO and Turkey are aligned in the Middle East–they can collaborate

**Ellehuus 19** (Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.//BVN SC)

A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—appnd NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base[s] at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns. Should NATO and Turkey move to restore some level of trust by taking these first steps, it will be important to avoid unnecessarily escalating tensions. For Turkey, this means abiding by the terms of the Syria ceasefire, not pursuing additional purchases of Russian military equipment, and doing its part to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State in the region or return of Islamic State foreign fighters to Europe. For the United States and Europe, the trick will be to apply the required sanctions and arms embargoes in a discriminate way. For example, whereas imposing sanctions in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and withholding delivery of Turkey’s F-35s due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 makes good policy sense, imposing additional blanket sanctions could do more harm than good, affecting the Turkish people more than their leadership and giving Erdogan another opportunity to blame the West for Turkey’s economic problems. A smarter approach might involve going after corrupt actors using the Global Magnitsky Act. Similarly, a total arms embargo by the United States and the European Union will only drive Turkey to procure more Russian or non-NATO interoperable military equipment. Rather, the arms embargoes should be limited along the lines of the most recent House sanctions bill, which includes exemptions for items to be used in NATO-approved operations. Finally, as some of Turkey’s biggest export partners, the European Union and the United States can provide needed carrots along the way to incentivize constructive behavior by Ankara. Measures might include an eventual upgrade of Turkey’s customs union with the European Union or limited visa-free travel to EU countries for Turkish citizens. For the United States, President Trump’s offer of a $100 billion trade deal will also be attractive to Erdogan in Turkey’s struggling economy. To be sure, repairing the trust that has been lost and returning Turkey to the path of Western integration will be a struggle, requiring sustained effort, and a setting aside of egos, on all sides. Yet on this occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Turkey and its NATO allies owe it to one another to pause for a moment and reflect not on their many disagreements but on what brought them together in the first instance and why that still matters.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-Russia k2 Emerging Tech

#### Turn–Turkey modernization good–allows for better Russian-Turkish cooperation

Starodubtsev 20 (Ivan Starodubtsev, December 10, 2020, “Can Russia and Turkey cooperate in cyberspace?”, <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/can-russia-and-turkey-cooperate-in-cyberspace>/RM)

It is clear that both **Russia and Turkey** today **think similarly** about **modern technologies**, including **AI and cybersecurity**. Russian companies and solutions, including Yandex with all the variety of its services, the Kaspersky cybersecurity company and social network and messenger software Telegram, are well known and in demand in Turkey. We may expect that Sberbank will soon enter the Turkish market with its solutions in the field of AI. Turkey-Russia cooperation At the end of this article, one may ask, can Russia and Turkey fully cooperate in the field of digital technologies? However, this question is no longer valid today as cooperation in the AI field has become a necessity. Russia and Turkey, which work together to ensure security in the region, including in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, should also cooperate in the field of digital technologies, primarily in AI and cybersecurity. Russia and Turkey both think in a similar way, stating that it is necessary to implement not only international regulation in digital space but also moral and ethical norms. The promotion of this idea to the world is another **potential mission of Russian-Turkish relations**. Achieving this task is not only about the prosperity of the two countries in the new technological order and economy of the future but also a **matter** of **peace and stability** of the region and the strengthening of neighborly relations.

### 2AC – AT: Syria I/L

#### Turkey and Russia are misaligned in Syria now–thumps the uniqueness AND the internal link

Tastekin 6-17 (Fehim Tastekin is a Turkish journalist and a columnist for Turkey Pulse who previously wrote for Radikal and Hurriyet. He has also been the host of the weekly program "SINIRSIZ," on IMC TV. As an analyst, Tastekin specializes in Turkish foreign policy and Caucasus, Middle East and EU affairs. He is the author of “Suriye: Yikil Git, Diren Kal,” “Rojava: Kurtlerin Zamani” and “Karanlık Coktugunde - ISID.” Tastekin is founding editor of the Agency Caucasus, 6-17-22, “Russia, Iran won't endorse Turkish military operation in Syria”, Al-Monitor, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/russia-iran-wont-endorse-turkish-military-operation-syria//BVN> SC)

Turkey failed to garner Russian and Iranian backing for a fresh military intervention against Syrian Kurdish forces at the meeting of the Astana platform this week. Senior diplomats from Turkey, Russia and Iran, the three guarantors of the platform, as well as representatives of Syria’s government and opposition, attended the June 15-16 meeting in Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan, known previously as Astana. While the official agenda included topics such as the return of Syrian refugees, the humanitarian and economic situation in Syria, the work of the constitutional committee in Geneva and confidence-boosting measures toward a political settlement, the main issue was Turkish threats to wrestle control of further territory held by the Kurds. President Recep Tayyip has openly named Tel Rifaat and Manbij as targets, vowing to rid them of “terrorists” as part of a plan to create a safe zone with a depth of 30 kilometers (about 20 miles) along the Turkish border. The groups in Ankara’s crosshairs are the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party. Ankara equates them with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the armed outfit designated as a terrorist group over its decades-long separatist campaign in Turkey. Speaking to reporters ahead of the meeting, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Kremlin’s special Syria envoy and head of the Russian delegation, called Turkey’s intervention plan an “illogical and irrational” prospect that threatens “an escalation of tension and a new military confrontation in those areas,” according to Syrian media. He dismissed speculation that Russia could turn a blind eye in return for Turkey blocking Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO. “There is no such thing. We are not bargaining. We are not giving up on our allies in the region,” he said. Ali Asghar Khaji, the head of the Iranian delegation, “underlined that Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are untouchable” in a meeting with the Turkish delegation, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Sousan, who led the Syrian delegation, urged the United Nations “to rein in [Erdogan’s] aggressive policies” in a meeting with UN officials, Syrian media reported. In response, the UN officials cited statements by the UN secretary-general’s spokesperson in support of Syria’s sovereignty and against fresh escalatory moves in the country. In separate talks with the Russians, Sousan rejected Turkey’s pretexts for attacks on Syrian territory, charging that they were designed “to achieve its expansionist ideals” and that “the Syrian people are determined to defend their country [and] resist the occupation.” Lavrentiev, for his part, pledged Russia would do its best to prevent further escalation in Syria. In the final statement, the parties denounced “separatist agendas” in Syria in a nod to Turkey’s security concerns and a rebuke of the Kurdish groups leading the de facto self-rule in the north. They also reaffirmed commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and a political settlement to the conflict, as they have done in all previous statements in the past six years. In Turkey’s view, its control of significant chunks of Syrian territory does not contradict that commitment. The parties also pledged to work together “to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations.” The sixth point of the statement referred to Kurdish-held areas in northeast Syria, saying that lasting security and stability in the region can only be achieved by preserving Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The wording matched the arguments that Russia has put forward against Turkey’s attempts to expand its control in northern Syria. Simply put, Moscow argues that the best way to address Ankara’s security concerns is to ensure that the Syrian army returns all the way to the Turkish border as Ankara begins to cooperate with Damascus and discuss joint measures under the 1998 Adana accord on security cooperation between the two countries. The communique suggests that Ankara has toed Moscow’s line, at least on paper. In the same paragraph, the statement acknowledged Turkey’s concerns, saying that the parties reject “all attempts to create new realities on the ground, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives under the pretext of combating terrorism.” In a reference to the United States, the statement denounced “the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to Syria” and “the actions of countries that support terrorist entities including illegitimate self-rule initiatives in the northeast of Syria.” Pledging continued cooperation to eliminate the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other UN-designated terrorist groups, the statement expressed “serious concern” with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which holds sway in Idlib and with which Turkey has tacitly cooperated on the ground. It stressed also the need to facilitate the return of refugees and support the UN-sponsored process of drafting a new constitution for Syria. The text, released by the Kazakh hosts of the meeting, did not explicitly mention the YPG or the PKK, but Turkey’s state-run Anatolia news agency said the final communique emphasized Turkey’s determination to “fight the PKK/YPG terrorist organization” and enact “any measures to protect our borders and prevent attacks on our people and security forces and innocent Syrian civilians.” Russia’s denunciation of “separatist agendas” — a reference to the Kurds’ autonomy drive and partnership with the United States — suggests that it is shifting to a position more pleasing to Turkey. This trend has been tangible in other statements in recent times. Moscow’s temperate policy on the Kurds appears to be wearing out amid rising Russian-US tensions over Ukraine, opening room for Ankara to maneuver. According to media reports on the talks, the Turkish side insisted that the YPG’s removal from Tel Rifaat and Manbij was a commitment that Russia failed to deliver under the 2019 Sochi deal, while the Russians recalled Turkey’s outstanding commitment to eliminate terrorist groups in Idlib and reopen the M4 motorway. Such exchanges between Turkey and Russia have recurred time and again as a tactic to balance or restrain each other. The talks in Nur-Sultan were significant in terms of clarifying Moscow’s attitude on Ankara’s intervention threat, for its initial reactions were softer and more ambivalent compared to similar tensions in the past, contrasting the firm objections of Tehran. Some Russian statements even sought to justify Turkey’s security concerns, fueling speculation that Turkish-Russian bargaining on issues related to NATO and Ukraine might extend to the conflict in Syria. Nevertheless, a marked difference was visible between Russia’s rhetoric and its actions on the ground. Russia took a number of steps signaling solidarity with the Syrian army, including joint military exercises in the south of Idlib on June 10. In a series of firsts, the Russians installed a Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft system at the Hasakah airport in the northeast; deployed tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons and missiles to the Abkar base in the same region; and dispatched eight helicopters to the Abu al-Duhur base in eastern Idlib. Russian planes and helicopters rumbled in the skies of northeastern cities such as Qamishli, Tel Tamir, Amuda, Darbasiyah and Ras al-Ayn. The Iranians, meanwhile, deployed reinforcements to the vicinity of Tel Rifaat and moved Shiite militia from Deir ez-Zor to the al-Nayrab base to the east of Aleppo. In other words, Russia and Iran were naysaying a Turkish intervention with their actions on the ground, and any expectation that they would step back in the talks in Nur-Sultan was unrealistic. Though the final statement touched prominently on Turkey’s concerns, the settlement path it outlined is dismissive of military intervention.

#### Turn–Turkey’s revisionist foreign policy destabilizes the Mediterranean AND the Middle East

Tziarras 21 (Zenonas Tziarras, researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre and a co-founder of Geopolitical Cyprus, and Jalel Harchaaoui, a senior fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a Swiss-based institute; “What Erdogan Really Wants in the Eastern Mediterranean”; Foreign Policy; 1/19/21; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/turkey-greece-what-erdogan-wants-eastern-mediterranean-sovereignty-natural-gas/BVN> SC)

In an episode that has tediously repeated itself several times since July, Turkey’s seismic-survey ships and navy vessels clash with Greek authorities while probing for hydrocarbons in waters off the small Greek island of Kastellorizo. Turkey and Greece—perennial foes—don’t see eye to eye on the Mediterranean’s maritime boundaries. Yet, each time they bicker, pundits are quick to reduce the Greek-Turkish standoff to a bilateral kerfuffle over natural resources. In reality, the dispute over Kastellorizo—and Turkey’s incursions in the Eastern Mediterranean more generally—are merely proximate symptoms of a deep-rooted conflict over sovereignty. That fight has been brewing for decades, and it was recently exacerbated by the abandonment of long-held Turkish foreign-policy principles based on caution and an aversion to adventurism. Nothing that happens in the Eastern Mediterranean is separable from the wider dynamics in a region where Europe, Asia, and Africa meet. The region has always been ground zero for great-power politics, but it has developed a new vulnerability in the aftermath of Washington’s ill-fated Iraq War, which prompted a reconfiguration of U.S. foreign-policy priorities around the world. Today, the United States is increasingly unwilling to intervene decisively abroad—making space for other actors to scramble in pursuit of their individual agendas, trying to carve out their own spheres of influence. Nowhere is this more evident than in Turkey’s environs, where Ankara has sought to capitalize on these changes to pursue what amounts to a revisionist geopolitical agenda. Domestically, this about-face has been buttressed by a move toward Islamic populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism—away from what some Washington policy wonks used to call the “Turkish model”: a perceived synthesis of economic liberalization, pro-Western democracy, and Islamic values that many believed could be a model for the Arab world. Now, rather than going for a clean and quick divorce, Ankara is leveraging its various institutional, economic, and security ties with the West to climb the power ladder of the regional system while embracing illiberalism at home. Since 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has exuded historical revanchism in justifying Turkish interference in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia—his discourse peppered with flowery mentions of “geography in our heart” and “our spiritual borders.” But a nostalgic policy of neo-Ottomanism doesn’t begin to explain Ankara’s geopolitical reasoning under Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey today seeks to become a great power able to negotiate on equal terms with the rest of the great powers and, wherever possible, impose its will by resorting to faits accomplis. In order to maximize its stature, then, Turkey has invested in its national security apparatus and military-projection capabilities while also ramping up its global soft power in everything including entertainment, religion, and commerce. All in all, Erdogan’s agenda encompasses much more than mere defense and survival. His ultimate goal is to alter the geopolitical status quo in ways he believes benefit Turkey. In this sense, Turkey is now a revisionist state: It embarks upon military interventions and seeks to control foreign territory, as in Syria and Iraq; challenges land borders and maritime boundaries, as with Cyprus and Greece; engages in demographic engineering and political interference, as in Syria and Northern Cyprus; maintains bases overseas, as in Somalia and Qatar; and galvanizes dependent proxies, as in Libya, northern Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All this may be needlessly provocative and eventually prove counterproductive in bolstering Turkey’s stature vis-à-vis erstwhile allies. But it’s a vindictive path informed by Ankara’s current foreign policy, which is instilled with Turkey’s own brand of political Islam: Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Gorus (National Outlook) movement of the 1970s. Chief among Milli Gorus’s tenets is that Turkey was—and continues to be—ripped off by the West.

### 2AC – AT: Ukraine I/L

#### Non-unique–Turkey is mediating between Russia and Ukraine now

Kirby 22 (Jen Kirby, Foreign and National Security Reporter, April 1, 2022, “What diplomatic solution might end the war in Ukraine?”, <https://www.vox.com/2022/4/1/23002085/peace-talks-ukraine-russia-war-turkey-neutrality>//RM)

The war in Ukraine has ground on for five weeks. For almost as long, Russian and Ukrainian officials have been attempting to negotiate. Those negotiations have yielded few firm results so far, especially as Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities. Still, the talking matters. Diplomacy is the only way this war will finally end, and the type of agreement that might end the fighting looks a lot clearer than it did even a month ago. In the early days of the war, the talks made little apparent progress. Ukraine appeared to be demanding an immediate ceasefire, and Russian withdrawal of troops. Russia, however, had pretty different ideas. It laid out some aggressive demands. Among them were: Ukraine’s neutrality and no membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); so-called “demilitarization and “denazification;” the protection of Russian language within Ukraine; and that Ukraine recognize Crimea as part of Russia and recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two regions in eastern Ukraine that Vladimir Putin had declared as independent on the eve of his full-scale invasion. In recent days, some glimmers of optimism have emerged. Ukraine has put forward serious proposals, which is centered around a commitment to permanent neutrality and an agreement not to seek NATO membership, in exchange for security guarantees. Russia has also reportedly eased up on some of its previous demands, including “denazification” — a likely ruse for regime change — and “demilitarization,” a sign that Ukraine’s battlefield successes so far have pushed the Kremlin to possibly reconsider some of its most maximalist demands. Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, who is helping to broker the talks, described the discussions earlier in the week as “the most meaningful progress since the start of negotiations.” But these really are just glimmers of progress — and they might not be so long lasting. Russia, this week, promised to “drastically reduce” military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv, in the name of “mutual trust,” though reports of shelling continued in those areas. Some, including US and NATO officials, have expressed skepticism that Moscow is sincere, and instead using talks to buy time, so it can regroup and refocus its offensive, potentially on areas in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since then, both Russia and Ukraine have downplayed the seriousness of the talks, even as negotiations resumed Friday. And huge gulfs remain. Perhaps the most intractable problem may be the future of the Crimean peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014, and Donetsk and Luhansk, which Russia and Russia-backed militias control parts of. Ukraine is unlikely to agree to slice up its country. It is also hard to imagine Russia settling for less territory than it controlled the day before its invasion in February 2022. Other issues will emerge, and concessions and proposals may shift depending on developments in the battlefield. The prospect of a quick peace deal between Ukraine and Russia remains unlikely. Perhaps the best case short term is that both sides broker a ceasefire that includes a framework for an agreement, and then work the details out over time. But the war continues.

#### Turn–Russia is currently making advances in Ukraine–NATO tech support solves and throws them off

Dan **Lamothe and** Adela **Suliman**, **06-24-**20**22**, [(Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 14 years, traveling extensively, embedding with each service and covering combat in Afghanistan numerous times.) "Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/24/severodonetsk-troop-withdrawal-ukraine-lysychansk/]//DS

Russia claimed control Sunday over the key city of Lysychansk, the last major Ukrainian foothold in the Luhansk region — signaling a potential turning point in Moscow’s campaign to take all of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials said their forces had withdrawn from Lysychansk after fierce fighting to preserve lives from the Russians’ relentless assault. The slow Russian advance across the region it has targeted since the invasion began in February has been facilitated by overwhelming artillery power that has leveled cities and towns and left a trail of wounded and dead prompting comparisons with the devastation of World War I in Europe. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in a statement that Russian troops and pro-Kremlin separatists of the self-declared Luhansk People’s Republic “have established full control” over Lysychansk “and a number of nearby settlements.” The Ukrainian military’s general staff said Sunday that Ukrainian forces were forced to withdraw from Lysychansk after waging a stiff but losing battle. Ukraine had tried to defend Lysychansk for weeks. The military said it decided to withdraw because remaining in the city would bring “fatal consequences,” given the Russian forces’ “overwhelming advantage” in “artillery, aviation, ammunition and personnel.” The decision was “made to save the lives of Ukrainian defenders,” according to a statement posted on Facebook. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed to return. “If the command of our army withdraws people from certain points of the front where the enemy has the greatest fire superiority, in particular this applies to Lysychansk, it means only one thing: We will return thanks to our tactics, thanks to the increase in the supply of modern weapons,” Zelensky said in his nightly address Sunday. “Ukraine does not give anything up.” The city is a key target in Russia’s battle to capture the Donbas region, the heavily industrialized area bordering Russia that is partly controlled by separatists loyal to Moscow. In 2014, they unilaterally established two independent “republics” in the Donbas region. ‘They’re in hell’: Hail of Russian artillery tests Ukrainian morale Russian President Vladimir Putin cited false claims of Ukrainian “genocide” against Russian-speaking residents there as justification for his invasion. Russia’s latest advances in eastern Ukraine add to creeping doubts among U.S. lawmakers and observers of the war that the Ukrainian government can stop Putin from seizing territory. Optimism sparked by the defeat of his forces in the battle for Kyiv in the spring has faded as Russian artillery hammers Ukrainian forces and civilian targets. As Ukraine war bogs down, U.S. assessments face scrutiny President Biden said last week that U.S. support for Ukraine is unshakable and will continue “as long as it takes” to ensure a Russian defeat. “We continue to fight. Unfortunately, the steel willpower and patriotism are not enough to achieve success — we need the technical resources,” the Ukrainian military’s statement added. Why is Ukraine’s Donbas region a target for Russian forces? Ukrainian troops withdrew just over a week ago from Severodonetsk, a city across the Donets River to the east. Russia’s capture of Lysychansk, if confirmed, would be a major victory that gives its troops clear access to Donetsk, the other region that makes up Donbas. Biden administration officials say Putin’s gains have been uneven and have come at a significant cost, highlighting the steep death toll among Russian troops. But Ukrainian forces also are paying a heavy price, which U.S. military officials rarely acknowledge. Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east Control over Donbas is the primary goal of Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine, after it failed to capture the capital, Kyiv, and other areas in the initial weeks of the war. Russian troops and their allies have been making steady gains in the east, as officials in Kyiv say they are outgunned and running out of ammunition. Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Yuriy Sak told the BBC earlier Sunday that Ukraine controls other cities in Donetsk and argued that “the battle for the Donbas is not over yet.” Serhiy Haidai, governor of the Luhansk region, said earlier in the day that in attacking Lysychansk, Russian fighters used tactics even more brutal than in Severodonetsk to overcome resistance. Photos showed bombed-out residential buildings in Lysychansk early Sunday, amid a barrage reminiscent of the destruction of Severodonetsk. As recently as Saturday, a Russian-backed politician said Lysychansk was “completely surrounded,” but defense officials in Ukraine said they still had control of the city. Those counterclaims were probably “outdated or erroneous,” according to an analysis from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank. It cited unconfirmed videos showing Russian forces erecting a red “victory” flag in Lysychansk and “casually walking around” its neighborhoods. “Ukrainian forces likely conducted a deliberate withdrawal from Lysychansk, resulting in the Russian seizure of the city on July 2,” it said. As Russia issued its claim of control over Lysychansk on Sunday, Slovyansk, a town about 50 miles west in Donetsk, came under intense shelling that killed at least six people, local officials said. Mayor Vadym Lyakh said in a video on Telegram that “the biggest shelling of Slovyansk recently” had left “a large number of wounded and dead.” Tetyana Ignatchenko, a spokeswoman for the Donetsk region, told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne News that at least six people were killed and 15 were injured in the shelling. She added that missiles hit the town of Kramatorsk, to the south of Slovyansk. In its assessment Saturday, the ISW said Russia was likely to fully take over the Luhansk region “in coming days” and would probably “then prioritize drives on Ukrainian positions in Siversk before turning to Slovyansk and Bakhmut,” in Donetsk. In other developments, Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey said Sunday that Turkish authorities have detained a Russian-flagged cargo ship loaded with stolen Ukrainian grain. Millions of metric tons of grain await export from Ukraine, blockaded by Russia’s control of Black Sea shipping lanes. The export blockades have resulted in global food shortages and rising prices, which have particularly affected poorer countries. Three people were killed in Russian strikes early Sunday in the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian officials said. Cities across Kharkiv were shelled Saturday and Sunday, according to regional governor Oleh Synyehubov. In one district, Russian forces “burned farm buildings, garages, and shelled open areas,” he added. Russian forces have recently intensified their attacks on Kharkiv, and some Ukrainians worry that Moscow is planning to renew its stalled attempt in March to seize Ukraine’s second-largest city.

### 2AC – AT: Econ I/L

#### Russia can’t help Turkey’s economy, they’re in a recession of their own

Carbonaro 6/30 (Giulia Carbonaro, US News Reporter, 6/30/22, “Russia's Economy is Collapsing, Data Reveals”, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-economy-collapsing-data-reveals-1720532>//RM)

If Russia defaulting on its foreign debt for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution wasn't a clear enough sign of the impact Western sanctions are having on the Russian economy, a new report on the country's socio-economic situation leaves no margin for doubt that the Russian economy is gradually collapsing. New statistics on the state of the Russian economy, produced by the country's Federal State Statistics Service, show production has plunged in multiple sectors, from vehicles to domestic appliances, as has retail confidence. Overall, Russia's industrial production index—a monthly economic indicator measuring real output in the manufacturing, mining, electric, and gas industries—dropped by 1.7 percent in May compared to the same month in 2021. That's higher than the decline of 1.6 percent year-on-year reported in April. Mining dropped by 0.8 percentage points in May 2022 compared to May 2021, and manufacturing dropped by 3.2 percentage points. The overall numbers seem quite modest, but they reflect a downward trend that is more obvious in the staggering drops affecting the production of specific products. Above all, car production has suffered, and it's now down by 96.7 percent compared to 2021. Production of trucks plunged by 39.3 percent, that of diesel and gasoline engines by 57 percent, that of diesel locomotives by 63.2 percent and that of freight wagons by 51.8 percent. French automaker Renault, which controls Russia's largest carmaker AvtoVAZ, suspended operations at its Moscow plant in March, under pressure from Ukrainian leaders to act in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Renault later agreed to sell its Russian operations for a nominal payment. Air cargo is down by 86 percent year on year. Other products were also affected. The production of fridges is also down by 58.1 percent compared with 2021 levels, that of washing machines by 59.2 percent, that of AC electric motors by 49.9 percent. TV sets were down by 49.7 percentage points. Production of elevators is down by 34.7 percent and that of excavators was down by 60 percent. Curiously, cigarette production also dropped by 24.5 percent. Graphs show that retail turnover and retail confidence have also gone down compared to one year before and even from the beginning of 2022. Wholesale turnover has also plunged drastically, with consumer demand dropping in what is likely a reflection of lower wages amid high inflation in the country. Even more significantly for the Russian population, pensions have also fallen in real terms, decreasing by 8.2 percentage points year-on-year in May, while salaries dropped by 7.2 percentage points in April compared to a year prior. These data are a clear sign that the Russian economy is suffering, despite the fact that the rouble bounced back after collapsing in late February following the invasion of Ukraine and that the country has held up surprisingly better than expected after Western sanctions were imposed. The drop in industrial production is less than Western economists expected, but the economic contraction of the country is still undeniable. Even the Russian central bank said it expected a fall in GDP of 7.8 percent this year, almost in line with Western predictions but not quite, as Western experts estimate that the country's economy will shrink by 15 percent by the end of the year, according to the Institute of International Finance's (IIF). One piece of unexpected good news for Russia came from the jobs market, with a record-low unemployment rate of 3.9 percent reported in May. And yet, as high inflation continues to cripple wages in Russia, it's unlikely this high employment will turn into higher consumer demand able to turn the tide of Russia's likely incoming recession.

#### Turkey playing both sides to ensure their economy stays strong

Adar 22 (Sinem Adar, Dr. Sinem Adar is Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP ,April 6, 2022, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine”, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/perceptions-in-turkey-about-the-war-in-ukraine)

Ankara is carefully trying to not antagonize Russia while continuing to militarily support Ukraine. Besides the economic burden that an open confrontation with the Kremlin might inflict on Turkey, it could also lead to military retaliation in Syria and to a subsequent migration wave from Idlib to Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population worldwide. At the same time, the increased Russian presence in Ukraine, particularly along the coastline in the south, further raises Turkey’s strategic vulnerabil­ity in the Black Sea, accentuating its Cold War threat perceptions. Ankara justifies its non-participation in the EU’s sanctions regime with these eco­nomic and security considerations. Turkish airspace also remains open to Russia. Still, Turkey is acting in close coordination with NATO and has repeated its firm commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty numerous times. Recognizing the violent conflict between the two coun­tries as “war,” in accordance with the Montreux Convention, Ankara closed the Straits to warships from any country, whether or not they border the Black Sea. Meanwhile, it is also acting as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia.

#### Turkey’s economy is low now–either should’ve already triggered the internal link or the link doesn’t overcome

Inman 7/4 (Phillip Inman, Phillip Inman is economics editor of the Observer and an economics writer for the Guardian, 7/4/22, “Turkey hit with soaring prices as inflation nears 80%”, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jul/04/turkey-hit-with-soaring-prices-as-inflation-reaches-24-year-high-erdogan>/RM)

Turkey’s official inflation rate increased to almost 80% last month – the highest in 24 years – as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s unconventional economic policies continued to drive up the cost of living. The growth in annual prices rose from 73.5% in May to 78.6% in June, according to the Turkish statistics agency. However, opposition parties and economists said recent hikes in oil and gas prices meant the real rate of inflation was almost double the official figure. The minister of treasury and finance, Nureddin Nebati, has attempted to head off criticism of the government’s handling of the economy, saying last week that consumer prices would start dropping by the end of the year. “I promise to you and to the president, we will see a drop in inflation starting in December,” Nebati said. His comments came after the government announced its second increase in the minimum wage in six months, raising pay by 30%. The increase lifted the monthly salary of about 40% of the workforce from $254 (£209) to $328. Erdoğan has claimed that Turkey’s problem is not inflation. “We do not have an inflation problem. We have a cost of living problem,” he said last month. Economists said Turkey’s official data disguised a more disturbing trend of rising prices that had shown no sign of abating. A monthly report release by Turkey’s ENAG group of independent economists showed consumer prices had risen by 175% in June compared with a year earlier. ENAG said prices had risen by 71.4% since the start of 2022. The Istanbul chamber of commerce said inflation in Turkey‘s largest city had reached an annual rate of 94%. “No one actually believes official Turkish data any more,” said Timothy Ash, an economist at BlueBay Asset Management. “There is no expectation of anything like a credible policy response.” The growing dispute over the veracity of Turkey’s official data is expected to be a difficult political issue for Erdoğan’s government ahead of next year’s general election, which is widely viewed as the toughest of his two-decade rule. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party, accused the state statistics agency of “lying”, urging it in a tweet to “stop committing crimes for the benefit of President Erdoğan.” A survey published by the Metropol polling agency on Friday showed 69% of respondents believed the unofficial ENAG figure and just 24% the one reported by the government. Turkey was hit hard by the fallout from the European debt crisis in 2012 and the threat of higher interest rates by the US Federal Reserve in 2013. Its currency tumble ever since. In 2013 the lira was worth 36p, compared with 4.9p on Monday. To arrest the decline, in 2018 Erdoğan embarked on what he called a “new economic model”, which meant setting aside rising inflation and cutting interest rates to boost economic growth. This was done against the advice of his central bank chief and caused the lira to plunge to a record low, pushing up costs in a country that is dependent on imported materials, especially energy. Inflation, which officially stood at 15% at the beginning of 2021, has now reached its highest level since a currency meltdown during the 1998 debt crisis that helped bring Erdoğan to power. Three central bank bosses have been fired by the president since 2018. The Turkish lira has plummeted 20% this year alone.

### 2AC – AT: Econ Decline

#### Turkish economic effects won’t spill over–no consensus in the literature

Samuelson 18 (Robert J. Samuelson wrote a twice-weekly economics column before he retired in September 2020. Both appeared online, and one usually ran in The Washington Post in print on Mondays. He was a columnist for Newsweek magazine from 1984 to 2011. He began his journalism career as a reporter on The Post business desk, from 1969 to 1973. From 1973 to 1976, he was a freelance writer. He was an economics reporter and columnist for National Journal magazine from 1976 to 1984 — when he joined Newsweek. He grew up in White Plains, N.Y., and attended Harvard College, 8-21-18, “Will Turkey’s economic woes spill over into other countries?”, <https://www.abqjournal.com/1211250/will-turkeys-economic-woes-spill-over-into-other-countries.html//BVN> SC)

WASHINGTON – The pertinent and unanswerable question about Turkey is whether the country’s present economic turmoil is an isolated event, mostly confined to Turkey itself, or whether it portends a larger economic convulsion that shakes markets around the world. Among economists and other experts, there’s no consensus. Some foresee contagion: Turkey’s problems will spread. Others envision a one-country economic blip. Which is it? The answer obviously matters. The global economy already faces obstacles to growth. American interest rates are rising as the Federal Reserve tries to prevent higher inflation. President Trump’s trade wars are threatening. If we now add a slowdown of “emerging market” economies – China, Brazil and similar “middle-income” nations – the global expansion might sputter or halt. Turkey’s experience is relevant. In recent months, its currency, the lira, has collapsed. At the start of 2018, it was trading at roughly 4 lira to the dollar; now that’s about 6 lira to the dollar. This makes it harder for Turkish businesses and consumers to repay debts, which – more than in many other countries – are often made in dollars. To repay these debts, Turkish companies need to earn more lira, which can be sold for dollars. The more lira go to repay dollar debts, the fewer lira are left over to buy other things. Economic growth slows. If debtors can’t raise the dollars to repay their loans, they default. Too many defaults, and growth stops. Turkey’s debt problems are undeniably daunting, notes economist Hung Tran of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry research and advocacy group. Consider: Between now and the end of 2018, Turkey faces debt repayments – principal and interest – of about $120 billion; in 2019, the total is about $200 billion. By comparison, Turkey’s economy – gross domestic product – is about $850 billion. Some of these loans could be rolled over; how many is unclear. Many debts were incurred by banks or private firms, encouraged by easy-money policies. The government pumped up the economy in the wake of a failed military coup in 2016 and in anticipation of a new election. The election was held in June 2018 and won by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He was surely helped by the economic stimulus. Last year, Turkey’s GDP grew 7 percent, up from 3.2 percent in 2016. To complicate matters further, Turkey and the Trump administration are feuding over the Turks’ detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor accused of anti-state activities. Now comes the reckoning. Many observers believe that what happened in Turkey will stay in Turkey. Its economy is simply too small – about 1.4 percent of global GDP, according to some estimates – to influence the rest of the world. “It’s mainly a Turkish issue,” says economist C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute. He doesn’t expect large spillover effects, say a slowdown of growth in Europe or capital flight from other “emerging market” countries, such as Brazil or India. Not all economists are so hopeful. Writing in The Hill, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute predicts that “Turkey will default on its debt and impose capital controls.” Capital controls are legal restrictions on money movements in and out of a country. He expects contagion – capital flight from heavily indebted countries – that will weaken the global recovery and hurt the U.S. economy. Economist Tran of the IIF thinks that emerging-market countries that have problems similar to Turkey’s – poor policies, maturing debts, sizable current account deficits – are the most vulnerable to capital flight. These include South Africa, Indonesia and Egypt. So far, the evidence is reassuring; the IIF’s most recent survey of capital movements didn’t detect any sizable money surges since the lira’s latest large drop. Crowd psychology could trigger a panic. If investors expect other investors to sell, there could be a stampede for the door. This story isn’t over yet. What’s uncontroversial, at least among many economists, is that Turkey will need to go to the IMF to end the present crisis. The IMF would provide a hefty loan – it’s doubtful anyone else would – and impose “tough austerity policies” designed to improve the economy’s performance, says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute. By their nature, these policies would be unpopular, especially with Erdogan, because they “could weaken (his) hold on power,” as Kirkegaard puts it. It seems likely that he would resent and resist them as long as possible. That could change everything. Stay tuned.

#### Turkish economy resilient–hyperinflation is normal for the economy

Balcells 2-11 (Francesc Balcells is running the Global EM Debt Fund at FIM partners. Formerly at PIMCO for eight years, managing EM hard and local currency debt portfolios, 2-11-22, “Why Turkey’s economic resilience has defied worst fears”, Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/1d8fd6dd-e951-49a1-bffa-b2c361c2d16a//BVN> SC)

The warnings back in 2011-2013 were ominous: “If the Turkish lira breaks through 2 against the dollar, the economy will implode.” Once the 2 was reached, the new implosion target moved to 3, then to 5, and here we are at 13. The economy is still standing. An economy with debt in dollars as high as Turkey’s should seemingly have imploded a long time ago under such currency volatility. The history of emerging markets is littered with balance of payments crises under similar foreign exchange depreciations. There might be several reasons for this resilience. For one, up until earlier this year, the Turkish authorities did what they always had done in the past when confronted with capital outflows and currency weakness: interest rate hikes, if only belatedly and often in an obfuscated manner. This boom-and-bust way of managing the economy kept the system going for quite some time. That time is what gave economic actors the chance to build buffers against an unbalanced economy. Banks, for example, kept balance sheets largely hedged on currency. By virtue of a build-up of dollar deposits and a low level of foreign currency loans made relative to them, banks also had excess dollars. So they kept lending dollars to obtain cheap lira funding, creating in the process another safety mechanism for themselves. But it hasn’t been only banks which have built resilience over time. As dollarisation progressed, households have continued to accumulate dollar assets but no foreign exchange liabilities. This is because banks were forbidden to lend foreign currency to households, making them a lot more resilient to currency risk. This was perhaps the regulators’ greatest foresight. The creditor profile of the country has also changed over time. Fickle portfolio flows have greatly reduced. Foreigners used to own nearly 30 per cent of the local debt market but this number is now less than 5 per cent (a mere $3bn in absolute terms). Meanwhile locals now own almost 50 per cent of the country’s sovereign Eurobonds. This has left Turkey more dependent on different types of external creditor — the syndicated loan market, trade finance, intra-corporate lending, or domestic lenders. These creditors are more patient, more long-term oriented than foreign portfolio investors. The passing of time has also allowed Turkish corporates, the weakest link in the country’s external balance sheet chain, to reduce debt levels somewhat while building a positive net short-term foreign exchange position. The problem, however, remains one of co-ordination. While on paper each economic sector has enough liquidity buffers of its own, they are all “joined at the hip”. One sector drawing on its foreign exchange assets has a ripple effect on the entire system, as those assets will be residing in someone else’s balance sheet. Against that, the country is tentatively turning its persistent current account deficit into a surplus by virtue of the very large lira depreciation which boosts exports and contracts imports. Whether this turn in the current account, if it materialises, is yet another boom-and-bust episode or a structural manifestation of a policy-driven rebalancing of the economy remains unclear. All in all, it’s been a surprisingly resilient journey, though longer than many of us would have anticipated. Turks also have suffered from high inflation and a squeeze in purchasing power in dollars. And the fact that Turkey hasn’t “broken” yet doesn’t mean it still can’t.

#### Turkish economy rebounding again

Anadolu Agency 5-24 (Anadolu Agency is a news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, 5-24-22, “Turkey boasts ‘diversified, resilient’ economy: Moody’s executive”, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-boasts-diversified-resilient-economy-moodys-executive)

Risks aside, Turkey boasts a large, diversified, resilient economy with a solid banking sector, an executive at Moody’s Investors Service, a sister company of the global ratings agency, said Monday. “They (Turkish banks) have had pretty good results. They are solid,” Kathrin Muehlbronner, senior vice president within Moody’s Investors Service Sovereign Risk Group, told Anadolu Agency (AA), citing “stabilizing factors.” “Exporters are benefiting clearly very much from the (Turkish lira’s) depreciation,” she said, praising the country’s “large diversified resilient economy.” She noted that Turkey may benefit from supply chain shifts in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. “Turkey can benefit massively from a nearshoring of production by European companies and (from its) Customs Union with the EU.” She said prospects for Turkish economic growth are optimistic, adding: “Exports are doing well. Lira depreciation helps. There are clear incentives such as credit stimulus for exporters and investments.” Muehlbronner welcomed steps by the Turkish government to shield the poorest households from inflation. Propelled by rising energy and commodity prices, Turkey’s annual inflation runs at a 20-year high of nearly 70% as of April, according to official data. Consumer prices have been increasing despite tax cuts on basic goods and government subsidies for utility bills to ease the burden on household budgets. After it took a hit from the pandemic like the rest of the world, Muehlbronner said she expects the Turkish tourism sector to have a good season. She underlined that the **Turkish economy may grow faster** than Moody’s forecast of 3% this year. On inflation, Muehlbronner said the upward trend stemmed from the weaker lira, especially through end-2021 and elevated commodity prices. “We think inflation will drop kind of mechanically at the end of the year because of a base effect,” Muehlbronner noted. Listing risks to the Turkish economy, she said high inflation, currency pressure and loose monetary policy create downside risks for the country. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) is expected to hold its key policy rate unchanged at 14% for the fifth straight month on Thursday, according to surveys. Inflation has surged since last autumn as the lira weakened after the central bank in September embarked on a 500-basis point-easing cycle. The government’s foreign exchange-protected lira deposits tool, she said, “was certainly a good step to stabilize the currency. And it has reduced dollarization of deposits by around 10 percentage points.” Muehlbronner was referring to the scheme that the government unveiled in December to boost lira deposits by protecting them against exchange rate volatility. Ankara has called on individuals and companies to convert their foreign exchange savings to lira to support the currency. “So, we’re back to the levels of share of deposits and dollars that we had before the latest currency crisis. So that’s certainly a positive step,” Muehlbronner added.

### 2AC – AT: Nuclear Ukraine

#### Putin won’t use nuclear weapons–NATO will retaliate if he does

Ullman 2/16 (Harlan Ullman, Harlan Ullman is an Atlantic Council senior advisor and UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, 2/16/22, “Why Putin won’t invade Ukraine”, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-putin-wont-invade-ukraine/>/RM

In regard to Ukraine, Putin also knows that an armed attack or aggressive use of force will make any chance of his achieving both his priorities even less likely than landing an astronaut on the sun. He also knows that the costs to Russia and to him personally will be high and possibly unaffordable. Sanctions and further isolation will hurt. Going to war, no matter the scope, or using cyber and influence operations to cripple Ukraine, will absolutely foreclose any chance for even part of Putin’s demands being considered by NATO. The Alliance’s response to a major attack will make the actions it took after Russia’s 2014 Crimean annexation appear anemic. It will expand its military capability and the number of forces stationed in Europe—exactly the opposite of Putin’s intent. NATO members will develop and deploy more advanced weapons, including new classes of missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. NATO badly needs a new strategic framework (here, ironically, Putin is right for the wrong reasons). If war breaks out in Ukraine, the Alliance will certainly move to a new framework incorporating some of the actions mentioned above and announce it during the Madrid summit in June—another outcome Putin won’t like one bit. In an escalation, the West will impose sanctions more strictly and robustly than before. How much this will dent Russia’s economy or Putin’s inner circle is uncertain. But the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline will almost certainly be cancelled, denting Russia’s energy sector. Whatever credibility Putin may have gained will be lost given the “big lie” of his assurances that force would not be used in Ukraine. Of course, Russia will have accused the West of provoking violence requiring an “appropriate response.” If a subsequent occupation of Ukraine were required, even of just a portion of the country, body bags could be flowing back to Russia. And what is Putin’s exit strategy? No such plan following a Russian attack is obvious for Moscow other than a prolonged twenty-first century version of the Cold War, but one in which Moscow uses substantial force resulting in even greater isolation. And that could doom Putin’s rule in a way similar to how Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev got fired two years after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An advantageous stalemate The billion-ruble question is: How does this crisis end? Speculation over invasion scenarios has ranged from a massive, overwhelming air, sea, and land assault to a mix of cyber, special-forces, and influence-based non-kinetic operations. Should Putin not grasp the predicament he has imposed on himself, a limited move in the Donbas or seizing a land bridge into Crimea would seem to be the lowest-risk and lowest-cost option. He could then judge how NATO chooses to respond and wait. But Putin would almost certainly suffer the same consequences as if he took Kyiv and occupied much of the country. Assuming there is no military action, Putin has two choices. First, he can prolong the crisis and maintain the buildup on the Ukrainian border. That would be expensive and wear down his forces. Staying on constant alert takes a toll on people and pocketbooks. Or Putin could terminate the exercise with Belarus on February 20 as scheduled, draw his troops back from the Ukrainian border, claim victory, and continue to push for negotiations—arguing that as the West wrongly predicted an attack, it continues to fail to recognize Russian security interests and needs. Russia will no doubt continue political and psychological pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to make concessions, either to accept the Minsk 2 agreement (despite its grant of semi-autonomy to the Donbas) or to suspend any request for NATO membership. And Russian “active measures,” such as disinformation campaigns, will continue to target Ukraine with the aim of eroding Zelenskyy’s standing and NATO solidarity by claiming “hysteria” over an invasion that never occurred. This scenario suits Putin’s interests far better than an uncertain military adventure, which is why he will choose it—and not because of anything uttered from a White House podium, no matter how much credit the administration will take for deterring a war.

#### Russia won’t escalate to nuclear weapons–he loses China if they do

Corera 4/26 (Gordon Corera, Security correspondent, BBC News, April 26, 2022, “Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons?”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169>//RM)

Putin claims Ukraine is part of Russia, so using nuclear weapons on its territory seems bizarre. Russia itself is close by and "the fallout could cross boundaries", warns Patricia Lewis. The only time nuclear weapons have been used in conflict was by the US at the end of World War Two against Japan. Would Putin want to become the first leader to break the taboo and use them? Some worry he has shown a willingness to do things others thought he would not do, whether invading Ukraine or using nerve agent in Salisbury. Dr Williams says there is a further reason why Russia might not use nuclear weapons - China. "Russia is heavily dependent on Chinese support, but China has a 'no first use' nuclear doctrine. So if Putin did use them, it would be incredibly difficult for China to stand by him. If he used them, he would probably lose China." Could it lead to nuclear war? No one knows quite where the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead. It could escalate and Putin would not want nuclear war. But miscalculation is always a risk. "They would imagine everyone would capitulate," says Patricia Lewis. "What would happen is that Nato would have to come in and respond." The US says it is monitoring the situation closely. It has an extensive intelligence gathering machine to watch Russian nuclear activity - for instance whether tactical weapons are being moved out of storage, or if there is any change in behaviour at launch sites. So far, they say they have not seen any significant changes. How the US and Nato would respond to any nuclear use is hard to predict. They may not want to escalate the situation further and risk all-out nuclear war but they also might want to draw a line. This might mean a tough conventional rather than nuclear response. But what would Russia then do? "Once you have crossed the nuclear threshold, there is no obvious stopping point," says James Acton. "I don't think anyone can have any confidence of what that world would look like."